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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the economic and political dynamics of
health legislation in Chile throughout the 20th century. Law is understood
as a process, in which legislation is the consequence of the political
interaction between different stakeholders within a specific socioeconomic and political reality. Law thus performs as a function of its
political dynamics. This case study discusses lawmaking in its
multifaceted character fulfilling different roles, understanding health
legislation in Chile as the expression of how society articulates and
represents different interests and how health reforms are determined by
the influence and capabilities of interest groups. The legal framework is
situated within a broader national social, economic and political context,
mediated by international influences and the strategic role assumed by
the state.
Empirically, the dissertation analyzes how economic and political
variables have shaped different legal transformations in a country that
has experienced significant, paradigmatic changes in health law, moving
from a basically charitable system, inherited from the Spanish colonial
power, to a strong and profoundly European welfare system—the second
oldest national health service in the world—to a radical neo/liberal market
model introduced in the late 1970s, and finally, towards a mixed publicprivate system, still present.
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THE RISE AND FALL OF WELFARE HEALTH LEGISLATION
IN THE 20TH CENTURY CHILE:
A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW

PRESENTATION AND INTRODUCTION

The dissertation examines how economic and political variables have
shaped different legal transformations in a country that has experienced
significant and paradigmatic changes in health legislation. I will provide accounts
of health legislation and health reforms with respect to the various interests they
uphold, seeing people not as autonomous individuals but as actors in specific
social locations and relationships. I am interested in law as a process, as a
movement that occurs in the context of the historical development of Chilean
society, where the Rule of law, based on the liberal tradition, is tied to the
modernizations of the 20th century. I will explore how the law and the legal
system are embedded in the transformations of the health sphere and the
different models of health care applied in Chile.
In these chapters, law is understood as a system of rules; namely,
legislation, decrees-laws and government regulations. My research also includes
governmental policies, as these offer useful insight into the legislation under
examination. For the purpose of this study, I do not consider any jurisprudence or
court decisions. Health reform is defined as a process that introduces regulatory
changes in the health field; it is a product of the interplay of interests. It is
ultimately reflected in the resulting discourse, policy implementation and
legislation.

2

I intend to apprehend law in “its transformational state through a focus on
actors, norms, and processes” 1 and analyze legislation as the result of the
interaction between different stakeholders in the political, ideological and
economic process of lawmaking. I will pay attention to how power is distributed
and how conflicts are resolved. Through this case study, I study if and how
lawmaking and the Rule of law can be multifaceted and fulfill different roles. The
Rule of law,2 as an expression of politics in its broad sense, and lawmaking, as
the outcome of processes of negotiation, can both maintain the social and
political order and be instrumental in promoting social change.
In this dissertation I will argue that law is the expression of politics. I intend
to capture law in what I consider are its temporal and spatial contradictions. I
hold that law, in both its creation and its representation, is simultaneously
situated in different times and spaces, with a plurality of identities and different
roles. In its temporal dimension, law is synchronic and diachronic. In its creation,
I consider that law undergoes contradictions between its essence and its
appearance; that is, between how it is created and how it is presented. This is
where the conflict-consensus duality is made manifest, which then becomes
1

See Peer Zumbansen, “Lochner Disembedded: The anxieties of Law in a global context”, (2012)
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies at 1
2
Rule Law as “ … a dynamic concept for the expansion and fulfilment of which jurists are
primarily responsible and which should be employed not only to safeguard and advance the civil
and political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish social, economic,
educational and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be
realized”, International Commission of Jurists, The Dynamic Aspects of the in Modern Age,
Geneva (1965), 15 in Vilhelm Aubert, “The Rule of law and the Promotional Function of Law in
the Welfare State”, in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, (Berlin &
New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986) at 30

3

formalized and makes the law appear to have its own identity, and even
autonomy. If the liberal state was founded upon compromise, that has crucial
implications for the law,3 consensus on a law is only a transitional compromise,
produced in a given space and time and an undetermined period, whose limits
are defined by the political dynamics.
This is because consensus is the pursuit of consent. Consensus by no
means expresses unanimity, nor a majority agreement, but rather an agreed
upon way to seek agreement. Consensus minimizes the level of conflict,
postponing it, temporarily neutralizing it, but it cannot eliminate or destroy an
opinion or minority point of view. From the point of view of negotiation and
conflict management, consensus does not require the active consent of those
involved. It is enough for those who oppose a decision to attenuate their
disapproval and tolerate dissidence. In this sense, a decision by consensus is an
acceptance of non-refusal. This reasoning, which is part of the origin of Greek
democracy, of which we are heirs, means that in processes of conflict-consensus
negotiation, it is fundamental to agree on the fact that we must not disagree.
Consensus is not on content but on form. In other words, we do not need to
agree on a decision, we only agree on the fact that we have to reach a solution:
we agree to not disagree.

3

Roberto Mangabeira Unger (1976), Law in Modern Society. Toward a Criticism of Social
Theory, (New York, The Free Press, 1976) at 75
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This is why I believe it is necessary not only to uncover how this conflictconsensus dialectic develops, but also to clearly differentiate between statutory
or enacted law (lex) and the principles of law (jus). This is where the concept of
hegemony is fundamental. Throughout this dissertation I seek to articulate the
notion of hegemony as the dynamic produced between coercion and consensus;
that is, where consent to not prevent the possibility of reaching an agreement
culminates in a consensual compromise, which is ultimately achieved or
promoted through non-coercive domination. Although domination does not
disappear, it coexists with a form of acceptance of the power of those who
exercise it. The ideological and cultural acceptance of the tacit or explicit
exercise of power shapes and sustains the political and social system in order to
maintain and perpetuate a state of homogeneity and the status quo, which is
historically temporal and is reproduced or modified in the same way as the
conflict-consensus dialectic. Finally, in its rational dimension and its roles, I hold
that the law can both maintain and reproduce the relations of power and create
or facilitate social change.
Therefore this research is guided by the theoretical assumption that legal
changes are the normative outcome of the political process expressed in
negotiations between a web of economic, political and social actors. Most of
these changes are rooted in legislative reforms of one form or another and have
been obviously affected by these major transitions. I intend to explain how health
legislation is achieved through negotiations infused with political dynamics,
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involving agents not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to
economic and political structures. Thus, to understand health legislation reforms
in Chile, I situate the legal framework within a broader political context, in which
specific changes to the health care system must be considered in light of broader
social, economic and political factors. It is in this context that I analyze and
discuss the endogenous and exogenous factors that historically influenced health
legislation; namely, the influences of the various political actors (stakeholders,
political parties, civil society, unions and professional associations); the political
process itself and its dynamics; the state and its role as an agent of
transformation in the context of a national project; and finally, the impact of
international influences throughout the historical time period of this work.
Chile has moved from a basically charitable system, inherited from the
Spanish colonial regime, to a strong and profoundly European welfare system
with the second oldest national health service in the world, to a radical neo/liberal
market model, introduced in the late 1970s, and finally, towards the current
mixed public-private system. The time periods that characterize these different
health models are as follows: the beginnings of the welfare state model (19241938); towards the National Health Service (1939-1952); the welfare state during
three different political administrations (1952-1973) and the market model (19731989).
My research is guided by the following questions: How has Chilean socioeconomic development influenced and shaped the different health models and

6

reforms? What have been the political economic purposes of these reforms, and
how have they translated into health legislation during the different models under
study? What were the ideological, economic and socio-political factors behind
health legislation reforms? How have political dynamics and the roles of different
actors been expressed in health legislation? Does law collaborate in supporting
the status quo, or can also generate social change? What can we learn about the
role of legislation reforms in social change from studying the Chilean health care
system over decades?
This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter one introduces a
theoretical framework for the analysis of law within a specific political and
economic reality. Chapters two and three, the corpus of the dissertation, contain
the qualitative empirical content, its analysis, and discussions of health legislation
in 20th-century Chile. Chapter four “Overall analysis and conclusion”
Chapter

one,

“The

legal

theoretical

framework

and

health

legislation”, analyzes legal theory, how legal processes are embedded in
political transitions, and how the law evolves and is transformed. I discuss the
legal system as an “ongoing process” and the law as a system that entails an
understanding not only of its nature, but also of how it is processed, dictated and
legitimized. Thus, I theoretically explore how the law behaves as a function of its
own dynamics, and, in particular, its political dynamics. Lastly, I am interested in
identifying how health legislation is framed by development policies, international
influences and the strategic role assumed by the state.

7

Chapter two, “Health legislation and legal changes during the welfare
state model”, investigates the beginnings of the welfare state model (19241938), the development of the National Health Service (1939-1952), the
incremental reforms leading to the National Health System and the welfare state
during three different political administrations (1952-1973). It discusses health
legislation in Chile as the outcome of an incremental process of health reform
negotiated over the course of the century.

Chapter three, “Legal and institutional changes in the establishment
of a market model of health: 1973-1989”, discusses health legislation within
the process of creating a neoliberal market approach, which represented a
rupture to the welfare state and the introduction of a new rationality. Following
this new logic, social consciousness around health issues was being neutralized,
making health concerns an individual problem, which facilitated the atomization
of society and stimulated the business of health care. This chapter analyses the
principles, doctrine, legislation and regulations that permitted and promoted the
establishment of a market model for health care in Chile after the 1973 coup
d’état and demonstrates how the legal changes were aimed at the following
objectives: the partial withdrawal of the state from the health sector, the creation
of a market favourable to the flourishing of the private sector, and finally, the
growth and development of the operational structure of the private health sector.
This section covers the period from 1973 to 1989.

8

Chapter four, “The rise and fall of welfare health legislation over decades:
overall analysis”, discusses how legal processes are embedded in political
transitions and how law evolves and is transformed. I examine legislation as an
“ongoing process” that reflects not only the nature of the legal system, but also
how the law is processed, dictated and legitimized. My analysis of the legal
transformations of the health sector in Chile is grounded in my understanding of
law as a process of transformation.

9

CHAPTER ONE

LEGAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
AND HEALTH LEGISLATION

INTRODUCTION
I will argue that law is the expression of politics. In its multivalent
character, law is the result of its own dynamics1 and the outcome of negotiations
mediated by unequal actors in a political scenario of power relations. When the
impersonality, neutrality and uniformity of the law is discussed, it is only a
representation and an illusion, because at its essence is the creative process,
which is not homogeneous and contains both authoritarian and liberating
elements,2 as the very legal system reveals the contradictory nature of social
life.3
The law disguises its internal contradictions and develops a dialectical and
fetishist identity, taking on a life of its own, independent of how, when and in what
context it was created. The negotiations and mediations that influence the
creation of law are not independent from the relationship between the different
interests at play in each historical and political context. They make the process of
law creation possible and/or feasible.
To analyze legal changes in the health sector, I discuss law as a process.
I will argue that law and legality have different dimensions and different
moments. Their dimensions of value and their ideological, political and rational
dimensions would seem to exclude one another, but they do not. In this process,
the individual is present and absent from different moments of the law and the
1

Refers to actions that take place at the moment they are needed rather than in advance.
Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1974) in Peters, “Law as a
Critical Discussion”, in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, (Berlin &
New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986) at 261.
3
Lelio Basso, Geseelschaftsformation und Staatsform, (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1975) in Peters, Id.
2
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legal system makes the individual both appear and disappear. The individual
appears in the content of the law, but disappears in its formality, when jus
becomes lex. That is, the individual is an active part of the creation of the law and
is yet passive in the face of legal formality.
From a theoretical perspective, I explore the relation between law and
politics, understanding lawmaking as the outcome of processes of struggle that
either maintain the social and political order or promote change. Analyzing the
dynamics of legal processes is essential for comprehending how the law has
been embedded in the political sphere (via conflict and consensus) and in
ideological debates. It is in this sense I will claim that law is both an expression of
politics and the result of its own dynamics.
The law is finally the result of interaction between different individuals in
the political, as well as in the cultural-ideological and the economic level, but the
law ultimately makes them equal: “we are all equal before the law.” In other
words, the law denies individuals their autonomy and transforms them, making
them all equal even when they are not, but at the same time it gives them
autonomy and presence by making them subjects of law endowed with rights,
epitomized in the doctrine of the Rule of law. This is very important in processes
of lawmaking in general and health legislation in particular, as the impersonality
of the law thus formalizes the equality of the unequal and suggests that any
particular law cannot embody the interests of specific people or any particular
group.

12

The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section: Law and its
identity, examines the law and the legal system as a “process in motion”, with
references to the German, French and Spanish traditions, which have two
notions of the law (German: Gesetz and Recht; French: loi and droit; and
Spanish: ley and derecho). Recht, droit and derecho refer to a whole body of
laws, principles, and institutions in the sense of Roman law (jus) and therefore
explain the law in its abstract and foundational meaning, which involves the
principles that determine positive law, as opposed to statutory or enacted law, or
lex, when law becomes law. In the second section of this chapter: Law and
political dynamics, I undertake a theoretical examination of how the law follows
its own dynamics, particularly its own political dynamics. That is, I explore how
the law behaves according to the articulation of interests between classes, social
sectors and pressure groups, in processes that both shape and modify health
legislation. I also present the need to analyze the concept of hegemony and its
impact on the legal system at the institutional, political and ideological levels. In
the third section of this chapter: Law and the welfare state, I examine how health
law and health legislation are part of development policies. I examine the role
historically exercised by the state, and its ties to the international variables and
influences that had an impact on development policies and social and health
legislation.
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1. THE LAW AND ITS IDENTITY
“One knows that one does not know why the law
functions; but one also knows that one can act
precisely because it functions”.4
A. The law: to be or not to be
All societies have their own mythology and evolve and invent themselves
in accord with their own beliefs. Durkheim identified law as a factor of social
integration; Weber as a mechanism in the exercise of power; Parsons as a social
subsystem and Marx as an element of the superstructure of society.5 Law, with
its multifaceted nature, moves from conceptualization to implementation and is
validated as a regulatory mechanism. As Jenkins writes, “Law is now intervening
in areas that it has hitherto steered clear of; it is imposing its opinions and
principles upon other social bodies, it is settling questions that were formerly
thought of as being political economic, or moral, rather than legal, in nature; and
it is issuing detailed directives about the ordering of various aspects of society
and social life.”6
Zumbansen

indicates

that

the

law

has

several

definitions

or

interpretations. It can be an institutionalized system of rule enforcement, a means
of stabilizing expectations, a means of oppression, a hope and also an empty
4

Christian Joerges, “Die Uberarbeitung des BGB-Schuldrechts, die Sonderprivaterechte und die
Unbestimmtheit des Rechts” 20, Kritische Justiz, 1987, 166-82 in Gunther Teubner, Law as an
Autopoietic System, (Oxford & Cambridge, Blackwell, 1993) at 7.
5
Csaba Varga, Law and Philosophy: Selected Papers in Legal Theory, (Budapest, Faculty of Law
of Loránd Eötvös University, 1994) at 44-45.
6
Iredel Jenkins, Social Order and the limits of Law, (Princeton, Princeton University Pres, 1980)
in Jan M. Broekman, “Legal Subjetivity as a Precondition for the Intertwinement of Law and the
Welfare State”, in Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, supra note 2 at 76 & 77.
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parasite. “Law, legal analysis, legal argumentation altogether constitute society’s
self-reflection and as such contribute to the formation of society.” 7 He writes that
the first definition (law as an institutionalized system of rule enforcement) is likely
to overburden the legitimacy promises of the state, and the second definition (law
as a means of stabilizing expectations) runs the risk of everything becoming law.
The third and fourth definitions (law as a means of oppression, and law as a
means of hope) focus on the anxiety surrounding the “why” of law, its purpose
and function. 8 Finally, in his fifth definition, the law as an “empty parasite”
operates and proliferates, but it does not acquire proper content. It remains open,
and this is why it is recognized in a very pluralistic way. “It is through the lens of
the fifth definition that the preceding four definitions reveal the deeply political,
sociological and cultural dimension of law.”9 Zumbansen specifies that, “Law’s
extreme functionalization is a necessity and as such is an inevitable by-product
of an increasingly differentiated, complex and pluralistic society”.10
Law exists in itself, but it has no value until it is inserted or interpreted in
its own history. It is primarily economic factors, along with social factors, that
determine (or at least influence) legal strategies and how the law is
conceptualized in a given society. It has the ability to be and to exercise a
function and a role, but it is not self-sufficient, neither in its genesis nor in its
reason to exist. As argued by Csaba Varga, “law is also the imprint of the whole
7

Peer Zumbansen, “The Future of Legal Theory”, (2010) 06 Research paper Osgoode Hall Law
School 38 at 4.
8
Id. at 5.
9
Id. at 8.
10
Id. at 9.
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history and culture of the nation. The norms are only signs which by themselves
mean nothing: they become alive only in the living practice of society.” 11 “The
result of this process is that the concept of law becomes burdened with
sociological content (a socialized concept of law) and it is also formulated in
rather general terms.” 12
Law is thus an element of power, but it is also a formal and rational reality,
an expression of will, which in principle represents or purports to represent
everyone. Unger indicates that the law imposes a particular and historical form of
social order upon human groups and reflects the profound social structure of
society.13 Buchanan would argue that law creates the society from which it draws
its authority, but that society also brings law into reality.14 This is why law cannot
be understood in isolation from other social phenomena and processes, but only
through its connections to these phenomena.15
According to Unger, the law continues to be a forum for political and
ideological debate. 16 It is therefore important to determine how law, using
normative systems, filters social problems and social reality. Commaille specifies

11

Varga, Law and Philosophy, supra note 5 at 54.
Broekman, “Legal Subjetivity as a Precondition”, supra note 6 at 77.
13
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1986) in John J. A. Burke, “The Political Foundation on Law and the Need for
Theory with Practical Value: The Theories of Ronald Dworkin and Roberto Unger” (San
Francisco, Thesis, Faculty on Law, University of Fribourg, 1992) at 43.
14
Ruth Buchanan, “Reconceptualizing Law and Politics in the Transnational: Constitutional and
Legal Pluralist Approaches”, (2006) 57 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 654.
15
Alan Hunt, “Exploration in Law and Society: Towards a Constitutive Theory of Law”, in P.
Barrios, Liberal Environmentalism and the International Law of Hazardous Chemicals, Thesis,
Ph.D. Philosophy, (University of British Columbia, 2007).
16
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1986), supra note 13 at 163.
12
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this in reference to Jean Carbonnier’s statements when he argues that politics is
the direction and law is what allows it to float,17 recognizing the role and the
function of ideology. The ideological role of law is, then, to disguise its process of
creation.
This is why once the law is made law, once it is resolved, it validates itself,
from within. This, as Teubner says, is in line with the Luhmannian interpretation
that there is no law outside the law and, therefore, positive law is a self-produced
law. 18 However, Luhmann’s autopoietic law, as a structuralist functionalist
approach framed in postmodernist currents, has the problem of being a system
that is closed “and loosely integrated with the other social institutions.”19 As his
interpretation is self-referential, only the law can change the law. This is both true
and false. That is, while it is true in the formal sense, it doesn't fully capture the
social embeddeness of law's context. This does not prevent the legal system
from reproducing. In other words, the law may seem self-referential and circular,
but in its essence it is not. The internal organization of the law may be circular,
but it is in a causal relationship with external influences, which are much more
complex. In particular the law understood as process and dynamics.
From an approach that looks at law as process, the neutrality of the law is
also fictitious, as the procedure is inseparable from the result. That the process
of lawmaking necessarily embodies values and incorporates ideas and notions
17

J. Commaille, L’esprit sociologique des lois, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994) at
23.
18
Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, supra note 4 at 2 & 3.
19
Max Travers, Understanding Law and Society, (Oxon, Routledge, 2010) at 51.
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about how power is distributed and how conflicts are resolved. It is probably
correct to say that without circularity, the perspective with which the Rule of law
was founded cannot be justified,20 but laws’ justification and its legitimation are
different concepts.
Law’s distinctive feature is its transmutation, only once it has been
formalized and not before. This transformation phenomenon of identity that law
undergoes is important, because the different “moments” of the law’s own
process are contradictory. On one hand, it confers it autonomy and, as discussed
above, it makes it seem self-produced, while on the other hand, it denies the
dynamics (or it seems to be denying the dynamics) of its own creation. We may
ask, then: Can law occupy an autonomous mode, with its own internal structure?
Is law eminently political; a primary outcome of disputes for self-interest?

B. Law, legitimation and autonomy
The problem of legitimacy for liberal law is legal rationality and not its
specific content that lends the law its legitimacy. From the liberal tradition legal
legitimacy derives from its rationality, its internal logic, more than from its moral
or ideological value. Faced with liberal society’s predicament of ensuring the
impersonality of power, the Rule of law is based on two assumptions: that the
most important powers are concentrated in the government and that power can
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be constrained by norms,21 as well as by the role exercised by the state. As
Bobbio points out: “It is true that law…consists of a set of rules of conduct which,
whether directly or indirectly, are formulated and validated by the state.”22 Bobbio
opposes a minimal state (liberal) to a maximal state (absolutist), and indicates
that democracy is not possible without a legal framework and invalid if it is not
accompanied by political pluralism. 23

The question of legitimacy becomes

crucial, challenging the foundations of liberal legal rationality. Autonomy and the
Rule of law are parts of this identity process, as law is politics, or it is a form of
politics. For Marxist theory, the law has direct ties to the state, but it displays
autonomy with respect to the state and reflects economic relations. It has the
potential to be coercive, manifests the interests of the dominant classes both
directly and indirectly and legitimates the system in which it is produced and
reproduced. The law thus fulfills the role of legitimating the product and the result
of its own creation and the values of the hegemonic classes and powers. 24
Critical structural Marxists25 suggest that the law has its own history (the concept
of the “relative autonomy” of the law). The law is understood as independent of
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the economic system, but dependent in a sense.26 It is precisely this “sense” that
has kept alive the debate to ultimately determine the degree of autonomy.
Poulantzas, for example, arguing with Althusser, proposes that the law is not
necessarily the “state’s ideological apparatus”, but rather organizes and
sanctions the real rights of the dominated classes, despite the fact that these
rights are invested in the dominant ideology and that these rights therefore are or
can be illusory.27
In relation to legitimation and according to Unger, modern liberal law has
three essential properties: 1) Rule of law; 2) legal justice and 3) formalist
adjudication.28 In addition, law at the legislative and judicial level must profess
the properties of generality, uniformity and impersonality.29 The law is legitimated
in its standardization and is applied to all, independently of their class condition
or power. This allows the law to validate itself without privileging one interest over
another and consolidates or ensures the functioning of the Rule of law in the
modern liberal state.30 This is why the Rule of law has also been described as an
“accepted measure ... of governmental legitimacy”31 and an essential pillar upon
which any high-quality democracy must rest.32
26
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The law thus develops its relative autonomy, upheld by the legal system,
which is to say, by its formality. In other words, the Rule of law and the legal
system both bring the law to life and make it autonomous. The law is formalized
and made “objective”, and the Rule of law guarantees the neutrality of the state
with respect to its citizens. In this sense, the law is politics in its historical liberal
form,33 despite its contradictory principles (content and form) that also reflect the
inconsistencies characteristic of liberal society. 34 This is why it is not the
autonomy of the law “per se” or its capacity to reproduce itself that is important,
as Luhmann35 suggests with his legal thesis.36 That the law can be autopoietic,
that it can reproduce itself, is not ultimately decisive, as the law is both essence
and presence. Tuebner positions the law in a “hypercycle”, writing that it is
“…only when the system has created the necessary conditions for hypercyclical
linking by describing and producing its own components that the actual
autopoiesis of law can begin.”37 Cycles link together to form a hypercycle of selfreferential systems.38 He refers to legal procedure, the legal act, the positivity of
law, the legal norm and legal doctrine as the components of a higher cycle of
links that precede the possibility of self-reproduction of the law. Yet it is my view
that as the law takes on a life of its own in the formal sense, it does not cease to
of Graduate Studies, York University, 2012) at 205.
32
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be a reflection of society. “Law is part of [society], everywhere exposed to and in
communication with it.” 39 For Teubner autonomy and autopoiesis are best
understood as a matter of degree, by examining the extent to whlch that system
manages to 'constitute its own components, action, norm, process, identlty - into
self-referential cycles'. When these cycles link together to form a hypercycle of
self-referential systems, the legal system can be said to be totally closed or
autoppoietic.40

C. Law and its dual identity: status quo and change
Hobbesian rationale understands law to be at the centre of the relationship
between humans confronted by conflicts of interest. However is law by its nature
conservative or progressive? Are there structural social changes that can
“determine” legal change?41 Can the Rule of law be multifaceted; that is, can it
fulfill different roles as a function of the different historical moments of law and
legality? Can the law’s autonomy and the Rule of law maintain the social and
political order at certain historical moments and protect citizens from arbitrariness
or even be instrumental in promoting social change at other moments? According
to Spitzer, “Law is thus always structure and praxis,” but he asks, “How we do
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decide whether that practice is expressive, repressive or both?” “How can law
both support and inhibit the transformation of (class) societies?” 42
From an orthodox Marxist perspective, the structuralist theses were
criticized for the relative autonomy they attributed to the legal, political and
ideological superstructure, considered to be a form of sociological pluralism that
blocked an understanding of power relations.43 However, the law has a large
degree of indeterminacy, in addition to its dual role, being able to be both an
agent of the status quo and an instrument for change. In asking about the
indeterminacy of law in its process and dynamism, there is certainly a factor of
uncertainty, tied to the very dynamics of historical and political contexts and the
relationship of the actors defending their interests, negotiating, maintaining
conflicts and generating consensus.
Habermas indicates that development toward a social and democratic
constitutional state can be understood as a form of constitutionalizing relations of
power. Changes in social legislation linked to working hours, union organization,
wage improvements, layoff protection, social security and other benefits are
instances of the juridification of the balance of power within legal action.44 The
distinctive characteristic of a legal system is not the confirmation of the status
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quo, but rather the recognition that things can change. In fact, legal theorists
have called attention to the relationship between law and social change, 45
questioning such matters as the role of law as a stimulant for progressive social
change and the methodology of legal tactics used by social movements in
promoting social justice.

Some authors argue that legal tactics are futile for

bringing about social change.46 Others point out that legal tactics can empower
social movements, offering them a venue for greater mobilization capacity. 47
Those that identify with the Critical Legal Studies48 movement adopt a rather
pessimistic stance, arguing that legal doctrines partially support the status quo.49
In this sense, I believe liberal legalism embodies the belief that social
reality is defective, but that it may be reformed.50 As is argued by Thomson,
“critical legal theorists assert that law is far from obvious primarily because its
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relation to power is not obvious.” 51 The law can be used as an element of
change, as a possibility for gradual reform, to the extent that it can be understood
as a dynamic process for extending or modifying rights and not only as a selfreferential mechanism with which it reproduces itself. Social changes imply
cultural changes (outlooks, perspectives, attitudes) that entail new demands and
their corresponding legal transformations.52
That the law can be an agent of change does not deny or refute that
ultimately, it is embedded in the economic and political structure of society and
reflects economic relations, particulary class interests, and is ideologically
transformed to appear neutral. As indicated by Zumbansen: “Law has and
obviously does in many cases serve as a weapon of hope and emancipation –
but also the opposite is possible and frequently the case: with reference to
existing laws, great deeds of injustice are committed, a tight grip of oppression
over society maintained and law deprived of all its sense of political
inconclusiveness, openness and critique.”53
“For the legal system in particular the notion of self-reproduction seems
difficult to reconcile with the fact that law is determined to a considerable extent
by political influences, economic structures, and social factors.”54 The legal order
thus reflects the social order, a product of social and class conflicts. In any case,
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Zumbansen,55 citing Wechsler56 and Lobel,57 indicates that the disenchantment
with the extension of “rights” to address issues related to social injustice and the
neutrality of legal processes are also reasons for dissatisfaction with the law as
an instrument for social change. As a product of human activity, the law reflects
the uncertainties of social existence58 and is therefore contradictory and can be
an agent of change and of oppression. Yet particularly with respect to health
care, it is interesting to note that the law invites us to discuss how to reconcile
interests, how to correct injustices, but it does not invite us to question basic
principles of transforming health into a right, like the right to property or to
freedom of expression. Constitutional and universal access to health care
services is not enshrined as a right, but private property and market economy
appears to be.59 Perhaps, “like religion in previous historical periods, the law
becomes an object of belief which shapes popular consciousness toward a
passive acquiescence or obedience to the status quo.”60
The law does not only play a role as itself and as an institutional relation
with and with respect to the state. The law is also embedded in the social and
articulates the interests of political dynamics. As mentioned above, it can be used
55
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by powerful interests to preserve inequalities and status quo, and it can be used
by less powerful groups as a mechanism for avoiding manipulation by private or
government power.61 That is, “by juxtaposing ‘arbitrary power’ and the ‘Rule of
law’ it may be argued that law can operate against the state as well as in its
service.”62 It is the historical contexts and political dynamics that articulate the
conflicts and consensus that also forge the identity of the law.

2. THE LAW AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS
A. The political nature of the legal process and the law as praxis.
Every society creates its own legal system and legal rationality, and it
becomes difficult to disassociate law from the culture from which it emerges
specifically. Law as a product of negotiation processes between several
stakeholders defending their interests is embedded in the social fabric and the
political and economic structures of society. It is the expression of how society
organizes itself and articulates and represents different interests and worldviews
in a given historical context.
Law and the state, from the Hobbesian philosophy of the social contract to
the present, are connected – directly or indirectly, only formally or overtly – to a
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discourse of power.63 Using a reflexive interpretation that sees a role for the law
in the resolution of conflicts in certain contexts and that makes the law receptive
to a range of rationalities, one can study the law as it is materialized at different
points in time as a dynamic ungoing process. The legal system interacts in a
large public arena in which as part of different contending interests intervene and
are reflected and the social order is legitimized: “…the law is never monolithic
(....) Its function differs, deepening on the relative strength of the social forces
which struggle around and within it, and on the balance between these forces.
The law is not a thing but a relation. Its formal rules can be given a different
social and economic content in different historical moments and at different
periods of struggle.”64
Althusser, in his structural Marxist paradigm, proposed law as a part of the
ideological apparatus of the dominant classes,65 but Poulantzas, much closer to
Gramsci, saw the law in broader and more dynamic terms, in that it also
“organizes and sanctions certain real rights of the dominated classes (even, of
course, these rights are invested in the dominant ideology and are far from
corresponding in practice to their juridical form).”66 While neither Gramsci nor
Althusser focused their studies on the law, they did not minimize its role. They
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understood it as a cultural institution that exercised strength and power through
the police and the courts. This means that discovering the hidden meaning of
legal texts could also be understood as a form of political struggle against the
established order, in this case the capitalist order.67 Poulantzas broadened the
debate to a more active notion of the law. A more dynamic law, in movement,
less one-dimensional, like the structuralists proposed. Law could be understood
not only as a receptacle of values and priorities determined outside of society,
but also as part of a complex social whole that society constitutes and where it is
constituted, 68 as the law is essence and appearance, content and formality.
Though for Poulantzas, the law obscures the real differences behind a facade of
formalism, 69 classes and social groups have many different determinations,
which consequently require a negotiation of interests. Poulantzas sees these
interests manifested as a block that “constitutes a contradictory unity of politically
dominant classes and fractions, under the protection of the hegemonic
fraction.”70 Referring to Althusser, Sumner, a legal sociologist, suggests that,
“Legal enactments must be seen as reflections of contemporary culture and as
reflections of political manoeuvre as well as reflections of economic structure.”71
It is interesting to note that these structuralist interpretations (Poulantzas,
Althusser) are criticized from both the orthodox Marxist perspective and post67
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modernism. In the debate between structuralism and contemporary postmodernist

interpretations,

structuralism

contributes

to

explaining

and

understanding the power relations behind the law, while post-modernism warns
us about the deterministic risks of trying to explain everything through the lens of
economic and political structures. 72 In the 1980s, other theorists indebted to
cultural Marxism, such as the Frankfurt School or the critical legal studies
movement, also sought to reveal the deep linkages between legal texts and
political contexts. Following Gramsci, the critical legal scholars suggest that the
law cannot be understood by means of its own self-referential introspection, but
rather through its political relations in order to identify the law’s interpenetration
with other social processes.73 E.P. Thomson74 most profoundly explores this
thesis, suggesting that the law is both inside and outside, with both visible and
invisible legal structures. Though Merritt75 suggests that this thesis could be seen
as “cultural reductionism”, Thomson proposes that the distinction between the
superstructure and the infrastructure levels out, as the law not only influences the
basis of society, but also becomes a part of it.76
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B. Conflict, consensus and hegemony
It is not law that defines power or guarantees the autonomy of legal
institutions, but rather it is the political process that ultimately determines the
legislative process (laws) and its legitimization. The rule exists because it is
accepted as a matter of convention, and convention is based on consensus (as
opposed to disagreement). Therefore, it could be argued that part of social
cohesion is also the result of a respect for the legitimacy that law confers. I do
not wish to understate the importance of the fact that legal rationality has a meta
rationale that is the result of its own process of legitimization, reinforced by the
ideological discourses and by the institutions that promote and support it. This
could probably be termed “hegemonic consensus”.77 This condition is the product
of the equation between the social and/or political forces that compete to defend
their interests and, at the same time, influence the processes of law creation.
There is a circular argument at play: legal rationality is dependent upon the
power structure in which legality is embedded, and, simultaneously, this legal
rationality legitimizes the character and environment of power relations.
Unger indicates, “interest-group pluralism, as we may call it, represents
law as the product of bargaining among organized interest groups. In a
democracy the primary but far from the sole locus of this lawmaking activity is
legislation, with its background in electoral party politics.”78 Unger further argues
77
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that, “Interest-group pluralism…is not a sociology of lawmaking, but rationalizing
legal analysis itself, a prescriptive discourse, providing an account of how law
becomes legitimate and how it should be represented.”79 For functional pluralist
traditions as well as for Marxist perspectives, power is dispersed in society in
individuals, classes or organizations. However Pluralists, unlike Marxist
traditions, deny that a particular group could dominate another, pointing out that
everyone has some power and that nobody can have too much. There are
pressure groups and interest groups that compete with each other, without any of
them having control of the state. In other words, power is disperse. For some, the
state is neutral with respect to the resolution of conflicts, and for others it
certainly is not.80 The differences with respect to the role of the law are not
insignificant, as for some it is an articulator for conflict resolution and for others a
mechanism of domination for the interests of the dominant classes, in which the
essence of the law hides the real differences with the facade of universal
formalism.81
Within the conceptual and theoretical framework of the law, when we refer
to the debate between conflicts or contradictions of interest and consensus and
models of legitimation, we can distinguish between conformist models and critical
models. Peters indicates that the critical model has both a static operating
mechanism, that is, “formal compliance with established law or accepted
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principles” and a dynamic operating mechanism, which is “justification through
rational arguments in critical discussion.” 82 It is true that in cultures where
harmony is highly valued and consensus is encouraged for resolving conflicts,
these encounters may be rejected.83 However, the pursuit “of consensus” does
not have to respond only to the functionalist tradition, in which “law answers to
requirements, customs and necessities emerging from social practice or
crystallizing out of public deliberations.”84 The law is not only an instrument for
achieving a social, political or economic objective, but also the result of the action
and the concrete dynamics and outcome of a cyclical process with its own
political dynamics. It is not, as Nonet and Selznick85 suggest within the notion of
“responsive law”, that citizens must appropriate the law in order to arrive at a
consensus around the direction of society. This formalist consensus, as
Zumbansen explains, idealizes the forces of cohesion in a society that is
profoundly complex and fragmented. “Therein lies, to be sure, the great danger
for law, for political, in particular democratic theory and for grand-scale social
theory.”86
Though the liberal state was founded, as Unger points out, upon
compromise, and this compromise has crucial implications for the law, 87
consensus on a law is only a conjunctural compromise, produced in a given
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place and time but for an undetermined period, whose limits and timing will be
those defined by political dynamics. Even Luhmnann, as a systemic functionalist,
explores the complex interdependence between conflict and the law, concluding
that a theory of law is related to a theory of conflict.88 Conflict is productive for
law, as it gives the legal system the opportunity to open itself up to the
environment, and it is with respect to conflict that the law makes expectations
widespread, evolves as a system, fulfills its role in society and attains unity and
identity.89 Conflict and consensus are not necessarily diametrically opposed or
extremes of a process. Both are contradictory, both are dialectic, both are
circumstantial and both are inevitable. One does not exist without the other, and
they are not fixed in time. Neither is more conservative or liberal than the other.
Christodoulides illustrates this very well when he indicates that, “Conflict theory
and consensus theory are too often seen as seeking their departure from gaining
leverage from, and positing some kind of teleology to, mutually exclusive
alternatives. This in turn has occasionally led to simplistic equations of
consensus to social structure and conflict to social dynamics…. Conflict is as
much inimical to social structures as it is intrinsic to them. Co-operation contains
conflict as it does consensus.”90
As discussed above, the process of law creation is an expression of the
articulation and negotiation of interests in a given social context, producing the
88
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dynamics of struggles for hegemony and power. Law, as the result of a process
of conflict, is, as Szabo puts it, “a condensed or concentrated” product of social
relations.91 Therefore, law is hardly ever, except during revolutions that generate
ruptures or dictatorships, imposed without some form of negotiation. It is even
possible that organized and critical players, as a result of their ability to induce
legal change without altering the existing order, may defend the status quo in
order to adopt standards that will achieve change in their respective social
contexts. It is in this sense that not only are the dynamics of law determined by
endogenous and exogenous factors, but the law itself can be understood as an
agent in such processes, hiding the conflicts of interest generated in its own
creation. Hence, law is a synthesis of both the dynamics that create it and the
results.
This debate about the political dynamics at play between conflicts of
interest and consensus seems to be in opposition with the concept of hegemony.
I say that it seems to be, as they are not contradictions per se. As Litowitz
indicates, “the concept of hegemony deserves broader consideration from the
legal academy because it is a critical tool that generates profound insights about
law’s ability to induce submission to a dominant worldview.” 92 This does not
mean that submission to a dominant worldview is necessarily imposed. Political
dynamics, like all movement, are cyclical and indeterminate, in action, and with
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results that are temporary and can even be contradictory. As these are not
neutral but rather the result of political dynamics themselves, the concept of
hegemony is crucial for identifying the mechanisms of power and the role of
ideologies in shaping the law, as a product of consensus. Law is legitimated in its
formality and accepted and validated as a temporary product of the result of
consensus, even when we know that this is devoid of content, contradictions or
hegemony.
All legal systems evolve as political practice in the exercise of power and
the construction of hegemonies. They depend upon or change in accordance
with the social and historical conditions associated with a society. “If we theorize
the notion of change in relation to the evolution of power relations, and the
concept of hegemony about constructing alliances, integrating rather than simply
dominating to win consent,” 93 we realize that law is achieved through the
dynamic and mutable processes of the construction of hegemony. Therefore, the
notion of “alliance” is important if we want to “associate” social sectors with a
specific worldview, in this case the hegemonic worldview. The concept of
hegemony thus becomes critically essential, since it fundamentally expresses a
form of domination, originating in lawful practices, exercised in diverse ways and
invariably linked to relations of influence and the power structure in a given
society. While social organizations induce and influence social and human
activity, hegemony is concerned with the reproduction of social structure, and
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more importantly, with the need to secure conditions for this reproduction. Law
has the ability to be and to exercise a function and a role in this process, but it is
not self-sufficient, neither in its genesis nor in its reason to exist.
Gramsci, when placing the concept of domination outside the state
apparatus and the economic sphere, conceptualized that the superstructure may
be autonomous with respect to the structure,94 and introduced the concept of
hegemony as organized consensus. Social groups can be subordinated to
others, but the basis of hegemony is always acceptance of the relation.95 This
organized consensus promotes a dominant worldview that is ultimately supported
by the majority of the social classes, with the law contributing to the development
of the mechanism for securing hegemony under the aegis of the dominant
class.96
When the legitimacy of the legal system is in crisis, new political economic
variables are introduced and new forms of political negotiation are developed that
minimize the universal nature of formal legality and open up new opportunities
and dimensions that require the legal and political spheres to be reconciled in
order to preserve hegemony.97 Furthermore, as the principal characteristic of the
law is its formal legitimacy, this legitimacy also bears normative strength, but
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since the content of law changes, it can also be manipulated to reflect specific
interests. It is in this process that structural biases are normalized.98

3. LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE
A. Law, development and the state
The state, unlike the government (the administrative body of the executive
power) and the nation (an ethno-cultural concept), is understood as the political
unit of a geographically delimited, organized human community with social,
economic, sovereign and coercive political organization. Public institutions in this
political unit are controlled by the citizens and organized into the state powers,
which are legislative power in order to legislate, executive power to administer
legislation, and judicial power to administer justice and enforce the law. The latter
also falls to the action of the police, which along with the armed forces, hold a
monopoly on legitimate physical force. For this research in particular, I prioritize
the intervention and action of the legislative power in its lawmaking processes
and of the executive power that administers the implementation of laws, leads
processes of social and economic development, executes social and economic
policy and must guarantee social rights, the accessibility of public health care
services and the regulation of private services.
The notions of development and health are sometimes elusive, but they
are closely linked to politics and the economy, and they are distinctive in their
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capacity to have both a conservative and progressive impact. Economic and
social policies are based on both endogenous and exogenous factors. The
former include economic and social development policies, the function and
evolution of the state, the development of the welfare state, social structure,
political representation, and the behaviour and action of political parties and
organized civil society (stakeholders). Finally, foreign influence on economic and
public policymaking and the country’s involvement in and links to the world have
been critically important in the shaping of the different health models.
Health issues, usually associated with medicine, chemistry and biology,
are addressed with science- and evidence-based practices, while their “political”
character in influencing policies, reforms and legislation remains neglected.99 As
Raphael argues, it is relatively uncommon to acknowledge the importance of the
social determinants of health, and it is even less frequent to consider the political,
economic and social factors related to health issues,100 yet there is a reciprocal,
synergistic and close interconnection between health and development.101 In the
case of the Third World or developing countries, the notion of development is
much more closely linked to questions of political economy than it is in the
developed world. Third world countries are less stable, more externally
influenceable, poltical scenarios are more diverse and development policies have
99
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more divergent options. At the same time, law is central to development, since it
involves policy choices choices and distributive objectives, which contribute to
development.
It could be argued that a social system that is sensitive to and dependent
on the outside world and international influences loses stability and leaves a
significant part of society without protection, subjecting them to the fluctuations of
external processes. On the other hand, an autonomous system under its own
control and its own logic that privileges formalism can be resistant to change and
less flexible for adapting to the times. Health policies are thus the result of
changes in economic relations, the action of political forces but also growing
international influence, which were also modifying the nature and role of the
state.
Unger points out, the state must profess neutrality and impersonality and
seek harmony. It must be the ruler and different from any other group in the
system of domination and dependence,102 but it is also particularly interesting to
note that the state can be involved in the negotiating process103 of articulation,
adaptation, re-articulation and resistance to change. The state is legitimized in
and with the will of its citizens, while social sectors or groups are also coopted by
the state with specific social benefits as a form of seeking political support.104
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It is in this political process that the state is configured as a product of its
own dynamics and historical conjunctures. It has a contradictory identity and
legitimates itself as an entity that intervenes in order to maintain order and the
Rule of law and to promote the economic and social changes for which society
“reached a consensus” in the political sphere and that it legitimized in the formal
sphere. In this context of political dynamics and development, the interventionist
state plays a double role: it neutralizes social movements through intervention,
and it promotes social change to contribute to social and economic development,
thus forming the welfare state105 for a large part of the 20th century.

B. The welfare state
An analysis of social democratic models of social development considers
the welfare state resulting of political struggles over state intervention aimed at
benefiting the working class, and it is interested in the process of how demands
were articulated and their impact on electoral politics. 106 The welfare state
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America. Pressure Groups, Stratification, and
Inequality, (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978) at 8.
105
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improved income distribution, but it also influenced and affected the
accumulation of capital. Furthermore, it brought about changes in labour
productivity and broadened many of the values and rights that certain workers
have acquired over time. Yet it is important to point out that the concept is not
necessarily straightforward and creates historical contradictions. Some associate
it, perhaps mistakenly, with the concept of “Socialstaat”, which is also a social
option or social intervention for the economic and political problems of capitalism.
“Socialstaat”, based on the Bismarckian policies of the 19th century, comes from
the Weimar Republic and Constitution,107 which explicitly protected the labour
force and regulated or restricted the economy in pursuit of social justice in early
20th-century Germany.108 It is also correct to say that this “Socialstaat” and the
policies of Bismarck were not progressive in the strict sense and sought to
neutralize the social movements in 19th-century Europe that threatened the
established order.109 This is why this concept of the social state is comparable,
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but not equivalent, to the evolution of the welfare state and the implementation of
Keynesian economic policies starting in the second half of the 20th century.110
In fact, both right and moderate left-wing political parties supported
Keynesian theory, which proposed mitigating the effects of economic depression
by stimulating demand through the state and influenced what we now call the
welfare state, with its most ardent defenders being the social democratic
governments. The welfare state system encouraged markets and industrialization
and promoted peace, social stability and social consensus. The welfare state has
not only improved the distribution of income and influenced the accumulation of
capital, but has also induced changes in labour productivity and enhanced the
values and rights gained during an individual’s lifetime. Although what we define
today as a welfare state stems from different conceptions, of both philosophical
and moral in their socio-historical genesis, the role and position of the state has
been unquestioned in its position at the epicentre of social, economic and
political processes within this model. 111 This is particularly evident in Latin
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America, where the state became more interventionist in order to ensure
emerging social rights.112
The welfare state thus seeks to balance the structural imbalances,
inequalities or inequities generated by political power and market interests. The
welfare state has also brought about important transformations in society. In
particular, by extending individual and collective rights to social welfare, it has
modified political struggles, seen new groups and collectives with demands
emerge, broadened the concept of democracy and ultimately reformulated the
state-society relation.
The welfare state has also been at the centre of criticism from all political
and ideological sectors. Conservative interpretations present it as an obstacle to
economic growth (seen clearly today with neoliberal policies), as it limits
individual liberties and strengthens the role and interventionism of a state seen
as inefficient and controlling. Classic or orthodox Marxist theory considers the
welfare state to be an action carried out by the dominant sector to neutralize and
coopt workers or to include them with less resistance in processes of capitalist
accumulation. Between these extremes, there are less radical variations, but
these present the welfare state in its contradictory nature, understanding that
while having conciliatory effect upon capital and labour, it is no less true that it
has an impact on social progress and that its effect on the social structure is
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ambivalent, maintaining both egalitarian tendencies and the preservation of the
status quo.
There are valid reasons for maintaining that the legal system of the
welfare state contributes to the very dynamics of economic growth113 understood
from the point of view of the development of capitalism, in that the social
measures contribute and are functional to growth policies. However, as Unger
notes,

114

contemporary law, through legislation, administration and the

adjudication and action of the courts, is also important for monitoring economic
control and unjust accumulation and for keeping markets competitive or
determinng if an agency is acting in the public interest.
Today, the significant structural differences between the Socialstaat and
the welfare state in its Keynesian version are fading, and it must be recognized
that the latter is instrumental to mass democracy. 115 According to a critical
interpretation, social conflicts between capital and labour transformed into
conflicts over the distribution of the gross national product. This reconciliation
between capitalism and democracy is the main reason that the welfare states
worked following the Second World War.116
From a strictly theoretical point of view, critical analyses present the
welfare state as an instrument for realigning capitalist accumulation policies or as
113
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a form of attaining political and social consensus without structurally altering
hegemonic relations. This interpretation has also changed following the
implementation of neoliberal economic policies that have rearranged capitallabour relations and the role of the state. “The transformation of the western
welfare state in the latter half of the twentieth century is marked by a significant
transformation of the role of the state in the establishment and provision of
formerly ‘public’ services.”117
It would seem that the neoliberal view, unlike its liberal alma mater, seems
to favour a legal system that guarantees more the expression of economic
freedoms than justice, social inclusion and even the constitution and stability of
the Rule of law. In this context, it would appear that a central dilemma of
democracy, depending on how it is interpreted or defined, is the disjunctive
between freedom and justice. “Whereas much of the twentieth century was
characterized by the central role of the state…present contentions of
functionalism emphasize the values of market freedom and competition as
endangered by state intervention”.118
The contemporary options of deregulation and privatization are reflections
of the neoliberal perspective that presents this tradeoff between freedom and
justice. Of the two concepts, already ideologized, neo-liberalism favour freedom,
and, hence, reject state intervention. However, as Scheurman puts it, “…we may
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not need to choose either formal law or the welfare state, either the Rule of law
or greater social and economic equality. The view advanced by so many authors
that there is a dramatic decision that needs to be made either for freedom or
equality is overstated.”119
Nevertheless, the last decades are demonstrating a metamorphosis of the
welfare state. Social policies are commercialized, and their function is no longer
complementary to processes of accumulation; instead, they are directly part of
this process. This has been thoroughly demonstrated with policies privatizing
health services and pension systems. Some, such as Peters, estimate that even
the modern welfare state has very subtly come to introduce major processes of
alienation, expressed as a “subjectivization of critical thought” in which freedoms
today are part of consumption.120

119

Bill Scheuerman, Scheuerman,“The Rule of Law and the Welfare State…, supranote 114 at
204.
120
Peters, “Law as a Critical Discussion”, supra note 2 at 277.

47

CHAPTER TWO

HEALTH LEGISLATION AND LEGAL CHANGES DURING
THE WELFARE STATE MODEL

INTRODUCTION
The development of social policies in Chile has been unequal and closely tied to
the trajectory of social struggles and the ability of mostly class-based social
movements to effectively voice their demands. Defining social movements is
clearly complex due to the relativity and historicity of the concept. A definition
cannot be transposed onto a given reality without understanding the reality and
circumscribing the definition to a given social, political and, of course, historical
context. For the purpose of this research, social movements are principally
understood as being associated with the labour movements and their protests, as
was the case in Latin America and Chile since the end of the 19th century. Later,
Latin America saw other expressions of social movements, tied to struggles of
national

liberation,

revolutionary

movements

and

political

and

popular

movements. The common denominator was political struggle itself, in national
causes closely tied to political life and the political parties. In the final decades of
the 20th century, other social movements also started to influence political,
cultural and popular life, distancing themselves from the traditions of the labour
movement and the primarily Marxist political parties with interpretations that were
critical of capitalist society. This was theoretically developed in analyses of postindustrial society, where social movements are seen to go beyond the context of
the class struggle. 1 Social movements also broadened with globalization
1
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processes and the socio-political impacts of neoliberalism, such as the exclusion,
atomization and marginalization of large sectors of society. Growing social and
economic inequity, despite relative economic growth, and the emergence of other
social and cultural concerns tied to the feminist movements, already more
consolidated, and the environmental, indigenist, sexual diversity, ethnic, student
and other movements began to have an influence on organized social
expressions.
Nonetheless, it is important to note both the historical importance that the
labour movement had for protest in Chile and the fundamental significance of the
political parties. It is probably due to the extent of the labour and union
movement’s organization and political tradition that social movements in Chile
were principally linked to this movement, which I prioritize in my analysis of social
policy in this dissertation.
The pension system, health care services and the education system all
became fragmented and developed in dissimilar ways as fractions of the middle
class, the working class,2 private interests, the church, medical doctors, health
professionals and health workers, the armed forces, and organized civil society
succeeded to varying degrees in pressuring the state to extend coverage.
This is why, in order to analyze the welfare state, it is necessary to
understand how political struggles have been articulated and how the state,
2
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whose role has been decisive, has intervened. The articulation of social demands
has an impact on electoral politics and, subsequently, on legislative processes.3
As discussed in the previous chapter, the welfare state has improved social
conditions and income distribution, and at the same time it has influenced the
economic structure and stimulated labour productivity. The Chilean welfare state
was built with a corporatist approach, following the European model, with the
active but uneven participation of all actors and stakeholders involved in the
various stages of its development over the course of the century.
The health system and its hierarchical provision of services was always in
a process of transition, in which health legislation and health reforms were the
result of an ongoing process of negotiation between actors and the various
interests at play.4 Reforms have an element of indeterminacy, due to the fact that
they are the result of this complex system of interactions among a plurality of
social actors, and this makes attention to process as important as attention to
content.5
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In this chapter, I analyze health legislation in Chile as the outcome of an
incremental process of negotiated health reforms, and I discuss the role of the
state and its relationship to economic and political development during different
economic and political contexts and governments between 1924 and 1973. The
chapter covers the following periods: the beginning of the welfare state (19241938); the process towards the establishment of the National Health Service
(SNS)6 (1939-1952); the first decade of the National Health Service (1952-1963);
and the welfare model during three different political administrations, a) the first
decade of the National Health Service

(1952-1963) and the conservative

government; b) the centrist Christian Democratic government (1964-1970) and c)
the socialist model of the Popular Unity government (1970-1973).
In order to analyze the process of reforms and health legislation over
these years, I have adapted Walt’s 7 conceptual framework, also modified by
Giarelli, 8 which includes four components: a) the context (political system,
macroeconomic situation, ideological and society values); b) the social actors
(stakeholders, political parties, unions, professional associations and civil
society); c) the content (strategies, type of reforms, nature of the legislation and
d) the process (dynamics of the legislation process and its implementation). This
chapter explores and discusses health legislation in the context of the interaction
of these four components, allowing an analysis and evaluation of health
6
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legislation during the period in which the welfare state was developed and
implemented in Chile.

1. THE BEGININGS OF THE WELFARE STATE MODEL: 1924-1938
Pressure to introduce significant social reforms mounted in the early
1920s. President Arturo Alessandri (first presidency 1920-1924), who enjoyed
the support of reformist Radicals and Democrats, formed the so-called Liberal
Alliance. While he received strong support from the middle and working classes
as well as from provincial elites, he was nevertheless unable to introduce the
social reforms he advocated. Congress was dominated by the rural landowning
elites, who pressured the government and forced continuous cabinet changes.
Yet, while Alessandri’s efforts to introduce reforms were resisted by the
conservative Congress, reform legislation gained popularity in the Congress
thanks to pressure from younger military officers who were unhappy about the
neglect of their armed forces and dissatisfied with the political backbiting, social
unrest and sharply rising inflation.9
Finally, under pressure from a faction within the military 10 and with
President Alessandri’s consent, Congress approved a wide-ranging set of laws.
For the most part, authorities were simply responding to pressures exerted by a
9
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growing number of workers’ organizations and a long series of strikes. 11
Ultimately, a context of political and socio-economic crisis, exacerbated by the
failure of parliamentary action, facilitated the entry of the military onto the political
scene. In 1924, due to a decisive political change, a fraction of the army seized
political power and pressured the more conservative members of Parliament to
implement more reforms. This military coup forced the resignation of President
Alessandri, and a military junta, headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs General
Altamirano, called on Congress to finally approve these changes. The 1924 coup
thus radically altered the social landscape, ratifying a long list of reforms that
brought about a major change in the nature of the state, which now adopted the
charitable perspective from which the welfare state would emerge. The
determinants of the military action were numerous, including the officers’
demands for a speedy approval of the pending labour and social reform bills.
The most important of these social laws was Law 4,054,12 which created
the Workers’ Insurance Fund, then known as the compulsory Security Fund and
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later renamed Social Security Services (SSS) 13 . The medical branch of the
Workers’ Compulsory Insurance Fund provided homecare and consultations for
workers and their families. It also offered inpatient and outpatient services,
created general hospitals and implemented an agreement with the “Charity”—a
body that controlled most of the hospitals in the country—using payments
allocated from the Workers’ Insurance Fund. 14 The creation of the Workers’
Compulsory Insurance Fund was an expression of the changing political reality,
which included the increasing social role of the state within a context of political
and ideological struggles and the emergence of a tripartite political spectrum
(right, centre and left parties), thus restructuring the political scene.

In

comparison with the personal savings of the former Social Insurance Fund and
the benefits of the Civil Servants’ Savings Fund, the Workers’ Insurance Fund
pursued a different objective. Administratively defined as a semi-autonomous
state agency, the Fund received its revenues from employer and worker
contributions as well as from state coffers.
A particularly noteworthy aspect of the reforms implemented during this
period is the autonomy that was granted to the Fund to either establish in-house
services or to outsource them. The practice that prevailed was to pay the Charity
hospitals for services rendered to the insured at cost price, according to prices
set by the Fund, without having to negotiate with doctors. This regulation was

13

SSS, Servicio de Seguro Social.
Fernando Rodríguez, “Estructura y características del sector salud en Chile”, in M. Livingstone
& D. Raczynski (eds.), Salud pública y bienestar social, (Santiago, CIEPLAN, 1976) at 66.
14
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crucial in the shaping of the Chilean health system. As the Security Fund lacked
its own hospitals, it did not become isolated or dissociated from the rest of
society. Instead, it was thought of as dependent upon Charity hospital services.
This facilitated the recruitment of more professionals and better-qualified health
personnel. The organizational structure also allowed the Fund to immediately
draw attention to the need to integrate and rationalize services, which was
specifically addressed in subsequent draft legislation. Before its enactment,
though,

Law

implementation,

4,054

faced

employers

several
launched

important
an

open

challenges.
boycott

Prior
of

to
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contributions, and business owners threatened to close down factories. The law
was finally promulgated on 8 September, 1924, along with a series of other
reforms, with little discussion and brought before the legislature at military
gunpoint.15
The new social welfare legislation was approved under a new conceptual
differentiation between “working” people and “the indigent”, providing new
grounds for legitimating waged labour that would become the essence of the
working class vis-à-vis the state.16 The Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare, Labour and
Social Welfare was created in 1924 to carry out the new legislation, naming Dr.
15

The following bills were thus approved without almost any parliamentarian discussion: National
Budget (1924); Nominations for Army personnel, promotions and retirements; Salary increases
for junior officers of the Armed Forces and Police; Police reorganization; Reform of the Armed
Forces’ Pension Fund; Granting legal standing to the Army factory; Labor Code amendments with
respect to unionization, labor contracts, right to strike, arbitration, tribunals and cooperatives;
Social Security coverage for disability, sickness and labour accidents and Law that was part of
the Labor Code.
16
M. Illanes, “En Nombre del Pueblo, del Estado y de la Ciencia...”, Historia Social de la Salud
Pública. Chile 1880-1973, (Santiago, Colectivo de Atención Primaria, 1993) at 197.
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Alejandro del Río as minister, who distinguished himself with advanced public
health proposals. With this nomination, the country officially recognized for the
first time the superior role of medical science in ensuring the physical and moral
welfare of its citizenry.17 The new ministry was responsible for public health, for
coordinating and administering all medical services and for monitoring the
institutions related to health care and social protection. Public authorities
recognized the interrelationships between health issues and socio-economic
conditions, the right of the population to receive curative care and the state’s
sense of responsibility for health care. This translated into the need to give
priority to the protection of disadvantaged sectors of the population.18
The following year, in March 1925, the organization of health services
became formally regulated with the creation of the Division of Social Hygiene.19
The historical importance of this legislation is indisputable, given the magnitude
of its social reach and the significant role that it gave to the state. Indeed, the law
involved all of Chilean society in health control measures, while the state took on
an important responsibility, becoming a highly centralized overseer. 20

The

political aim of this welfare project was twofold: first, to restore the bonds
between the population and the ruling class, and second, to incorporate the
working class into the national public realm. It thus focused on the most

17

Id. at 204-07.
Rodríguez, “Estructura y características del sector salud en Chile”, supra note 14 at 66-67.
19
División de Higiene Social.
20
Illanes, “En Nombre del Pueblo, del Estado y de la Ciencia...”, supra note 16 at 219-21.
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interesting aspect of the welfare state, which was to attend to, maintain and
restore the health of the working force—the pillars of the productive process.21
Although the state had no intention of taking over or reducing private
health care, it planned to consolidate its centralized vision and policy vis-à-vis the
socio-political organizations, such as the municipalities, that had considerable
jurisdiction over public health matters. These were regulated by the Health Code,
which the new law would modify. It is in this context that the new Ministry of
Hygiene, Welfare, Labour and Social Welfare transferred all public health
services from the municipalities to the Division of Social Hygiene.
These changes in the distribution of health care responsibilities were also
of great conceptual significance, as health became increasingly present in the
public agenda in terms of regulating working conditions, making health care
savings compulsory and extending the role of the state in public policies. Social
legislation gained enormous political, economic and social prestige and
contributed to social stability, as it helped to ensure the contributions of a stable
and healthier workforce to the process of economic growth and development. In
October 1925, Decree-Law 576 created the Retirement Fund and Social Security
for all municipal employees in municipalities and provincial assemblies.
Employees who were fifty-five years old and had completed thirty years of
service could retire with an entitlement to the rights guaranteed by this statute.22
21

Id. at 141.

22

The Retirement and Municipal Employees Social Security Fund was exempt from all tax. The
discount was a mandatory 5% of the earnings of each employee. The Fund could acquire real
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Although, as mentioned above, the law appears to be a hybrid of politics
and ideology and a means for controlling social practice,23 it is also closely linked
to negotiation processes to approve legislation related to social benefits, pursuits
of equity and protection from (arbitrary) state intervention.24 In these cases, the
relation between the law and social change encourages or at least facilitates the
mobilizing capacity of actors25 to promote legislative changes.
While organized labour had its own position with respect to the reforms,26
the medical intelligentsia supported the overall model of the welfare state in its
construction of a new and modern concept of “welfare”, a successor to the
concept of charity. The reforms were also a result of pressure from the large
contingent of workers migrating to cities following the marked decline of mining
estate on behalf of a request received by it, and could also provide mortgage loans on property
within its unique domain.
23
C. Sumner, Reading Ideologies: an investigation into the Marxist Law Theory of Ideology and
Law, (London, Academic Press, 1979) in Roman Tomasic, The Sociology of Law, (London,
SAGE Publications, 1985) at 13.
24
D. Grimm, “Der Wandel der Staatsaufgaben und die Zukufunt der Verfassung” in D. Grimm
(ed.) Staatsaufgaben, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996), 613-646 and E.-W. Bockenforde, “The rise of
the state as a process of secularisation”, in E.-W. Bockenforde (ed.), State, Society and Liberty
Studies in Political Theory and Constitucional Law, (Trans. J.A. Underwood, New York and
Oxford, Berg, 1991), 26-46 in Peer Zumbansen, “Governance: an Interdisciplinary Perspective”,
in David Levi-Faur (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2012) at 86.
25
Michael Mc Cann, “Rights at Work: pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization”, in
Kostiner, “Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social
Change”, (2003) 323 Law & Society Review 2 at 324. Helena Silverstein, “Laws, Meaning, and
the Animal Rights Movement”, in Kostiner, Id.
26
The workers’ organizations did not offer unconditional support to all the new reforms. They did
not, for example, support the Workers’ Security Fund (Law 4.054). They criticized the reforms as
a “fraudulent attempt to legally rob the workers of their wages”. The organizations added that
workers would never be able to enjoy their pensions, as their miserable conditions would not
permit them to live to the required age to obtain the pension. They also argued that while
employers contributed to the Fund, eventually and ultimately the workers would suffer due to poor
living conditions. They concluded that the creation of the Ministry of Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare,
Labor and Social Welfare Hygiene, did not necessarily support the interests of the working class.
In contrast, the medical intelligentsia supported the overall model of the welfare state in its
construction of a new and modern concept of "welfare", successor to the concept of charity.
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operations in the northern regions of Chile between 1910 and 1920. This entailed
the need for social policies that could alleviate growing concerns about the
struggle for subsistence. In this context of social turmoil, the working class began
to take on an important political significance as a force of electoral support. At the
same time, new movements within the military faction called for a Constituent
Assembly. Alessandri was recalled to the presidency to complete his agenda of
reform, beginning with a new constitution that was ratified in September 1925.
The new constitution reflected international changes and global trends,
such as a tendency to recognize individual rights and a growing acceptance of
the state’s obligation to ensure social rights. Essentially, it gave the executive
branch broad administrative powers, increasing the presidential term from five to
six years, with direct election. The 1925 Constitution deprived the Chamber of
Deputies of the authority to impeach ministers, but it upheld its right to indict
ministers and the president of the Republic for abuse of power. It also
established the incompatibility of the position of minister with that of a member of
Parliament. It determined the separation of the church from the state and
guaranteed freedom of religion and conscience, while ensuring civil liberties and
individual guarantees. The protection of labour, industry and social welfare was
ensured. The new constitution also helped create the Electoral Court and the
Central Bank.
These legal provisions also sought to protect workers’ right to social
welfare, decent housing and satisfactory socio-economic conditions and to
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guarantee the health of the population. That same year, Decree-Law 379 27
approved the final text of Law 4,05528 on workplace accidents. Under this new
law, the definition of “workplace accidents” did not change, but now the onus of
proof fell on the employer and not on the employee, as in the past, employees
had to demonstrate that they had suffered an accident at the workplace (theory
of fault liability or tort). Since the new law followed contractual theory, it was a
significant advance from the previous legislation.
Notwithstanding these social advances, the conservative opposition and
labour unions were, for different and even opposing reasons, strongly against to
these changes and reforms. The same year, 1925, the Social Republicans’
Front29 was created, with the aim of safeguarding social legislation. Among its
leaders were workers, employees, and two medical students.30 The importance
of this Front lies in its reconceptualization of the corporate welfare state—a

27

Decree-Law L 379 (1925). Work Accidents. The employer's responsibility also extended to
diseases resulting indirectly from the exercise of the profession or the work undertaken by the
employee, and which caused the disability. Without prejudice to the responsibility of the
employer, the accident victim, or those who are entitled to damages, can also claim from third
parties responsible for the accident, the total compensation for the damage suffered in
accordance with the requirements of the law. When it came to a case where a third party, having
caused the accident, was required to pay, this law absolved the employer of all responsibility
towards paying the compensation. The law provided for full coverage of occupational injury and
illness (medical benefits in cash and in kind).
28
Law 4,055 (1924). Reformed the Law of Industrial Accidents. An industrial accident meant
any accidental injury suffered by the worker or employee during work or in any way related to
his/her work, and resulting in disability. The employer was liable for accidents and injuries
sustained by their workers or employees. However, the employer was not liable for accidents that
occurred in bizarre circumstances, unrelated to the work and intentionally caused by the victim.
No. 5 of Article 574 of DFL 178, Social Welfare, published on May 28, 1931, along with other laws
relating to work, merged into a single text of this law, and finally repealed this rule.
29
Frente Social Republicano.
30
J. Flores, La Dictadura de Ibáñez y los Sindicatos (1927-1931), (Santiago, Dirección de
Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos, 1993) at 79.
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model that would subsequently be taken up by Chile’s Social Republican Union
of Employees.31
In 1926, the Workers’ Federation of Chile 32 and employee unions
supported by the Communist Party 33 organized national strikes and protests
demanding the immediate dissolution of Law 4,054, the elimination of the newly
formed Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare, Labour and Social Welfare and the end of
the welfare state model.34 González Cortés, a deputy at the time, expressed
what was being disputed by workers’ organizations with great clarity: “...the
Compulsory Insurance will smoothly and rationally generate social peace, a
friendly alliance between the two major factors of production [i.e. capital and
labour], today deeply divorced due to the sad and real misery of those who work
and to the blind and senseless hatred that the professionals of the revolution and
their crazy dreams are condensing in them.”35

31

Unión Social Republicana de Asalariados de Chile
Federación de Trabajadores de Chile (FTCH).
33
The Communist Party was founded in 1922 and which began to have a strong presence in the
organization of Chilean working class activities. Until then, these had been organized and
coordinated by the Democratic Party, led by Luis Emilio Recabarren considered the father of the
Chilean labor movement.
Luis Emilio Recabarren was born in Valparaiso in 1876, from very poor parents and worked from
a young age as typographer. With formal schooling, he was self-taught. In 1894 he joined the
Democratic Party of Chile. He became an ardent public speaker and founded several
organizations and newspapers to foment solidarity within the workers. Became director and editor
of the El Trabajo (Work) newspaper. Later he became the publisher of the La Vanguardia
(Vanguard) newspaper. Recabarren was elected Member of Parliament in 1906, representing the
Democratic Party, but he was prevented though from assuming his position because he refused
to be sworn on a bible. He was very involved with the Labor movement and was prosecuted to
exile in Argentina. In 1910, after returning from Europe he was arrested and sent to jail. He
founded the Socialist Party in 1912 and founded several other politically engaged newspapers. In
1918 he contributed to the foundation of the Argentina’s Communist Party and later in the 1922
the Chilean Communist Party. He lost the presidential election in 1920, while being in jail.
34
Illanes, “En Nombre del Pueblo, del Estado y de la Ciencia...”, supra note 15 at 228.
35
Chamber of Deputies, Session Bulletin, 25th Special Session, May 19, 1922. Bill declaring
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However, the expanding welfare state continued to enact new laws and
regulations, extending social legislation. The second Health Code was created
along with the Higher Council for Child Welfare 36 and the Central Board of
Welfare and Social Assistance,37 which was an autonomous entity with technical
and financial resources. This semi-public institution was responsible for the
management, administration and construction of hospitals, shelters, asylums,
mental institutions and orphanages. Two years later, in 1927, charitable services,
medical services and compulsory insurance were centralized and regulated by
Decree 2,101, and Decree 581 also approved a set of laws on occupational
diseases.
Numerous social measures resulted from the new institutions founded in
the 1920s, which sustained the increased action of the welfare state. The
functions that Decree-Law 689 of October 17, 1925 prescribed for the Council for
Social Assistance and Welfare Departmental Boards were subsequently moved
to the Central Board of Charities. 38 Decree with Force of Law (DFL) 178 39
compulsory Sickness and Invalidity insurance submitted by Exequiel González Cortés. Also
processed the Act that created the Fund for Private Employees based on the individual
capitalization system enacted in 1925.
36
Consejo Superior para la Protección de la Infancia.
37
Junta Central de Beneficencia y Asistencia Social.
38
The Central Board of Charities served the Welfare Services and Social Welfare under the
authority of the President of the Republic. It was composed of the following members: The Social
Welfare Minister who presided over the board; the President of Charity Services of Santiago, the
Director General of Health, two members of the Council of Welfare, and the Dean of the Faculty
of Medicine. The Central Board appointed the presidents of the Charity Services- both, Provincial
and Departmental. Medical assistance as in the Compulsory Insurance Act 4054, and which was
granted to individual employees, eventually came under the jurisdiction of the Central Board of
Charities. The President had to decree the regulations for the operation of Charitable Services
and Social Welfare.
39
Decree-Law (DFL). 178 (1931). Created the Labour Code. Merged laws and decree-laws
promulgated between 1917 and 1931.
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created the first Labour Code in Chile, and in terms of social security, it is worthy
of note that employers were obliged to take all necessary steps to effectively
protect the lives and health of their workers and employees. They were
responsible for all hygiene and safety measures in the workplace and for
facilitating timely and adequate medical, pharmaceutical and hospital care.40
At the end of 1927, the new Chilean political landscape again witnessed
major changes. President Alessandri resigned due to lack of support from
General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who had previously brought him to the
presidency in the 1924 military revolt. Alessandri went into exile, and the
government was taken over on an interim basis while General Ibáñez, without
the support of the political establishment, announced his candidacy for the
presidency. Finally, Emiliano Figueroa, the sole candidate for the Liberals,
Conservatives and Radicals, won by a large majority, but he was rapidly
subjected to pressure by the now Minister of Internal Affairs, General Ibáñez. A
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Injury: referred to an accident that the worker or employee had suffered on account of or in
connection to his work. The employer was liable for accidents caused to their workers and
employees, except for accidents occurring under bizarre circumstances, those unrelated to work,
and those intentionally caused by the victim. The onus of proving the exceptions stated above fell
on the employer.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the victim of the accident or anyone entitled to compensation
could claim compensation from third parties for the damage suffered. The employer was held
responsible for a disease caused directly by the exercise of the profession or work performed by
the worker or employee, which caused the worker’s disability. There were three types of
Disabilities: temporary, permanent-partial and permanent-total. If the accident resulted in Death,
the relatives and other persons mentioned in the Code were entitled to compensation. Other
important issues to be highlighted are the following:
Pregnant workers were entitled to have a six weeks break before birth and six weeks after. The
employer was required to reserve the working position and had to pay a subsidy. The working
places had to have independent adjoining facilities, where mothers could breastfeed their children
and leave them there while they were at work. In the warehouses, shops, bazaars and other
similar commercial establishments, the employer had to maintain a sufficient number of seats and
chairs and make them available to the dependents or employees.
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new election ultimately brought the general to power, and he ruled in a dictatorial
fashion from 1927 to 1932, suspending Parliament and administering the country
with decree-laws. The repression led to arrests, and many of his former allies
and partners were forced into exile. His aim was to institutionalize a “foundational
state” through a project of “national salvation”. This came as a response to his
desire for a strong government that would put an end to government corruption
and public disorder and rebuild political parties, Parliament and the concept of
the free vote. With an anti-oligarchic discourse, Ibáñez sought to contain the
ruling class and resolve what he saw as the moral crisis of Chilean society.
Ibáñez sought the support of a fraction of workers attracted by the idea of
non-politicized policies free of class distinctions, put forward by the Republican
Confederation of Civic Action (CRAC, 1929-1931). 41

& 42

His main political

instrument and argument was social legislation, which allowed him to delimit the
boundaries of social conflict in legal terms.43 He also created new social and
health-related institutions, like the Biological Society of Chile44 founded in 1928.
Shortly afterward, in 1929, the Bacteriological Institute45 was established, which
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Flores, “La Dictadura de Ibáñez y los Sindicatos (1927-1931)”, supra note 30 at 127 in Mario
Parada, (2004) Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile: un análisis
sociológico, (Ph.D. Thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain) at 159.
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Confederación Republicana de Acción Civil.
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Ibáñez requested the elaboration of the Work Code, promulgated in 1931.
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Sociedad Biológica de Chile.
45
The Bacteriological Institute of Chile, created by the Act 4556 was designed to accomplish the
following: 1) A forum for bacteriologists, who were dedicated to research and other working
needs required in the country; 2) The development of serums, vaccines, biological products and
biochemical in general; and 3) Control of the manufacture and sale of bacteriologist products, in
accordance with the guidelines issued by the Directorate General of Health. The Bacteriological
Institute of Chile was also legally entitled to carry out manufacturing and sales. The Institute was
dependent on the Ministry of Education, notwithstanding the technical supervision exercised by
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was responsible for the development of biological and chemical products,
scientific research and the training of hygienists. That same year, the Superior
Council of Hygiene46 was also created, and in 1931, Law 5,51547 created the
Central Board of Charities.48
Ibáñez’s uncertainty concerning the implementation of a refounding of the
state, along with his indifference to workers’ claims, the economic crisis of 1930
and the fatigue across the political spectrum caused by indiscriminate
repression,49 led to the failure of his corporatist projects. His initiative to unify,
without consultation and by decree, all health care services under a new superministry of social welfare sparked the fury of professionals, teachers and
students in the medical field. Ultimately, the dictator-president resigned due to
pressure from a large civic movement, with doctors and medical students playing
a major role.50 There ended the advancement of corporatist initiatives, but not
their underlying ideology, which remained latent in the conservative mind until
their comeback in the mid-1960s.
the Ministry of Social Welfare, through the Directorate General of Health. A Director who was
appointed by the President of the Republic headed the Institute. It comprised of the following
departments: Biochemistry, Bacteriology, and Control. A Board of Directors, consisting of the
Director and Heads of Departments, formed the management. The Institute had to supply their
products to all the institutions designated by the Government. It conducted free examinations,
and provided bacteriological, immunological and entomological support.
46
Consejo Superior de Higiene.
47
Law 5,515 (1932). Created the Central Board of Charities. Appointed the Board’s members
and executive officers and outlined the conditions for electing the remaining members, including
the vice-president. According to this law, the president of the Board was the Minister of Social
Welfare.
48
Junta Central de Beneficencia.
49
Persecution, banishment and exile of prominent figures like Arturo Alessandri and Dr. Exequiel
González Cortés.
50
Contributed to the death of a medical student in the riots during the civil insurrection against
Ibáñez.
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In the 1930s, a new phase in the conceptual development of Chilean
medicine began. A series of new principles was being applied in the organization
of care services, such as periodic planning, comprehensive treatments, multiplecause diagnoses, a concentration of efforts towards the most vulnerable people,
the creation of a public technical authority and the ongoing responsibility of the
state in social matters. Along the same lines was the growing state involvement
in pension policies. In 1930, blue-collar workers and journalists saw the creation
of the National Public Employees and Journalists Fund 51 as an autonomous
institution and a legal entity in itself. The Fund, among other functions, was
responsible for managing the payment of pensions and allowances, which the
law provided for by means of a Trust Fund established specifically for this
purpose along with life insurance allocations when needed.52 The country already
had the necessary legal basis for state intervention, reinforced by the 1925
Constitution and the 1931 Health Code.53 The provisions of the Health Code
governed all matters relating to public health in the country.
At the same time, the impact of the global economic crisis of the 1930s
and disputes within the Chilean working class led to the creation of the Socialist
Party in 1933. Later, 1937 saw the introduction of free distribution of milk to
51

Decree-Law (DFL) 1,340 Bis (1931). Creates the National Public Employees and Journalist
Fund. Caja Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Periodistas (CEPP)
52
All employees appointed by the President or any other competent authorities, and those being
paid out of public funds, were subject to the provisions of this Act. In terms of benefits, they were
entitled to retirement or a disability pension, a family subsidy and a life insurance. Medical
services and the possibility of applying for loans from the fund were additional benefits.
53
Law 226 (1931). Established the Public Health Code. (Código Sanitario). The Health Code
also created the National Health Service under the responsibility of a General Manager who
necessarily had to be a doctor.
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children under two years of age, and in 1938, Law 6,174 54 established the
principles of preventive medicine with the aim of defending and restoring the
productive capacity of the workforce, which suffered from tuberculosis,
rheumatism, syphilis and cardiovascular diseases, as well as many other
disabilities and illnesses caused by poor working conditions. This law came as a
response to the fact that the curative system was not adequately protecting the
population, as both visible morbidity and hidden (cardiovascular) morbidity were
having a serious impact on workers and their families. The law thus ordered the
implementation of regular health check-ups for workers. The Workers’ Insurance
Fund, through its own medical services, offered medical care, allowing the Fund
to monitor the health conditions of its members and prevent the onset of chronic
disease, along with detecting the causes of occupational diseases. The Fund
also created the Mother and Child Division for workers and their wives during
pregnancy (a preventive measure) and for the children of the insured up to two
years of age (a combined measure of prevention, care and protection).
Chile’s social and health laws up to 1938/1939 already illustrated the
state’s involvement in health and welfare. However, the multiplicity of institutions
that were created, then modified, subdivided or merged, in addition to the
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Law 6,174 (1938). Established the Department of Preventive Medicine. Established that all
provident funds to be covered by Act No. 5.802, would come under the purview of the Ministry of
Health, Welfare and Social Assistance, and Mutual of Police. It provided for preventive medical
services to monitor the health status by imposing and adopting measures aimed at discovering,
and preventing the early development of chronic diseases such as tuberculosis, syphilis,
rheumatism, diseases of the heart and kidneys, as well as work related diseases: lead poisoning,
anthracnose, silicosis, hookworm, and others of the same nature.
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fragmentation of family coverage (i.e. different members of a family were covered
by different services or divisions), caused the curative and preventive services to
become both expensive and complex. Furthermore, the welfare state model had
failed to resolve the lack of access to public services for the middle classes.
Hence, the universal right to medical care became the great challenge of the
Popular Front, which took office in 1938. It was in this new political scenario that
the minister of health of the time, the socialist Salvador Allende, emerged as the
architect of the relationship between politics, social medicine and the medical
movement.
The Socialist Party joined the Communist Party and the Radical Party
(sectors linked to the petite bourgeoisie, the middle classes and professionals) to
form the Popular Front, 55 which won the 1938 presidential elections and
accelerated the process of industrialization and the increased involvement of the
state in social affairs. 56 A major earthquake in 1939 placed a number of
additional demands upon the health sector, and therefore the administrative

55

The Popular Front in Chile was an electoral and political left-wing coalition from 1937 to
February 1941, made up of the Radical Party, The Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the
Radical Socialist Party. Two of the Popular Front presidents belonged to the Radical Party (a
middle-class, liberal party). Other organizations, such as the Confederation of Chilean Workers
(Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile), the native Mapuche movement (Frente Único
Araucano) and the women’s movement (Movimiento Pro-emancipación de las Mujeres de Chile),
also joined the Popular Front. The Popular Front candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, won the
presidential elections in 1938 and governed until his death in 1941. The Front was then
transformed into the Democratic Alliance, which also won the 1942 presidential election, with
Gabriel González Videla as president.
56
Carolina Tetelboin, (1980) La práctica médica en Chile, (Thesis, Universidad Autónoma
Metropolitana-Xochimiloho, México) at 46-47.

69

harmonization of different health-related services became an imperative of the
times.57 & 58

2. TOWARDS THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (SNS): 1939-1952
The Popular Front administration brought the Socialists and Communists
into the already established bargaining system for political negotiations,
transforming potentially revolutionary forces into relatively moderate participants
in legal institutions. The newly elected President Pedro Aguirre Cerda59 pursued
a model of state capitalism in which the government collaborated with private
enterprise in the construction of a mixed economy. The Popular Front promoted
import substitution industrialization along with welfare measures for the urban
middle and working classes.
Early in 1941, the Socialist Party withdrew from the Popular Front coalition
because of its animosity towards the Communist Party, its rival in its claim to
worker loyalty and Marxist inspiration. Because the Conservatives and Liberals
blocked nearly all legislation in Congress, little social reform was accomplished,
57

Roberto Belmar & T. Hall, “Evaluation of Chile’s Health Care System 1973-1976”, (1977) 7
International Journal of Heath Services 532.
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T. Hall & P. Díaz, “Social Security and Heath Care Patterns in Chile”, (1971) 1 International
Journal of Medical and Sanitary Services 364.
59
Pedro Aguirre Cerda was born in 1879. He became a Spanish teacher in 1900, and in 1904, a
lawyer. He completed law studies at the Sorbonne in France and later became president of the
National Society of Teachers. He was also a member of Parliament, a deputy and a senator, and
he was the first dean of the new economics school at the University of Chile. As a member of the
Radical Party, he was the minister of Public Instruction and of Internal Affairs, serving two
presidents (Juan Luis Sanfuentes and Arturo Alessandri). He was also an active politician against
the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. In 1938, he won the presidential election to become
president with the Popular Front under the slogan, “To govern is to educate”, promoting technical
and industrial schools, creating thousands of new regular schools and encouraging the growth of
the university system to cover the entire country.
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except for improvements in housing and education. The greatest achievement of
the Popular Front was the creation, in 1939, of the Corporation for the Promotion
of Development and Production.
In January 1941, Law 6,640 was merged with Law 6,334 (1939) and the
revised text approved creating the Corporation for Reconstruction, Relief and
Development of Production. This new law subsequently created two separate
entities: the Corporation for the Promotion of Development and Production
(CORFO)60 and the Corporation for Relief and Reconstruction. The CORFO was
founded to promote domestic production in order to raise the population’s
standard of living by exploiting the country’s natural conditions, lowering
production

costs,

supplying

credit

to

new

enterprises,

especially

in

manufacturing, and improving Chile’s international balance of payments.
The CORFO mission also included maintaining a geographic balance in
the development of mining activities, agriculture, industry and trade, thereby
ensuring the satisfaction of the economic needs of different regions. The
Corporation also collaborated in the manufacture and import of machinery and
other elements of production. It put forward proposals and helped in the adoption
of measures to increase domestic consumption, and it advocated a greater
participation of Chilean interests in industrial and commercial activities. Finally,
CORFO oversaw the various means by which the general developmental and
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Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO).
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production plan was being financed, and it tracked the direct funding of various
planned works and granted loans according to the law.
In terms of health care, this historical period saw trade unions’ demands
and petitions for improved universal medical care and comprehensive health care
services. They called for such services to be coordinated and integrated in order
to facilitate workers’ access to medical benefits. There was also the support of
the medical profession, which, lacking alternatives, was eager to advance the
project that sought to unify and better coordinate work opportunities and
professional development.
These transformations in health services took place while a whole new
economic sector was developing: the large mining industry. This spawned new
types of social organizations, increasing the unionization of workers and
stimulating active state intervention in labour-capital relations. In a move towards
the preventive and curative integration of health services, coverage slowly
broadened to include workers’ families, directed more towards a specific class, or
its sub-groups, than towards the individual. Funding for the new administration of
these services was obtained through contributions from beneficiaries, employers
and the state, while the medical profession was increasingly demanding better
planning.61
Once political conditions were more appropriate for a deeper reform, the
Popular Front government submitted a bill to Congress known as the “National
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Health Service Bill”, which was the first of its kind in Latin America and only the
second in the world, after the British National Health Service. 62 However,
President Aguirre Cerda established two conditions for the bill: it had to be
accompanied by a “down-to-earth” development program and by sound
economic studies, assuring the availability of resources. The approach was
based on a formula according to which all of society contributed to the funding of
the service with a solidarity-based system.
The proposal incorporated the original objectives for establishing a
professional corporation, but considerably widened the scope and influence of
such a corporation. The project boasted a laudable mission—to strongly protect
public health and maintain a high level of professional ethics, thereby promoting
the public medical profession and punishing those doctors who did not comply
with these ethical principles. In this new scheme, the role and activities of the
profession remained the responsibility of the Medical College. Holding onto these
responsibilities was intended to assure physicians a central position in the health
system. Accordingly, it was proposed that physicians should also get involved in
legislative reform and procedures, as well as in the administration and control of
public health services, private medical institutions and all or part of the health
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sector. 63 However, entrusting these responsibilities to physicians displeased
parliamentarians, particularly lawyers, who expressed their concern at the
provision that physicians’ disciplinary tribunals would have the power to
administer justice on economic and ethical issues related to their professional
practice. Ultimately, the project was deemed to be extremely flawed and was
rejected by Parliament. President Aguirre Cerda died of tuberculosis on
November 25, 1941, and a new president, Juan Antonio Ríos, was elected in
1942.
The same year, as a result of the merger between the Central Department
of Maternity Protection and the Department of Infant Health, the General
Directorate for the Protection of Maternal Health, Children and Adolescents
(PROTINFA)64 was created. This Directorate carried out preventive activities for
mothers and children who were not benefiting from the services provided by the
Workers’ Insurance Fund. Despite a limited budget that severely restricted its
work, PROTINFA offered preventive and curative maternal care, childcare, dental
care, maternity clinics, hospitals for children with special needs and orphanages.
It thus sought to protect and assist mothers from the early stages of pregnancy
up to the end of the breastfeeding period and then to assist children through to
adolescence.65
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Also in 1942, the Employees’ National Health Service (SERMENA)66 was
created and tasked with providing medical and dental benefits to public and
private employees. SERMENA was founded by merging the health departments
of the National Fund for Public Employees and Journalists (CEPP)67 and the
Private

Employees’

Prevention

Fund

(EMPART).

68

These

were

semi-

autonomous public administrative entities whose funding came from the
contributions of employees and manual workers (who had a different contractual
legal status and public benefits) and from state funds. The SERMENA, as a new
system, offered enhanced benefits for private and public employees and
constituted an innovative body in Chilean health care. It offered a free-choice
system (services could be paid for with vouchers provided to beneficiaries) for
private and public employees of the Social Security Services (SSS), and for
retirees and their families. Later, in 1968, the SERMENA was restructured under
Law 16,781,69 which aimed to reorganize curative medicine.
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Chile went through different stages in its socio-economic development and
was also subject to significant international influence, which shaped its social
model and its health system. In the mid-20th century, the country was embedded
in the economic traditions characteristic of “Third World” models, as monoexporters of raw materials and natural resources. As in other countries in Latin
America, attempts were made to apply alternative economic and social
(“developmentalist”)

models

that

implemented

the

Import

Substitution

Industrialization (ISI) strategy, with an emphasis on Keynesian economic policies
and a welfare state. This was even further developed during the Popular Front
governments between 1938 and 1941 and in the years that followed.
Health policies were also highly influenced by changes in domestic
economic relations and by the influence of the international context of the period.
For example, a partnership between the School of Sanitation and the Rockefeller
Foundation was included among the objectives of the Division of Health and
Hygiene at the Institute of Inter-American Relations. The Institute, created in
1942, pursued military, political, productive and moral objectives. Its political
objectives were to improve health conditions in zones considered strategic for the
their dependents were excluded from the purview of this law. In accordance with Article 65 of
Decree-Law No. 338 of 1960, all those who could be considered as dependents of
parliamentarians - serving and retired - were entitled to the benefits prescribed by this law. The
administration of the health care system created by this law, and in particular, the Medical
Assistance Fund that would fund all or part of the benefits, was entrusted to the National Medical
Service for Employees (SERMENA). The Medical Assistance Fund granted a number of benefits,
including, medical consultation, surgery, several medical tests and examinations, hospitalizations,
emergencies, and obstetric and dental care. The benefits were granted by the SERMENA under
the "free choice" protocol (the beneficiaries could choose the provider of the medical service).
The SERMENA had the power to sign agreements with the National Health Service or any other
public or private entity. The law also created the National Advisory Council on Health in the
Ministry of Public Health.
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United States and its allies. In practical terms, its goal was to be instrumental in
the growth and development of the industrial sector by stimulating improvements
in productivity, obtained principally by improving the health of the workforce. The
Institute’s moral objective was to demonstrate the tangible benefits that resulted
from democracy in action and to gain the support of the working population.
Collaboration with the United States came in the form not only of funding for
hygiene programs, but also of training for medical doctors and human resource
development.
In 1943, the School of Public Health 70 at the University of Chile was
created in response to the urgent demands of public sector health institutions.
The new school offered specialized training in techniques that could provide
responses to the needs and concerns of health institutions. Two years later, the
National Health Board created the Health Units,71 which were inspired by the
United States Health Centers. These units were preventive in nature and
constituted the first attempt to implement a holistic type of medicine at the
municipal level. Hence, the distinction between preventive and curative medicine
was re-evaluated, and access to medical services in suburbs and underprivileged
neighbourhoods was ensured. 72 A considerable number of Latin American
physicians were trained in different public health schools in US universities and
later served in several Chilean public health departments. It thus became
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possible to articulate a particular conception, paradigm or understanding of public
health and its role in Latin America, and this conception was promoted, spread
and implemented in several countries in the region.
Also in 1943 and despite numerous objections to the “excessive medical
dictatorship”, the National Health Service Bill was finally approved and sent to
parliamentary committees. Once again it suffered setbacks, which continued for
another four years until 1947, when a controversial article regarding doctors’
authority on wages for professionals working in the public sector was eliminated.
A swift final vote in Congress approved the bill. On that occasion, the then
senator Allende stated that for the first time in the history of Chile, doctors and
senators agreed. It is worth noting that the mandate of the Popular Front’s health
experts was to ensure compulsory social welfare managed under government
control, delivering preventive and curative physical and mental health care. The
overall strategy was threefold: a) a social medical program aimed essentially at
improving health and nutrition, b) a national campaign against pests and viruses,
and c) improved housing standards for families.73
At the international level, at around the same time as the creation of the
United Nations in 1945, the World Health Organization (WHO) was founded. A
process of redesigning existing regional entities was also taking place, such as
the reconfiguration of the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) and the
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Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, now ECLAC). Also, during this
time, innovative changes were taking place throughout the region with respect to
health and its relationship to economic development. According to the new
conception, health was not simply the “absence of disease”, but according to the
WHO definition, it was also “the complete state of physical, mental and social
well-being”. Meanwhile, the Chilean state was praised for playing an important
role in the planning of health actions and their integration with national
development.
In this historical context, the Popular Front government introduced a new
bill to bring the management of all hospitals under a single government agency.
These hospitals were classified into three broad sectors: 1) private charity
hospitals, which received government subsidies; 2) social security medical
services, and 3) state-run health care organizations, such as the Board of Health
and the Directorate for the Protection of Maternal Health, Children and
Adolescents (PROTINFA), which provided primary-level care and delivered
preventive health programs. The bill would eliminate at least six state agencies,
which would be merged into one new organization. At the time, the eradication of
the divisions of Public Health, Charity and Security appeared to be a significant
political loss for the purposes of allocating government posts, which went against
the traditional pursuit of the support necessary to remain in power. The growth of
the state bureaucracy since the 1930s indicates an unnatural expansion,
especially in the social realm. This is a reflection of ongoing agreements and
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circumstantial political settlements more than any actual requirements or real or
legitimate technical or institutional needs.74 The bill took ten years to become
law.
The reality in Chile and the long history of negotiations between political
actors and civil society was a reflection of the complexity of the situation and of a
society that was very fragmented, highly politicized and with a great degree of
participation in public life. As Zumbansen indicates, the forces of cohesion in a
society are profoundly complex and fragmented: “The reason for the growing
regulatory challenges to modern law was and continues to be the rising
complexity of society. To address a multiplicity of values, interests and
rationalities with a dedication to democratic governance ultimately to result in
consensus idealizes the forces of cohesion in a society that is actually deeply
complex and fragmented.”
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However, this context was not only a great

challenge; it was also, as demonstrated above, what enabled actors to express
themselves and citizens’ voices to be heard during the legislative process.
Referring to Zumbansen, this offers “great hope for to better identify the potential
of law to play a distinct role in the complex array of voices and forces.”76
In the 1946 elections, the Radical Party candidate, Gabriel González
Videla, won with 40.1% of the total vote and, according to the Constitution,
74
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required Congress to ratify his election. Without sufficient parliamentary support,
González Videla was forced to redefine his alliances and make pacts with the
Liberals. This entailed a major constraint for the centre-left coalition that had
originally proposed and supported his candidacy. It even gave way to the
unprecedented occurrence of Communist leaders taking on three ministerial
portfolios. But later, in 1947, after municipal elections that increased support for
the Communists, the Liberals refused to work with the Communist ministers and
demanded their expulsion from government.77 This situation was exacerbated in
the context of the Cold War and, in response to pressure exerted by the United
States and Great Britain, González Videla denounced a Communist conspiracy
against the established order.
Chile quickly became enmeshed in the Cold War, as Moscow and
especially Washington meddled in its affairs. As a result, González Videla also
launched a parliamentary debate that culminated in the 1948 enactment of the
Law for the Defence of Democracy, otherwise known by the opposition as the
“damned law”. He expelled the Communist Party from his cabinet and then
completely banned them from participating in politics under the new law.
Although González Videla feared Communist intentions and respected the
wishes of the United States government, he also turned against the Communist
Party for several other reasons, including his wishes to mollify right-wing critics of
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his government, especially landowners, to whom he promised a continuing
moratorium on peasant unionization. He also sought to remove any ideological
justification for a military coup. 78 For the following ten years, the so-called
“damned law” proscribed the Communist Party.79 In addition to the repressive
repercussions, this provoked popular protests and ultimately led to the
fragmentation of the party system.80
Meanwhile, the protection model developed in Europe was attracting
enormous interest around the world, including in Chile, which sent legal and
health professionals off to Europe to study it in the field. In their report, two
specialists (Pinto Santa Cruz, an attorney and Dr. Viel, a medical doctor)
introduced the “ought to be” concept of social protection, illustrating it with the
successful British model and comparing it to the Chilean situation. Their report
showed that the country was able to reach a “higher state of consciousness” with
respect to social rights with the same legal, institutional and technical elements
already in place. They put forward three lines of action that would be necessary
in order to achieve these objectives: 1) address/reduce risks that affect
productive capacity (epidemiology, sanitation, safety and hygiene) in coordination
with a sanitary housing plan; 2) provide curative care for the population, including
78
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periodic check-ups, early diagnosis, clinical treatment and rehabilitation; and 3)
provide monetary subsidies for citizens when deprived of income due to illness,
disability, unemployment, etc.
The development of these lines of action involved a dual structure—one
that could maintain workers’ economic security while protecting their “physical
and biological” integrity. Policies developed under these lines of action also had
to be in harmony with the imperative to maintain purchasing power, fair income
distribution and the productive capacity of the population. In summary, the model
clearly reflected a way of organizing services that was based on a notion of
solidarity. It was postulated that to be effective, the new social system should be
considered along with other important measures. Among these were wage
increases and a comprehensive social protection plan based on the principles of
unity, consistency, continuity and universality in the legal protection of all people,
at all stages of life and independent of a person’s occupational activity. With
regard to the administration of the system and given the characteristics of
Chilean insurance and medical care, the distinction between “commercial
services” and “personal services” was to be highlighted. 81 Personal services
included medical services offered to all members of the community, not as
charity, but as a right guaranteed by law and implemented by the National Health
Service.82
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This entailed a significant break with previous policies and demonstrated
how the health system was being reformed and health legislation was being
articulated as a function of new socio-economic and political conjunctures, in
response to competing interests and the local importance of international
influence. The most important consequence of social policy reforms was the reconceptualization of the social functions of the modern state, bringing various
inter-linked institutions together under the same welfare principle. However,
although these different institutions shared similar objectives and functions, they
were not governed by any national guidelines, coordination or planning.
Moreover, the beneficiaries of the different services were completely dispersed
due to the fragmentation of both public and private-public institutions. The
duplication of roles was common, and comprehensive family care was suffering.
Laboratory and radiological examinations, for example, were conducted when a
patient first consulted with a doctor, and then repeated in the hospital when the
patient was subsequently hospitalized.83 The atomization of services and a lack
of coordination contributed to the need to create a single health care service at
the national level. In addition, some experiences of collaboration between
different services, such as the “coordinated fight against venereal diseases,”
demonstrated the possibility and effectiveness of a single national health service.
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Ultimately, tight budgets and administrative barriers limited the efficiency of all
existing services.
The Radical Party84 and the centrist Falange Nacional Party disagreed on
proposals regarding the future implementation of the National Health Service.
This divergence further postponed the adoption of the law while also highlighting
major differences between the government and the opposition. This became
evident with regard to certain articles in the bill addressing the feasibility of
merging services and concerns about the future of preventive medicine. 85
Another key issue was the future of curative medicine, which, according to the
government and to conservative political forces, should be in the hands of either
the public or the private sector.86
Further, the importance of other factors that also delayed the reform
cannot be overlooked. These were related to the government’s economic plan,
which, as indicated, sought to align economic policies with the national program
of import substitution industrialization. Given the political strength of the rightwing parties in Congress, doubled by the de facto power of the conservative
forces, which controlled most of the media and business, negotiations on the
84
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economic program significantly limited social reforms, which would have imposed
even greater tax burdens on capital. President González Videla was in a minority
position and did not respect the commitments of the same political parties that
had put him into the presidency. Changes in the political discourse before and
after the election were considered serious and unacceptable. The crisis led the
president to veer to the right in exchange for support from conservative political
forces. Moreover, strict bicameralism demanded a verdict from both houses, thus
further delaying the legislative process.
The lawmaking process was also subject to a likely presidential veto, thus
making the elimination of the entire National Health Service Bill even more
probable. As deliberations about the SNS continued, in December 1948, DFL
9,263 87 , 88 created the Medical College, thus converting the Chilean Medical
Association into a professional body that granted doctors official representation,
allowed them to participate as official interlocutors with state authorities and
ensured their ethical and professional regulation. Membership in the Medical
College was mandatory for physicians, which contributed to control by peers and
87
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reinforced the credibility of the health care institutions. This legislative change,
however, revealed important disputes within the medical profession, whose
political action on specific social issues reflected divisions along party lines. The
Medical College thus failed to reach unanimity on a professional vision of the
economic and labour demands of doctors and other health professionals. Given
the growing political and economic importance of the middle class and the
strengthening of corporatism, it was not possible to ignore or easily overcome the
vagueness and lack of consensus that plagued the physicians’ decisions.89
Debate over the need to extend curative care to the entire population
continued. Senator Allende indicated that the impact of the SNS was immense.
He also declared that he was convinced that these ideas, for which he had fought
for so many years along with workers and technicians, employees, professionals
and intellectuals, would become a reality and would constitute an advance in
social legislation.90 To appease right-wing opposition to the SNS Bill, the article
on public care for work-related accidents was removed, and it was proposed that
this responsibility remain in the hands of private insurers. For their part, the
Liberals supported the “free-choice” format in order to give greater options to
patients and to encourage physicians to fulfill their “mission” and “cease thinking
of the patient as just statistics”.91 On another front, through political transactions,
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a political agreement was reached to include the SERMENA in the SNS. This
suggestion was incorporated into the bill that government sent to Congress, but
President González Videla soon vetoed it. The health minister explained that
instead, a provision would be introduced into the law allowing the president to
decide, by simple decree and whenever deemed appropriate, to include the
SERMENA in the SNS.92
With a “national consensus” cabinet formed by members of the Radical
Party, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, the government faced a very
difficult economic and social situation. Finance Minister Jorge Alessandri
balanced fiscal accounts and increased the salaries of civil servants, but he soon
had to propose special legislation imposing measures to stabilize prices and
wages, causing major popular upheavals. In January 1950, the Chilean National
Board of Employees93 sparked a general standstill with a series of strikes. The
ambiguity of the Radical Party led it to support the strikers against the president,
forcing him to meet popular demands. Almost immediately the press accused
him of leading “a government that works for the unions”. Only a month later, the
government changed the composition of its alliances by calling on Radicals,
Social Christians and Falangists to join a cabinet focused on “social sensitivity”.94
The new cabinet received political support from across the political spectrum,
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and, as a result, it was able to move forward on the social policies demanded by
many different actors.95
It is important to note that social legislation progressed only when the
Social Christian wing of the conservative political forces and the also
conservative Falange Nacional group joined the “social sensitivity cabinet”. 96
Senator Allende was instrumental in this process, given his reputation as a great
speaker, respected physician and outstanding political leader.97 This facilitated
the development of a more extensive and inclusive health plan,98 along with
clarifying the country’s social protection principles and the association between
“biological protection” and “economic security”, thus defending for the first time
the idea of health insurance reform.
As changes to health care were, then, an expression of the articulation of
interests, there was no reason for them to be merely functional. The law was not
only an instrument for achieving a social, political or economic objective, but also
95
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the result of political dynamics, which were reconceptualizing the notion of health
and models of health care administration. Conflict and consensus are not
necessarily opposites or extremes. Law is a conjunctural compromise that is
made manifest at a given place and time, and its timing is determined by political
dynamics. As discussed by Christodoulidis “Conflict is productive for law in a very
important way. Conflict provides the legal system with an occasion of openness
to the environment. It is in litigating conflict that the law perceives the social
environment and it is in communicating about conflict that law links operations to
previous operations and exists as a system”. 99
Social demands, slow economic growth and an increasingly heated
political arena characterized the 1950s. In addition, the accelerated mobilization,
polarization, and radicalization of ideologically opposed parties placed more
stress on the state to compromise and reconcile demands and projects. The
legislative process was, hence, the result of political and corporate agreements
that made the projects viable. At the same time, an influential and interventionist
state was clearly already developing by the middle of the 20th century, which
would have not only an important economic mission, but also a strategic role in
the social and health sectors. The state was given a strategic role as the key
“national plan” for social and health policies. This certainly contributed to
guaranteeing greater social and political stability, as by promoting social
development

and

improving

living

conditions,

social

movements

were

99

Emilios A. Christodoulidis, Law an Reflexive Politics, (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1998) at 130.

90

simultaneously neutralized. Also, while state intervention brought about
unquestionable progress in the improvement of the health of the population, it
also contributed to maintaining the privileged position of medical professionals
within the biomedical paradigm. Chilean democracy advanced by means of
political agreements that were constantly making exceptions for certain groups.
This is how extensive legislation, a multiplicity of institutions, various regulations
and a range of procedures created legal confusion and greater difficulties for
financial oversight.100 This situation still has consequences today, as is evident in
the popular belief that good health is mainly associated with access to free or
low-cost medical services.
In this reform process, the conservative political forces were hegemonic,
but parliamentary discussion allowed “windows of opportunity” for various actors.
Taking advantage of one such window of opportunity, on 23 November, 1950,
Parliament unanimously approved new health insurance legislation, with a
landmark article based on a report stating the need to create a National Health
Service responsible for protecting public health with hygiene activities and
preventive and curative medical care. Clearly, pressure was mounting and a
consensus was being built to meet the country’s health needs in a
comprehensive way. The creation of the SNS, initially proposed years earlier,
was seen as a necessary step toward these ends.
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During discussions about the creation of the SNS, the medical body went
on strike several times, using the “collective resignation of public office” as a
powerful threat to force the government to send new draft legislation to
parliament that would regulate physicians’ working conditions, remuneration and
professional development as well as the labour relations of health professionals.
In response, the government presented the Medical Employees’ Act.101 In its
defence, Senator Allende emphasized that “only a great sense of responsibility
and an incredible amount of tolerance have enabled doctors to continue
working,” because they had been “violently harassed” by the economic reality.102
He argued that the suspension of their services was the only means with which
to “shake up the lack of national awareness,” and that there was an urgent need
to consider “a new conception of our public health.”
When the SNS proposal was finally presented to Parliament in September
1950, Allende also spoke in favour of passing the Medical Employees’ Act,
stating the need for a comprehensive plan that would transform society in
support of the defence of human capital and a social conception of medicine. He
added that all doctors were already committed to this mission, and it was only
their physical working conditions that still needed to be improved. His purpose
was to establish parameters that would go beyond a corporatist vision and seek
ways to integrate physicians into a more comprehensive and holistic medical
101
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approach, which would facilitate and promote the health of the population. During
the discussion of the Act, a great doctrinal and ideological dispute arose
regarding the care model the country needed. Parliamentary debates featured
strong arguments that endeavoured to make it politically acceptable for doctors
within the public health sector to receive preferential treatment. This proposal
involved high fiscal spending and hence, the assurance of adequate funding was
required, which meant a 73% increase in public health expenditures.
With this parliamentary approval, a global solution to the doctors’
problems had been found. They were well remunerated for six hours a day in the
public sector, with the possibility of complementing their income in private
practice.

The Act initially focused on physicians, who were soon joined by

dentists and public-sector pharmacists, excluding all other health professionals,
including university-trained nurses.103
The right-wing sectors argued that they feared that the same groups of
professionals who requested the project’s approval would eventually turn against
the law, as they would find that their professional freedom, the only true stimulus
ensuring the high quality of medical professionals, was disappearing. 104 In
contrast, the Communist MPs argued that the project brought privileges to
physicians but did not consider the situation of all health workers at large. Law
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10,223 105 finally established the Medical Employees’ Act on December 17, 1951.
It was an extensive and detailed legal instrument that became increasingly
complex with multiple modifications over time to accompany changes in the
professional activity of medical work.106 The Act fixed wages, limited professional
working hours to 36 hours a week and controlled the distribution of hours to be
worked in different institutions. Just as the National Health Service would soon
be created as a new employer of medical doctors, the Medical Employees’ Act
finally secured their individual and corporate rights. An important result of this
new legislation was that doctors were now grouped into one body, as Law 10,323
made membership in the Medical College a compulsory requirement in order for
doctors to practice. This enabled them to gain great bargaining power, propose
initiatives, defend their corporate interests and regulate the relations between
themselves, the public and the state.
However, other problems arose. The Medical Employees’ Act granted
proportionally more incentives based on seniority than on merit, which dispirited
public service employees and led doctors to seek private patients while refusing
to perform public service in the future SNS. Furthermore, the Act did not ensure
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the economic security of professionals, as inflation was rampant and the wage
increases stipulated in the Act were not granted. Finally, on August 8, 1952, Law
10,383 107 was promulgated, establishing (article No 63) the National Health
Service108 as an independent legal and administrative entity for ensuring public
health and health care for the population. This law modified Law 4,054109 on
compulsory insurance, making insurance against sickness, invalidity, old age and
death compulsory for all workers earning a wage. It also covered workers,
applicants or trainees in any job, industry or occupation. Those self-employed as
artisans, artists, small manufacturers and fixed or mobile shopkeepers or people
who performed jobs and provided services directly to the public on the streets or
in squares or warehouses, were insured as long as their total annual income did
not exceed the annual living wage.
The onus of implementing the policy and the law fell on two institutions:
the Compulsory Health Insurance and Disability Fund, which was eventually
renamed the Social Security Service (SSS), and the National Health Service. The
SNS reported to the Ministry of Health, which remained responsible for protecting
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the health of the entire population and was also mandated to improve and
promote the health of workers, their spouses and their children up to 15 years of
age.
Despite all these up and downs, doctors successfully concluded the first
phase of a lengthy legal battle in support of their ongoing professional activities.
They first secured the creation of the Medical College in 1948, and then they
continued with the unification of the medical workforce under the SNS. They
finally secured their own labour and economic regulation with the Medical
Employees’ Act in 1951.110 With all these prerogatives, the medical corporation
was now prepared to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of
health policies. Thus, the creation of the Medical College in 1948 and the Medical
Employees’ Act were actually two “parallel laws”, adopted as a direct response to
physicians’ demands. Together, they contributed to the creation of the National
Health Service in 1952 (Law 10,383).
3. THE WELFARE STATE DURING THREE DIFFERENT POLITICAL
ADMINISTRATIONS
A. The first decade of the National Health Service (SNS): 1952-1963 and the
conservative government
By the middle of the 20th century, the Chilean State had already assumed
a predominant role in the health sector, greatly impacting the well-being of the
population. The state was responsible for implementing programs for health
protection and recovery, and the National Health Service (SNS) developed
110
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policies for prevention and promotion, health education and eradication of
infectious diseases. It also employed all new graduates from medical schools,
offering them a career within the country-wide SNS. It also emphasized its social
commitment and provided opportunities for improving the quality of care.111
The principles that guided this philosophy, on which the actions of the
National Health Service were based and which outlined the structure of the
welfare state, were the following:
A. People are more than mere biological units. They are natural beings who
create families and communities and live in ways that are favourable or
detrimental for their health.
B. Individuals contribute to their collective well-being with their physical and
intellectual energy. Health is a component of economic development,
which exists in a relationship of dependence with other factors that
condition one’s standard of life.
C. Health results from an ecological balance. The country requires a single,
centrally-administered service and integrated health care actions.
D. Both the SNS and the organized community at large are responsible for
health.
E. The main goal of the SNS is to reduce the risks of disease and death.
Integrating health care actions under appropriate and systematic
programs to meet health priorities fulfills this objective.
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The SNS responded to the extensive demands of the population in an
effort to make health care a social right. It was the synthesis of specific,
articulated interests as well as social and political contradictions and
disparities. 112 With the creation of the SNS, the following organizations were
merged into a single health authority: the Charity and Social Assistance Office,113
the Workers’ Insurance Fund Medical Service,

114

the National Hygiene

Service, 115 the Office for the Protection of Children and Adolescents, 116 the
Technical Hygiene and Industrial Safety Section of the Labour Department,117 the
Bacteriological Institute of Chile and the municipal health and medical
services.118 Thus, 90% of public-sector medical resources were integrated into a
single entity, leaving out only the SERMENA, the health departments linked to
national defence institutions, universities and railway employees.119
The institutional and legal organization of the SNS120 followed that of the
SSS: it was a public legal entity that functioned autonomously and was
administered by the Ministry of Public Health. During the discussion of Law
10,383 around the creation of the SNS, the spirit of the bill was that the National
Health Council would oversee the administration and supervision of the financial
resources of the Service. Nevertheless, Parliament did not legislate accordingly
112
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and refused to provide the CNS with these capacities. Instead, it turned the CNS
into a merely administrative advisory organ of the SNS Director General. Initially,
the Council only included representatives from the business sector; later
however, in response to a proposal by the “Falangista” MPs (later the Christian
Democratic Party),121 labour representatives were also incorporated. This was a
significant change, as for the first time in history, non-health and non-medical
professionals, who had typically been considered outsiders, were able to
participate legally in the closed circle of technical decision-making. After several
adjustments, the Council was made up of fifteen members with the right to vote,
ten of whom were doctors and two of whom were labour representatives.122
Over the years, the SNS Director General accumulated a large amount of
power, making him the most important public official in the health sector; even
above the minister of health.123 This led to political disputes, which did not end
until 1979 with the dismantling of the SNS.

In these disputes, the Medical

College insisted that physicians’ rights be respected, in particular with regard to
fixed remuneration and flexible daily hours of work.
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The Service was also charged with supervising the municipalities to
ensure proper safety standards within each jurisdiction and the Surgeon General,
who received public subsidies and was responsible for the supervision and
technical protection of private charitable health-related services. SNS officials
were divided into technical and administrative officers and technical assistants.
The country was divided into provinces, and each

province had a chief

physician. The SNS mandate included establishing centres to prevent and
protect the public from health risks. Its activities included: a) immunization
against communicable diseases; b) monitoring pregnant women, infants and
children; and c) providing pre-nuptial consultations in order to prevent hereditary
diseases. The SNS was also tasked with education and the promotion of the
means and conditions to protect health throughout the country. Its main tasks
were to disseminate information about health practices and to connect the public
with services for the protection of collective and individual health. It also relied on
its adequate and stable infrastructure and excellent human resources, all of
which were influenced by the labour movement’s social demands and by the
European experience.
To accomplish its objectives, the SNS was structured in eight health care
units124 and guided by five structural principles: a) technical, administrative and
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financial autonomy; b) formal and functional integration; c) normative
centralization; d) executive decentralization; and e) definition of priorities and
program planning. It was structured around three main organizational levels: a) a
central level, including the office of the Director General and its departments, in
charge of the regulations, inspection and evaluation of the service; b) an
intermediate level consisting of health zones with essentially a coordinating
function, responsible for supervision and inspection and c) a peripheral or
executive level, constituted by hospitals and other establishments that directly
executed health actions.
As a state system and central authority for medical services and public
health interventions, the SNS contributed enormously to mitigating the
differences between the various social security funds, which were eventually
eliminated, creating the same entitlements for all formal workers and their
dependents. The SNS granted medical services to individuals and their families
organized in several categories: a) individuals covered by the SSS (Law
10,383); 125 b) workers covered by the commercial marine fund law (Law
10,662);126 c) municipal employees; d) victims of work-related accidents, covered

small, local community clinics with nursing services and close links with community organizations,
permitting the decentralization of specific health care actions; 7) small, local emergency units
mostly linked to police departments in isolated areas; and 8) general hospitals with limited health
care services.
125
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by the Service of Social Insurance; e) civil servants, retired employees of the
SNS and the indigent, with the exception of individuals who had completed
military service in any branch of the armed forces; f) firefighters who suffered
accidents in the line of duty; g) seniors 65 years of age and older without social
insurance; h) students in primary, secondary and technical schools, colleges,
tertiary training institutes and universities; i) patients protected by infant and
maternal care programs; j) patients participating in venereal prevention and
rheumatic fever prevention programs; k) affiliates of institutions with agreements
with the SNS, whose expenses were covered by their institutions, and finally, l)
all individuals without any type of insurance coverage and not included in any of
the preceding categories. Overall, while the indigent already had access to free
services, the SNS tripled the number of non-indigent people able to receive free
medical services in the new institution’s hospitals and clinics.
The SNS provided curative care to 4,200,000 people, representing 70% of
the population. The SNS also took on other responsibilities related to disease
prevention and social protection, such as the free milk-distribution program and
the payment of indemnities to workers in case of illness, which was administered
by the Social Security Service. 127 In addition, the SNS was responsible for
providing social assistance to seniors and retirement residences as well as

trades. They had to be serving Chilean ship owners, ship operators, maritime industries,
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127
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minors in need of special services.128 The SNS thus became a fundamental pillar
in the public health sector, providing resources and performing key activities
under its mandate. Its creation meant a revolution in the health sector in legal
terms, while the changes it brought to the structure, organization, programs and
objectives of health care caused a true upheaval.129
The new health legislation of the 1950s thus shaped the direct intervention
of the state in medical care and public health and facilitated free access to
medical services, which gained the status of a social right. This right was
internalized by the population and attained total legitimacy with the SNS. The
state became the neuralgic centre of health care and was the target of demands
made by health professionals and the general public. Therefore, the socialization
of health services, demands for greater state involvement and state responsibility
for responding to health needs and guaranteeing the right to medical services
were the historical “leitmotiv” when it came to health for the great majority of the
population. The presence of the state also allowed for the professionalization and
development of a highly scientific, first-rate hospital infrastructure, following the
recommendations of the Flexner Report130 from the early 20th century in the
United States.
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Nonetheless, Chilean society was clearly differentiated into three socioeconomic classes: a) the business sector, self-sufficient in the satisfaction of their
social and health care needs; b) employees and professionals, with stable
incomes and economic situations based on their capacity to accumulate savings
and c) workers and farmers, who required legal protection as a result of their low
remuneration. SNS legislation reinforced this class differentiation.
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It

consolidated the SNS as a service that reconciled interests, distancing it from the
health reformist utopias promoted by Chile’s very brief so-called “Socialist
republic”, which held power for only 100 days in 1932.132 However, despite its
strong orientation towards a social concept of medicine, the Service maintained
the exclusion of those social groups not covered by the health insurance policy
implemented in 1924.133 It is interesting to note that the nature of the health
services, the type of medical practice, the technology applied and the definition of
health and illness were rarely criticized.
Despite its beginnings and its unique, innovative and internationally
recognized development, the SNS gradually distanced itself from the model that
had inspired it. This was the result of several factors, the most critical being the
continuous redefinition of its mandate due to ongoing changes in the
government.
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inefficiencies caused partly by the successive attempts by authorities and
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physicians to modify the legal bases of its structure as well as the health system
at large. Furthermore, slow economic growth and pressure to reign in increasing
medical expenses did not allow the SNS to grow as quickly as the needs of its
beneficiaries.
By the end of the 1950s, Chile was still facing an economic and
development stalemate. As the crisis intensified, it became increasingly evident
that conservative President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) was unable to deal
with the economic and the social problems facing the country. At the same time,
the economic and social proposals of the so-called “developmentalist” approach,
which included agrarian reform, a national program for marginal urban
populations and the creation of various community organizations, were gaining
momentum. These benefited from the expansion of the “Alliance for Progress”
promoted by President Kennedy in the United States, aimed at limiting the impact
of the Cuban revolution in the region. 134 In this context and with the 1964
presidential elections in mind, Jorge Alessandri’s government proposed a new
health law to Congress in an attempt to respond to the demands of the middle
class.
Due to the high cost of medical services for middle-income groups, who
received no benefits from the SNS,135 the government proposed the creation of
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an alternative and complementary service to the SNS. Approximately 1.5 million
people would benefit from the new law. This bill aimed to develop a less
bureaucratic system and to resolve several limitations of the current system,
including offering employee health care benefits (for active and retired
employees and their families) in the same SNS institutions, but under a freechoice model. This system

136

entailed extending SERMENA preventive

measures (created in 1942) by fusing the health departments of the Fund for
Public Employees and Journalists and the Government Social Security Fund for
Private Employees.
As part of the bill, the SERMENA would be reorganized to offer free
choice in curative care to public employees and individuals belonging to different
funds of the Social Security Service along with the retired and their families.
Initially, SERMENA benefits and health care services were offered exclusively in
SERMENA facilities, but later a series of agreements were signed so that SNS
establishments could also be used. Something worthy of note in this initiative is
the way it was negotiated, which was unlike previous lengthy negotiation
processes. For the project presented to parliament in 1961, no consensus was
reached, in spite of the existence of the National Health Council, 137 medical
conferences and ongoing discussions with stakeholders.

to contribute to the Social Security Fund of the Municipal Workers. The National Health Service
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136
The benefits provided were medical visits, examinations, hospitalization, surgery, obstetric
care and medical emergencies.
130
Consejo Nacional de Salud.

106

In September 1964, MPs passed an imperfect piece of legislation, leaving
the most controversial parts of the basic legislative discussion unaddressed.
Similar to what had occurred in 1952, the main obstacle for this initiative was
insufficient clarification about where the extra and necessary funding required for
the SNS would come from. It is also interesting to note that the Medical College,
as a powerful and prominent lobby, was already disappointed with the
predominance of the socialized medicine approach at the time. The College was
determined not to increase the number of SNS health care services included in
physicians’ salaries and advocated instead a free open model, where payments
would be received for medical consultations.138
Later in 1963, when the Christian Democratic Party proposed its
“Revolution in Freedom”139 program as part of its political platform, the country
was facing a critical internal political crisis. The “Revolution in Freedom” program
was a development model that combined capitalist growth with social
development and the strengthening and reinforcement of popular participation.

138

This was especially true when the Ministry of Health insisted on modifying the Medical Act to
reinforce the law that would increase the physicians’ workday to eight hours. The College
expressed its opposition to this change of policy and sought instead to impose a type of payment
that was fee-based, instead of salary-based.
139
His Christian Democratic Party – largely Catholic – was the first liberal religious party in Latin
America. The Catholic Church in Chile, which had supported rural conservatism, had become
reformist and was encouraged in this by the Second Ecumenical Council. For President Frei:
“There are two principal roads-capitalism and communism (…). Man is sacred. He is greater than
the system. He has the right to life, liberty and to his own personality. No system has the right to
deprive him of his rights. Both principal systems do this (….) Capitalism by dehumanizing him
(…) and communism by making the good of the state more important than the good of the
individual”. Eduardo Frei M. in Gross, L., (1967) “The last, best hope: Eduardo Frei & Chilean
democracy”,
New
York:
Random
House,
retrieved
(May,
10,
2013)
http://book.filipinofutures.com/christian-democracy/revolution-in-freedom-eduardo-frei-montalva.

107

The program was endorsed by both centre and right-wing parties, primarily to
avoid a division and to defeat the political forces of the Popular Front (composed
of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the middle-class Radical Party),
headed by Salvador Allende, who was leading the polls as the likely winner of the
1964 presidential elections. In 1964, Eduardo Frei Montalva was elected
president and became the first Christian Democratic candidate to win presidential
elections in Latin America. His victory resulted in the modification of health
policies such that the idea of health became a basic right to which all citizens
should have access, and the 1925 constitutional principles were fully respected,
recognizing that the state was fully responsible for providing the resources
necessary to implement a national health plan.

B. The centrist Christian Democratic government (1964-1970)
With the beginning of President Frei’s administration, Chile witnessed the
appearance of two major health paradigms. The first was influenced by the
Cuban socialist model, which was implemented after the victory of the Cuban
revolution in 1959. The second paradigm was based on a flexible liberal model
with a social orientation, close to the German social market economy model. The
new Christian Democratic government supported the second approach, hoping to
reinforce state responsibility in the health sector while, simultaneously,
stimulating private health-related initiatives. In order to increase popular support
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for the government and to include the population in the decision-making process,
the government implemented a series of measures to increase popular
participation.140 With the creation of the “Revolution in Freedom” program, which
would correct Chile’s extreme inequities without the need for violent political
struggle, the possibility for real and global health reform was closer than ever.
Employee participation became an issue of national interest for President Frei.
His government intended to create a National Health System for all citizens that
would be universal, complete, self-sufficient, efficient, appropriate, communityoriented, equitable and respectful (to human dignity).141 For the first time, the
country was seeing health reforms proposed that aimed to overcome the existing
deficiencies and to put an end to two-tier medicine wherein one system catered
to blue-collar workers and the other to white-collar workers.
This proposed system was not much different from the Unified Health
System 142 proposed later by the Popular Unity coalition that replaced the
Christian Democratic government in 1970.143 The desire to restructure the SNS
was due to its internal limitations and to overall changes in the health sector and
the medical profession after six years of a conservative regime. The government
hoped to implement a deep reform, with the ideal of unifying all health care
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services under one single umbrella. This was clearly demonstrated in the
parliamentary debates of 1964, when the Director General of the SNS avowed
that the government policy was to move towards the creation of a National Health
System with a standardized funding and management mechanism. To supporters
of the initiative, the National Health System seemed to be an ideal and definitive
solution. However, a significant amount of public opinion had to be swayed,
along with tough negotiations with many stakeholders, especially the Medical
College, beneficiaries and other health care professionals.144
As soon as President Eduardo Frei assumed his mandate, he established
a Compulsory Insurance Fund to meet the needs resulting from the high
numbers of work-related accidents and illnesses.145 The Frei Government also
attempted to extend the role of the SNS, elaborating a policy of national planning
that was adapted to limited resources and addressed the high infant mortality
rates and the relatively short life expectancy of the population. On the other
hand, there was a political consensus that public resources and health benefits
were insufficient and unevenly distributed, socially and geographically. Also, with
the objective of incorporating other social groups into the economic and social
process, the government reinforced the role of peripheral health care services
and rural clinics. Due to the increasing enrolment rates in nursing, medical and
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The initiative to legislate on industrial accidents was excluded from the reform of 1952. During
the Frei administration, Decree-Law No. 16.764 (February 1, 1968) was promulgated, providing
insurance against risks from accidents and occupational diseases.
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obstetrical schools, the quality of health assistance and human resources
improved.146
In terms of the problem of accessibility, availability and payments of
medical services for employees, President Frei indicated in his first presidential
message that the solution was to make the SNS a genuine health care provider
at the national level, covering all sectors of the population. He added that any
alternative solution had to be considered only temporary, since it was not
possible to accept two classes of medical care (one for blue-collar workers and
another for white-collar workers). In this respect, between 1966 and 1967 the
Ministry of Public Health emphasized several important initiatives, as follows:
a) The Decennial Health Plan (1966–1975), following the lead of the PanAmerican Health Organization (PAHO), whose methodology emphasized
the need for greater efficiency in the provision of health care services,
better coordination of existing health care instruments and a more rational
use of the resources available;147
b) The creation of the National Planning and Budget Office for the health
sector;148
c) The creation of the National Consultative Health Council 149 (CNCS,
replacing the CNS)150 and of Community Health Councils151 and
146

Morales, “Sistema político, planificación y políticas públicas”, supra note 140 at 50.
OPS-OMS (1965). The planning method advocated the rationalization of resources according
to priorities. These were associated with costs, and were established taking into account the
extent of health damage, the importance of the targeted social group, their vulnerability and other
specific actions to evaluate against the backdrop of specific circumstances.
148
Oficina Planificación y Presupuesto del sector Salud.
149
Consejo Nacional Consultivo de Salud.
150
The constitution of the National Health Advisory Council was enacted in April 1967, and
incorporated in 1968 in accordance with Law No. 16.481 pertaining to curative medicine.
151
The Community Councils (Consejos Comunitarios de Salud) were representative
organizations that worked at the community level in areas linked to health care institutions and
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d) The completion of a national study on the availability of human resources,
with the support of the PAHO and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).
In summary, the Decennial Health Plan attempted to target the most
critical problems, developing political programs to extend health care and
benefits and focusing on improving the integration of services. 152 The new
National Consultative Health Council was mandated to support the Ministry in all
aspects of the planning, coordination, and integration of health actions at the
national level. The CNCS acquired the mission of establishing the National
Health System, intended to serve the entire community equally.153,154 Its primary
objective was to promote public awareness, educate the population on health
issues and facilitate prevention programs, but its interventions were clearly
insufficient. The 80 community health councils created by the end of the Frei
administration did not accomplish their mission, primarily due to their
organizational limitations and their lack of political direction.155
On the other hand, the Medical College noted that this new scenario was
actively modifying medical practice in public institutions, with an emphasis on
hospitals. In 1970, eighty community councils were operating in the country (Emanuel De Kadt,
"Las desigualdades en el campo de la salud" 133 in Livingstone & Raczynski (eds.), Salud
pública y bienestar social, supra note 13. As they had to be convened by a delegate of the
Ministry of Interior, their development was hampered by bureaucratic procedures.
152
Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 196.
153
Most of its members were directors of services (SNS, SERMENA, armed forces, police,
gendarmerie etc.), to which were added the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of
Chile, representatives of the Association of Faculties of Medicine, professional associations
(doctors, dentists and pharmacists), and one representative of the workers and other employees.
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Valdivieso & Juricic, “El sistema nacional de salud en Chile”, supra note 143 at 9.
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providing assistance for those needing social assistance. The Medical College
also emphasized the need for medical doctors to migrate to rural and isolated
areas. The College stressed the need to preserve a totally professional and
ethical approach to health care, independent of political interference.156 However,
the health sector did not receive resources proportional to the growth of the
population, and these restrictions and the uneven distribution of health
professionals and resources for doctors ultimately limited its capacity to improve
the country’s health indicators.
Public health legislation, in place since 1931, was also modified in 1967.
The new Public Health Code157 took on a great mission: to resolve all issues
under the SNS mandate related to health protection and to supervise public
hygiene under the umbrella of municipal services. In addition, it contemplated
offering coverage to pregnant women and mothers during the first six months
post-partum, as well as free dental service to students in public schools. At the
same time, the new code regulated the compulsory reporting of some diseases,
imposed regulations on food storage and preparation and was responsible for
regulating sexual education, controlling venereal diseases, vaccinating the entire
population and supervising laboratories and the pharmaceutical industry. The
new Public Health Code also regulated the actions of the SNS with respect to

156

See 14 Vida Médica (1952), Revista del Colegio Médico in Id. at 192.
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Health Code
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monitoring the mental illnesses of alcoholics and drug addicts, the sanitation of
cemeteries and the hygiene of public spaces (including public transportation).158
However, the Curative Medicine Bill, 16,781159, presented by the previous
government in 1961, continued to move through the parliamentary debate
process despite the change in government, as it was already too late to reverse
the process. In addition, all physicians and their employers were in favour of a
free-choice model, in direct conflict with the principles of universality, integration
and equity advocated by the Frei Government. 160 This proposal divided the
population of employees into three income groups, where each group had
different access to medical care. The cost of the service was established
according to specific tables. This way, the payment structure included an already
complicated financial equation that attempted to balance several interests: the
government’s need to reduce costs; users’ requests for a reduction in the cost of
co-payments; and professionals’ wishes to maximize their incomes.161,162
The new social and political scenario following the election of the Christian
Democrats was reflected in the parliamentary debates about Bill 16,781. This
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Romero, “Desarrollo de la Medicina y la Salubridad en Chile”, supra nota 65 at 885-886.
See infra note No 172.
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The Medical College publicly contradicted the President by claiming that they were not
consulted. They rejected the government’s proposal of the universal Right to Health mentioning
that throughout the world, Health was in crisis due to the cost of medicines, thus creating the
need to find ways to assume these costs according to the society’s economic capacity to
adequately compensate physicians. (See (1965) 7 Vida Médica).
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The issue of co-payments was the most controversial because of the harsh economic reality of
the employees. According to the Ministry of Health data, 70% had an income equivalent to two
monthly minimum wages, thus fulfilling the same criteria as the workers who received free care
by law. Hence employees considered the co payment to be a kind of discrimination. (See (1965)
7 Vida Médica).
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time, however,

representatives with various interests were involved in the

process, not only physicians and the bureaucratic elite. The decision-making
process was open and democratic, with diverse organizations represented, thus
altering the nature of the debates. The energetic demands of the employees and
health workers weakened the powerful influence of the Medical College and
forced the government to modify its purely technocratic position.163 Declarations
made by public employees in the Senate highlighted the issues that were at play,
affirming that this project was a long-held aspiration of employees because their
low incomes were not sufficient to cover their medical expenses.164 As a result,
the employees not only supported the physicians’ demands, but they also
requested that the free-choice model of health care be extended to all, without
any differentiation based on economic status. 165 All this clearly demonstrated
how the passing of laws and especially their implementation required the
collaboration of intermediate bureaucrats and health authorities, who could either
facilitate or block the reforms.166
The conflicts of interest increased in 1966, when the opposition, led by the
“gremialista” 167 group, supported the physicians by demanding a socialized
163

These views were articulated by the Confederation of Private Employees (CEPECH) and the
National Association of Public Employees (ANEF), whose president, Tucapel Jiménez, was an
important leader who was later assassinated by agents of the Pinochet dictatorship. In Parada,
Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 199
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Senate, Daily sessions Journal, October 24, 1964.
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model of medicine. This group, along with more conservative sectors, argued
that the SNS was moving away from a modern conception of health care and
endangering the practice of medicine. They held that the SNS had gained too
much power and was putting health care in danger, as the profession was not
able to delegate responsibilities or revise the fundamental principles or payment
structures proposed in 1952. 168 Rather, their proposals had to be sent to
Parliament for review, and they had to request that their demands be heard by
the Medical College before any decisions were made.169 & 170
At a more general level, the Curative Medicine Bill articulated three logics
that had been associated with the health system since its very beginnings: a) the
political logic of universal, free access to health care and professionals paid by
salary; b) the social logic of middle-class values, such that white-collar workers
would accept sharing the same services that blue-collar workers received, in
equal conditions; and c) the corporative logic, which attempted to impose market
flexibility on the public-private relationship, following a free-choice model. These
interrelated logics corresponded to three contradictory fronts of change: a) the
institutional front, led by technocrats wishing to sustain the transformation and
rationality of the Decennial Health Plan; b) the corporative front, which tried to
which was the critical intellectual elite behind the pro-Pinochet Unión Democrática Independiente
Party. “Gremialismo” is a conservative current of thought closely linked to sectors of the Opus Dei
in the Catholic church. In Chile, gremialismo was the ideological support for the political party
Unión Democratica Independiente (UDI, Independent Democratic Union).
168
Vida Médica 4 (1966), Revista del Colegio Médico in Parada, Evolución del sistema de
protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 199 & 200.
169
Vida Médica 7 (1965) in Parada, Id.
170
The Medical College initiated a "hard line" policy and undertook a wide mobilization against
the curative medicine project. They also reinforced their ties with the employees’ associations.
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accommodate the interests of the SNS; and c) the socio-political front, which
expressed the new face of Chilean society in an active process of
democratization and mobilization for more and better services and social
participation.171
The government was thus losing control of social dynamics, while
physicians faced unexpected changes to their profession, such as the greater
autonomy of non-medical doctors and the spread of popular awareness in favour
of health rights. The Curative Medicine Act172 & 173 presented by the conservative
government in 1961 was finally passed in 1968. The same year, at the end of
President Frei’s mandate, despite the growth of the social medicine model and
the influential role of the SNS, a difficult scenario of complex political and
ideological orientations took shape. These orientations facilitated some structural
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Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 40 at 198.
Law 16,781 (1968) Curative Medicine Act The law was established to provide medical and
dental assistance to beneficiaries, retirees, the unemployed of the institutions listed in Article 2 of
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beneficiaries of the Social Welfare Fund of the Municipal Workers, the Crew section of the
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changes and resulted in a more liberal reorientation of the health sector.174 As
already indicated, the SERMENA175 was responsible for the implementation of
the Curative Medicine Law, which benefitted two million people. Thus, the SNS
and the SERMENA176 became the fundamental pillars of the National Health
System. 177 At the same time, health policy overall was becoming more
technocratic, more interested in the management and efficiency of health care
and less interested in the principles of socialized medicine in Chile.
The new Curative Medicine Law attempted to solve two problems at once:
the shortage of medical assistance for employees and the demands of
physicians trying to reorganize their working conditions according to their
professional and economic interests. The SNS thus began to incorporate the
free-choice system, with beneficiaries responsible for co-payments. This funding
174

Labra, (1997) Política, Saúde e Interesses Médicos no Chile (1900-1990), supra note 89 at
158.
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The SERMENA, according to the definition established by the Decree-Law 286 (March 31,
1960) was a semi-public institution, endowed with a legal personality, whose relations with the
government were maintained through the Ministry of Public Health. Its fundamental role was to
provide exclusive curative services and preventive medicine to contributors in the various
insurance institutions. Its sources of funding were the transfers from workers’ and employers’
salary contributions. Another source of revenue came from the direct sale of the bonds of curative
medicine to patients. (Francisco Ortiz, “El sector salud y sus recursos financieros análisis de la
década”, in Hugo Lavados (ed.), Desarrollo Social y salud en Chile, (Santiago Corporación de
promoción universitaria, 1980) at 174-177).
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The Employees National Health Service (SERMENA) as a semi-public institution with a legal
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service was also exclusively responsible for the Preventive Medicine of several Family Allowance
Compensation Funds The SERMENA performed the following functions entrusted by Law: a) It
provided preventive medical services according to Law 6,174; b) The payment of the time-out
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of its beneficiaries.
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In 1968, the Chilean population was distributed as follows: manual workers (blue collar) 47.9%
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mechanism coexisted with the traditional system and was established in Law
15,076, 178 which regulated the professional work of surgeons, biochemists,
dental surgeons, pharmacists and chemists. This legislation, along with Law
16,744179—implemented on February 1, 1968, creating “mutuales” or workers’
insurance associations to cover accidents in the workplace and occupational
illnesses—consolidated the free-choice model and contributed to the increase of
private health care providers. 180 The mutuales established a compulsory
178

Law 15,076 (1962). Revised the text of the Statute for medical-surgical, pharmaceutical
or chemical-pharmaceutical, bio-chemical and dental surgeons (Law 15,021[1962]). The
medical-surgical, pharmaceutical or chemical-pharmaceutical, bio-chemical and dental surgeons,
who were enrolled in their respective professional colleges, and exercised professional duties in
office or as paid employees, were called "public officials." This law did not apply to the private
exercise of the profession of public officials.
The provisions of the law applied to the National Health Service, the Services of Public
Administration, Public, semi-Public or Autonomous institutions and, in general, to any natural or
legal entity. The professional staff serving in the Armed Forces or the Carabineros de Chile
(Police) was subject to the laws governing the armed service or the Corps of Carabineros de
Chile, respectively. The National Health Service and the State Universities (or those recognized
by it) could grant scholarships for the development of a proprietary form of training grants or
scholarships for nursing homes.
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diseases. The Law declared that Social Insurance against risks of accidents and occupational
diseases should be made mandatory. This Insurance was compulsory for employees, public
servants, and also employees from the municipal and de-centralized State administration. This
law covered students who had a source of income from their respective institutions, as well as
self- employees and family workers. The law ensured that all students were insured against
accidents suffered during their studies, or in carrying out their professional practice.
For the purpose of this law, an accident meant any injury that occurred to a person in the
workplace or in connection with the work, and that resulted in disability or death. Work accidents
also referred to accidents that occurred in the direct path (one way or return) between the
bedroom and the workplace, and those occurring in the direct path between two places of work,
but corresponding to different employers. Occupational accidents were also considered under
this law. Occupational accidents comprised those accidents suffered by union leaders in the
performance of their union duties. Interestingly, this law did not entertain accidents caused by
circumstances unrelated to the work or intentionally inflicted by the victims. Occupational
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disability or death. Benefits were provided for temporary incapacity, disability, survival and death.
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purview of the Social Security Service, the National Health Service, the Welfare Funds and the
Employers Mutual.
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Jorge Jiménez, online: Escuela de Medicina Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, retrieved
(November 23, 2011) http://escuela.med.puc.cl/publ/medamb/OrganizacionSanitaria.html, at 2.

119

insurance plan to which employers were required to contribute 0.9% of the
taxable wages they paid and could optionally make an additional contribution
based on the risk and the business activity of the company, up to a maximum of
3.4% of taxable remuneration. Law 16,744 covered the following individuals: a)
all the self-employed; b) public servants in the central government as well as in
decentralized public institutions and municipalities; c) students who worked for
their educational institutions; d) employees and their families and e) students in
public and private schools who suffered accidents while in school or in
internships. 181 DFL 163 182 regulated social security and the extension of
compulsory insurance. This enactment fixed the text of Law 10,383 from August
8, 1952 and Law 16,840 from May 24, 1968, making it compulsory for all persons
indicated by law to receive insurance against sickness, invalidity, old age and
death.183
As already highlighted, the curative medicine legislation was clearly the
outcome of a dispute of interests between white- and blue-collar workers, where
the latter were displeased with their dependence upon public services like the
SNS.184 The law also resolved conflicts between the Medical College and the
SNS Association of Employees, preventing the SNS from becoming the sole
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employer in the health sector.185 These two groups had clearly different views
and understandings of the payment mechanisms in the public health system, with
the physicians preferring a free-choice system paid for through service fees and
the Association of Employees preferring salaries. The Curative Medicine Law
regulated the use of SNS facilities during hours that did not conflict with the
medical attention of legal beneficiaries and also allowed the possibility of offering
public health care services in private clinics in order to avoid the construction of
expensive health centres.186
The SERMENA coordinated its operations 187 with many of the health
professionals’ associations, enabling beneficiaries to purchase subsidized
“coupon-cheques” to pay for their medical care.188 As white-collar workers and
the middle class frequently complained about the lack of accessible services,
which forced them to pay to access the private system or wait for long periods for
an appointment in the free, public system, the law introduced a new option that
transcended this two-tier medical system. With the new free-choice model,
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The Medical College was responsible with registering the professionals who wished to join the
free choice system and with determining prices for all medical acts that were to be covered.
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The funding of these activities came from several sources, the most important being employee
contributions of 1% of their taxable income and a contribution of 2% by the insurance fund. The
law also gave the SNS the power to regulate work schedules, resources and the hiring policy for
all its personnel, including physicians.
187
Since the SERMENA and other public and compulsory insurance institutions were also
involved in the implementation and administration of services under the Curative Medicine Law,
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mechanisms for payment and to oversee the remuneration of health care professionals.
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The services provided by the SERMENA were diverse in nature, and included hospital care,
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R. Gutiérrez, “Acceso de obreros y empleados a los beneficios de la medicina socializada” in
Livingstone & Raczynski (eds.), Salud pública y bienestar social, supra note 14 at 96.
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patients189 were able to choose their doctors from a list of all registered doctors,
with the possibility of using some specially allocated hospital units. However, this
new option also placed new constraints on the infrastructure, which had
previously been used largely by only blue-collar workers.190
Despite the new Curative Medicine Law’s acceptance of the free-choice
model, which the Medical College had been advocating, the College manifested
its opposition. In particular, according to the physicians the new law gave doctors
very little power to co-administer the new system, with only modest flexibility in
the fixing of prices for medical services and remunerations. They also objected to
the lack of financial stimuli offered by the new system and to an increase in their
workload. Hence, the Medical College increased its lobbying capacity, pressuring
the government both to change the law and to meet its economic demands.191
The Medical College penetrated all the layers of the SNS, forming a control
pyramid with the leaders at the top and the base of the organization spread
throughout the country.
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This facilitated the College’s links with other

stakeholders, especially the National Federation of Health Workers (FENATS).193
With these connections and corporate relationships, they were able to form a
vast movement within the health sector, which became very aggressive and
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conservative. In this context, the opposition to the Christian Democratic
government, the corporate “gremialista” movement and the historical supporters
of social medicine shared the College’s demands until their ideological
differences were brought to the surface in the presidential elections of 1970,
when physicians divided into two irreconcilable factions.194
The Curative Medicine Law did not try to incorporate white-collar workers
into the SNS, nor did it create a parallel system just for them. Instead, the
SERMENA was based on an intermediate formula that offered similar benefits to
those offered by the SNS, and, unlike the SNS, operated on the free-choice
model, with some restrictions. In general terms, although the Curative Medicine
Law was contested and patients were presented with two public models, the law
finally allowed white-collar workers to have access to free medical care and
transformed the SNS, which became a great pillar in the health system, covering
almost 90% of the population. It was complemented by hospitals, university
hospitals and medical care for the armed forces, railroad workers and the police.
The private sector, however, covered 10% of the population and was organized
around private clinics, doctors’ offices, assistance services provided by large
corporations and different popular and traditional medical practices. Although the
194
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free-choice model did not meet the interests of the majority of doctors and only
25% of physicians registered with this system, the number of patients who opted
for health care under this new model increased exponentially.195 More than one
million people already benefited from the SERMENA between 1964 and 1972.
The number of medical services increased yearly, jumping from 27,100 in 1964
to 2,356,900 in 1972.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SNS AND SERMENA
CARACTERISTIC

SERMENA

SNS
Manual workers, farmers,

Private employees and
BENEFICIARIES

peasants, artisans, craftsmen,
public servants
clerks, employees and the poor.
48% of the population as direct
beneficiaries and approximately

COVERAGE

20% of the population
17% of the population due to
indigence.
Very limited. Beds
located in private

Hospitals and clinics in a fully

INFRASTRUCTURE
institutions and in SNS regionalized system.
facilities.
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therapeutic care,

curative care. Public health care
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preventive screenings. for the entire population.
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Co-insurance; patients Free for services covered by the

PATIENT

pay part of costs.

HEALTH

Employees and

law.

Salaried employees
PERSONNEL

contract workers

Source: Adapted from T. Hall & P. Díaz, “Social Security and Heath Care Patterns in Chile”,
(1971) 1 International Journal of Medical and Sanitary Services 364.

In general terms, criticism of the Christian Democratic government’s
health policy came from different political and social sectors, which caused
conflicts between the workers’ unions and professional associations and the
state as the regulator of the health reforms. According to the government,
popular participation increased, wages improved, bureaucratization was reduced
and medical services were extended. Critics, however, argued that the increase
in popular participation was insufficient, as community participation in the
management process was considered to be weak, superficial and symbolic, even
when recognizing the presence of such participation in the advisory councils. In
addition, they noted that during this time there was a lack of innovation in the
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practice of medicine, which continued to be developed under the same dominant
and orthodox model. The biomedical model controlled by medical doctors
persisted, based on the health-disease paradigm, despite evidence that pointed
to the benefits of a wellness paradigm.
In terms of statistics, public health expenditures increased by 68%
between 1964 and 1970—a 49% per capita increase. The number of people
working for the SNS also rose from 42,165 in 1964 to 55,173 in 1970,
representing a 31% increase. Finally, the percentage of total expenses used to
pay wages increased from 50.2% to 61.5% during the same period.196 Of all the
deficiencies of the SNS, the inequities in the services provided to the rural
population and the poor were the most critical. Furthermore, the system was still
very bureaucratic, and funding was inadequate. The distribution of resources was
also uneven, with 40% of resources concentrated in the private sector.
On

the

national

political

scene,

society

was

demanding

the

democratization of public institutions, beginning with the University of Chile,
accused of supporting the country’s conservative forces, which were resistant to
social change. As a result, in 1968 the country embarked upon a university
reform process. All medical educational institutes were questioned and criticized
for their inability to train enough professionals to meet the demands of the public
health system. In order to address these problems, the curriculum in the medical
schools was reformed, introducing social science courses and opening a
196
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Community Medicine Department as well as emphasizing research based more
on a social-medicine approach.197 With the participation of the Medical College, a
new joint educational committee was formed to produce professionals with
critical skills, social awareness and active involvement in the community. 198
Ultimately, the Medical College decided to partake in the new changes to make
up for lost opportunities in previous attempts to assert technical and economic
autonomy.199 Furthermore, the salary model of payment for health care services
positioned doctors against public employees, which privileged but also
constrained the doctors’ professional development.
Meanwhile, non-medical health workers organized themselves in the
combative National Federation of Health Workers (FENATS), which did not
believe in the supposed technical and rational superiority of the bureaucracy or
that the altruism of the medical profession would lead to an advance towards a
model of social medicine. Disillusioned, the FENATS decided to push for the
democratization of services to fracture the rigid professional hierarchy. They
protested that they had neither control nor representation in the SNS, adding that
if they had some influence, several problems in the health sector that had been
197
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reported to the authorities and the public would have already been resolved.200
The health workers went on several strikes with the support of the
Workers’ Central Union (CUT)

201

and launched a campaign for the

democratization of the SNS and a socialized form of medicine. Among other
demands, they called for the direct participation of workers, via their
representatives, in the administration and management of all public institutions
and state corporations. During these demonstrations, the FENATS claimed that
the SNS was not providing health but selling it, denouncing that the Curative
Medicine Law was an incentive to return to the old liberal system. They pointed
out the serious wage disparities: 10% of health care workers (4000 physicians)
received 55% of all wages, whereas the other 45% of wages were distributed
among 40,000 non-medical health care workers (blue- and white-collar workers).
The political context was already highly charged. In addition, President
Frei failed in his attempt to create a National Health System, and following
several strikes, the Decennial Health Plan collapsed. The Christian Democracy
administration completed its final year amidst great political, ideological and
social turmoil, enormously frustrating the health sector. The government was
paralyzed and isolated. Its own party was divided, giving rise to radicalized
sectors such as the “MAPU”202 and, later, the Christian Left.203 However, many of
its reformist efforts were not in vain, as it had accomplished significant progress
200
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in agrarian reform, industrial modernization, technological innovation, the partial
nationalization of the copper mining industry, 204 education reforms and the
unionization of farmers. In the health field, despite political, financial and
administrative difficulties and little cooperation from medical doctors, access to
services was extended and the basic indicators of health improved. The
democratization process was furthered, and the accessibility of health care
services for the middle-class improved as a result of the predominance of the
middle class and parties of the political centre.
However, by 1970, forces of the political left wished to revert the capitalist
model of development and further expand the process of democratization in
order to build a new society based on the premises of socialism. This was the
socio-political project known as the “Chilean road to socialism”, under the
leadership of Salvador Allende, the former health minister and senator. This
political program was widely supported by a coalition of parties, headed by the
Socialist and Communist Parties. Their coalition, known as “Unidad Popular”
(Popular Unity), was elected in the presidential elections of 1970, making
Salvador Allende the first president of Marxist inspiration to be democratically
elected in the world.
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C. The socialist model of the Popular Unity government (1970-1973)
The Popular Unity government’s goal was to reorient economic
development and re-direct the process of capital accumulation to satisfy the
basic needs of the workers, peasants and middle class. Its primary objective was
to reduce the high degree of concentration of foreign and domestic monopoly
capital. Beginning in 1970, the Popular Unity government implemented the
nationalization of strategic enterprises (especially mineral resources), a vast
agrarian land reform, the control of foreign trade and the financial market, price
controls and wage increases. Although the Popular Unity program and political
platform facilitated a series of fundamental changes and transformations in the
socio-economic structure, these changes were not mere reforms or amendments
to the productive system, nor were they merely measures to reduce the social
inequalities that were structurally linked to economic underdevelopment. With
these reforms, the government sought to ensure state control over economic
processes in order to restructure the economy and transform the existing model
of development.205
The formation of the Popular Unity government marked a new advance
and a further strengthening of the state apparatus and a qualitative change in the
nature of government intervention in society. The purpose of ensuring state
control was not to destroy the state apparatus, 206 but rather to establish a
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revolutionary process 207 that would change the living conditions for the vast
majority of the population—people who had traditionally been ignored. The
Allende government developed a political and socio-economic platform to found
Chile’s first socialist society.
The government’s economic policy had four main objectives: a) the
redistribution of income; b) the expansion of government programs and services;
c) state control of key and strategic industries and d) the expansion of agrarian
reform. At the same time, its social policy aimed to strengthen the process of
wealth distribution through reforms in the fields of education, housing, social
welfare, health and employment. The proposed changes also attempted to
profoundly transform the health sector. According to the minister of health, the
implementation of the aforementioned reforms, such as the control of natural
resources and the main and strategic means of production, along with extensive
land reform and income redistribution, would result in the improvement of overall
living conditions, thus impacting health determinants and the well-being of the
population.
The doctrine of the Popular Unity government and its proposal for the
transformation of the health sector were presented in the first presidential
message to Congress. In this message, President Allende insisted on the
necessity of extending public and universal health care to combat important
207
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social and medical problems—a position he had been advocating since the
1930s. He recalled the important role played by the left-wing political parties and
himself in the creation of the National Health Service, following the health
definitions and principles proposed by the World Health Organization. He also
linked his political principles to the Cuban revolution, arguing that health was a
dialectical biological and social process, a result of the interaction between
individuals and the environment, both of which are influenced by the relations of
production in a given society. These were, as he highlighted, the overall
determinants that influenced the level of wellness in society, including physical
and mental health.
For Allende and his government, health was strictly correlated to the
economic and social structure and the improvement of individual living conditions
within society. The close relationship the government saw between health
determinants and socio-economic development permitted it to situate health
within the complex relationship between the individual and the environment. As a
result, improving the health status of the population was related to bringing an
end to the old capitalist mode of production and building a socialist society. It was
in this context that Allende expressed his commitment to defend and promote the
right to full access to health care and preventive and public health services for
the general population. The government asserted that health was an inalienable
human right and that its full realization was the state’s responsibility. The
government declared its full responsibility for encouraging revolutionary changes
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to challenge traditional policies that were hindering the construction of a more
equitable, efficient and adequate health system.208
As previously indicated, the National Health Service was already a key
form of government intervention in health, and its creation was the culmination of
a historical process of state legitimation in the health field, in which Allende
himself had been a key figure. The work of the SNS included the administration
of physical and human resources in order to implement national programs and to
evaluate and assess the impact of its services. In addition to environmental
control programs and the monitoring of infectious diseases, the population had
access to ongoing services that controlled the spread of communicable diseases,
ultimately contributing significantly to reducing the morbidity and mortality rates of
the population. Regardless of the diversity of the successive governments and
the resistance of a great number of physicians, and despite political, financial,
technical and managerial limitations, the SNS always sought and encouraged
active community participation in the implementation of health activities. It is
interesting to note, for instance, the progress made in preventive medicine by
means of the implementation of health education programs that promoted
awareness and facilitated a better understanding of health-related issues and
prevention strategies.
According to one of Chile’s most respected physicians, Dr. Alejandro
Goic,209 the SNS was instrumental in the development of educational programs
208
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that drew on the expertise of professionals, technicians and specialists. The SNS
also had a regulatory function, facilitating a more equitable distribution of medical
resources throughout the country. The mission of the SNS, coupled with the
organizational principles of decentralization and the training of professionals
according to humanist and social principles, helped to develop a more allinclusive medical approach210 and an appreciation of the value of teamwork.211
The SNS thus encouraged professionals to engage in superior practice through
training programs, to focus on specializing, to participate in clinical and
experimental research and to undertake epidemiological work.212 Most of the
physicians who worked in public hospitals for a certain number of hours per week
allocated their remaining time to working in a private practice. Their involvement
in the public sector was motivated by their social vocation and by the benefits
their involvement entailed, such as prestige, access to the hospital infrastructure
for experimental research and the opportunity to share knowledge and
experience with colleagues.
Despite all the improvements in the health field, the SNS still had notable
gaps and weaknesses. It was most criticized for its excessive administrative
centralization and slow decision-making process. These two basic problems not
only limited its effectiveness, but also served as a barrier for the establishment of
209
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regional or local authorities and complicated the rational and prompt
redeployment of resources. Another criticism often levied against the SNS was
related to its enormous magnitude, which allowed it to control nearly all the
hospitals, nursing homes and urban and rural clinics in the country. Critics held
that its size, coupled with its oversized staff, transformed the SNS into a giant
with a heavy and complex administrative system. Moreover, the rigid funding
structure (due to the elaborate bureaucracy) and the reduction in the funding of
services also affected staff salaries, which were generally below that of other
public-sector employees. Finally, the most radical criticism of the SNS came from
defenders of private medical practice and targeted the very concept of socialized
medicine.
In the public system, patients had to accept the hospital, the medical
professionals and the available and accessible resources without almost any
choice.

This situation was not acceptable to many physicians, who called

instead for the right to “free choice”. This prerogative was continuously requested
by the Medical College, despite its strong interest in facilitating medical careers
within the SNS that simultaneously preserved the possibility to engage in private
medical practice. The victory of the Popular Unity coalition in the 1970
presidential election even further radicalized these different health care models.
Without suppressing the activities of the private sector, the government
took action to allocate the majority of public sector expenditures through a
redistribution of taxation and a reorganization of social security. The health policy
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was aimed at implementing three major reforms: a) the development of greater
and improved capacity for the provision of health and medical services; b) the
expansion of democratization and popular participation in the implementation of
health actions and activities and c) the establishment of a Unified National Health
Service with greater centralized capacity and the inclusion of the SERMENA.
The

new

paradigm

for

implementing

these

policies

entailed

a

transformation of the organizational structure by centralizing the decision-making
process and decentralizing the level of execution. Improving access to medical
services was part of the government’s Six-Year Health Plan (1970-1976), in line
with its Six-Year Economic and Social Development Plan. The Health Plan
emphasized the need for planned structural changes. This was reinforced with
the establishment of an ad hoc Ministry of Health office within the SNS and the
transformation of the CNCS into the Council for the Development of the Health
Sector.213
The Health Plan identified the resources and funds allocated annually to
the SNS and redirected them as needed to meet the new demand for services. It
was believed that the demand for services would increase, not only because of
the new awareness, educational programs and enhanced popular participation
process, implemented to promote the right to health, but also because of the
incorporation of marginal and economically weak social sectors into the system
and the income redistribution called for in the Six-Year Development Plan.
213
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The Six-Year Health Plan included the following objectives: a) to meet the
quantitative and qualitative health needs of the population; b) to increase the
number and accessibility of services; c) to enhance the effectiveness of
resources and funds and d) to improve the quality of medical services in order to
optimize health indicators.214 Another aspect of the Six-Year Health plan was the
development of local health centres and satellite clinics tasked with administering
outpatient services 215 and attracting specialists, community volunteers and
medical students. A local “health team”, which constituted an excellent
opportunity for medical students to gain experience, offered services 7 days a
week, 24 hours a day. Health teams shared their expertise with their
communities and also participated in community training and education,
especially with respect to the prevention and control of disease. This program
permitted newly qualified students to practice and assist those in greater need in
remote areas. Overall, the program helped to provide medical services to two
million people and reduced the long wait times and denials of medical assistance
by the SNS.216 Despite its shortcomings, the SNS had come to embody the
principle of social responsibility in the health field, moving towards offering
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comprehensive and socialized medicine, which was noteworthy in a developing
country like Chile.
In general, and despite its inefficiency, lack of resources, and financial and
organizational shortcomings, the political establishment and the general
population never questioned the state’s involvement in the health sector. The
extensive coverage of the SNS throughout its large network of hospitals, urban
clinics, rural clinics and dispensaries permitted the extension of health care and
health-protection services to 100% of the population, covering 90% of all
hospitalizations and 60% of all ambulatory services. No more than 10% of the
population was covered by the private sector. Indeed, this responsibility of the
public sector and the growing importance of state intervention in the health sector
was also part of the overall trend towards an increased role for the state in
ensuring the country’s socio-economic development.
The evolution of the Chilean economy reflected the increasing amount of
state intervention in all economic areas, which started as early as 1939, when the
state became the economic engine of the development process. As previously
discussed, this permitted the creation of large public companies, not only in
unprofitable areas of the private sector, but also in critical economic areas of the
industrial sector that were devoted to the production of intermediary products like
pulp, petrochemicals, metal products and rubber. The state also played a
significant role in investing in public works, providing a boost to the overall
economic process and expanding the availability of social services.
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The new organization of health services as presented in the Allende
administration’s Health Plan was informed by a belief in democratization as the
main instrument necessary for transforming the structure of the SNS. This was
considered to be a fundamental reform “that would allow citizens to participate in
the implementation of the program’s objectives, as their participation would
ensure the appropriate use of resources to satisfy their health care needs.”217
Politically, the Popular Unity health reform sought to democratize services
in a broader sense than that entailed in the concept of decentralization
advocated by physicians. Full participation and responsibility were expected from
all staff and citizens in evaluating the role of management and monitoring the
performance of each of the services, as well as in critically evaluating the steps
taken to meet policy objectives. To enable this democratization process and
secure the participation of health workers and the user population in the decisionmaking process and power structure, the government promulgated Decree 602
on September 21, 1971. 218 This decree created local and multi-stakeholder
health councils. It also modified the structure of existing health councils and
217
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remedied the deficiencies of the community councils that had been created
during the previous administration, though the health councils started to enjoy
much greater decision-making capacity than the community councils.219 Between
September 1971 and December 1972, 269 local councils and another 207 multistakeholder health councils were created across the country. Approximately a
third of these units belonged to the province of Santiago, where the population
already enjoyed better health conditions than the national average.
These health councils constituted additional political forces as the
administration dealt with physicians’ strikes, which had sabotaged medical
services, and they allowed a reasonable level of service to be maintained in the
face of the civil disobedience movement and ongoing opposition to government
policies. They were also instrumental in redesigning the nature of curative
services by establishing a direct link between patients and medical personnel.
The intention was to coordinate joint action and initiatives by the popular health
219
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councils and the local and multi-party health councils, bringing together
representatives

of

trade

unions,

neighbourhood

organizations,

youth

organizations, sports clubs and women’s organizations.220
During this time, many health actors were actively involved in political
struggle. Medical students, for instance, expressed their commitment to labour
organizations as well as their willingness to work exclusively in the public sector.
They also supported reforms to create a Unified National Health Service, in
which physicians would share with each other and with other actors the mission
of delivering public and popular medical services.
Along with its democratization policies, the government introduced
regulations to reduce the bureaucracy of the SNS. This restored political and
administrative power to the local level to allow for better planning in line with the
social needs of each community or region. Without a doubt, the democratization
process seemed promising. This was palpable, for instance, in the successful
organization of the Health Brigades, which were supported by the Social
Development Council and composed of volunteers. In the region of Santiago
alone, these Brigades had 2,800 “health volunteers”. The Brigades’ actions
reached different neighbourhoods in an attempt to identify citizens with health
risk factors. These moves to promote the participation of the general public were
recommended and adopted by participating states during the Third Special
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Meeting of Ministers of Health of the Americas.221 At this meeting, the region’s
physicians expressed their scepticism about the efficacy of purely technocratic
planning measures due to structural inefficiencies at the national level. They also
demanded that the concept and function of public health once again be
rethought.222
Despite its promise, the program’s countless efforts to encourage
democratization ultimately achieved more modest results than expected,
especially at the management level. A study of the democratization process223
demonstrated that in the local health boards in the Santiago area, community
participation was essentially limited to women, particularly through the centres for
mothers. The limited participation of the broader public resulted in a lack of
qualitative change in the nature and kind of medical services offered. It provoked
instead the criticism of users demanding increased services, better coverage and
greater accessibility, while the public did not question the dominant paradigm or
the administration of medical services. As a consequence, there was a lack of
innovation at the conceptual or paradigmatic level, and no new discoveries were
made regarding how to deliver health care services in the future. We can
hypothesize that the lack of qualitative changes was due to the lack of creativity
221
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and autonomy in the public participation process. It appeared that planners,
administrators and politicians drove public participation from the outside, with
goals that were not always equally shared.224
Despite the shortcomings and limitations of the popular participation
program, though, it made visible the relationship between health issues and
social determinants such as housing, drinking water, hygiene, sanitation and
nutrition. Furthermore, some programs improved health conditions, such as
those implemented to combat childhood diarrhea, improve nutrition (a campaign
provided children with a half-litre of milk per day), fight alcoholism and intensify
preventive health measures. At the same time, the greater financial, human and
material resources devoted to the health care system permitted an increase in
staffing and in the number of contracted doctor-hours. This directly benefitted
mothers and children, but at the same time prioritized hospital care over
ambulatory services. In the end, just as with the previous Frei administration, the
geographical redistribution of human resources was insufficient, despite all the
decentralization efforts.225
The third major reform in the Popular Unity administration’s health policy
was the establishment of a Unified National Health Service (SUS). 226 The
purpose of the unified service was to ensure the “right to health” for all citizens,
and this meant that the SUS had to be more comprehensive, with the capacity to
224
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provide “efficient, timely, equitable, ongoing, adequate and free” medical care. In
addition, as previously indicated, the SUS aimed to integrate all health
institutions, including the public services created by the SNS under the umbrella
of the employees’ medical system (SERMENA), which was primarily accessible
to the middle class.227 This proposed change was not insignificant, since it was
clearly perceived as an end to the two-tiered system, with a free-choice system
for employees (the middle class) and the public system for blue-collar workers
and peasants. The free-choice system covered about 25% of the population, paid
for with patients’ pre-payments and supplemented with subsidies from both the
private system (30%) and the SERMENA public system (70%).
According to the minister of health, the cornerstone of the health policy
was a significant change in the structure and organization of the sector. With the
creation and the development of a Unified National Health Service, the country
was seeing historic measures being taken in the health field. In this context,
health sector planning took on an entirely new meaning, streamlining decisionmaking processes and improving and rationalizing the use of resources.228 The
government attempted to coordinate health activities and maintain positive
relations

with

various

universities,

professional

associations

and

other

organizations as a result of its belief that these institutions were essential
partners. Similarly, the administration relied on the active participation of health
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volunteers, whose associations functioned much like unions and community
organizations, willing to contribute mainly in the most remote and marginalized
areas of the country.
The obstacles were not insignificant, as the overall objectives were
extremely challenging, aiming not only to improve the quantity and quality of
services, but to enhance the degree of humanization in the services offered and
to promote decentralization, democratization and popular participation. For
Allende, this was a revolutionary process that required health workers to be
united in their “cohesion, fervour, charisma and sacrifice in the performance of
their duties”.229 He insisted that the revolution had to start with the very people
who participated in the process.
In October 1972, after the country came to a standstill due to mass
protests against the Allende administration, the government was finally able to
progress further in terms of its administrative reforms, as all negotiations with the
opposition to change legislation had become impossible. The government
amended the Curative Medicine Law, establishing a partnership between the
SNS and the SERMENA and abolishing the process of direct payment from
patient to doctor. This lowered the final cost of health care services and granted
employees access to the SNS, providing coverage to at least two and a half
million employees. The differences between government authorities and the
Medical College on the establishment of the SUS, along with widespread political
229
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opposition to the government, made it exceedingly difficult to implement legal
changes to reform the health sector. The SNS-SERMENA agreement was thus
presented as an administrative measure intended to prevent a complete
paralysis of the reform process.
The Medical College took great offense to this administrative act and
reacted vigorously to oppose the measure, as it modified the principle of free
choice. The new procedure replaced the “bonus cheque” pre-payment that had
been administered by the Medical College with a referral that directly linked the
patient to public SNS services. According to the government, this measure
allowed the public sector to secure increased funding, improve health care and
more rationally redistribute financial, material and human resources. As a result,
the monetary value of each medical service was also reduced, and the
SERMENA had to pay the SNS for the use of its infrastructure and resources.
As we have seen, this measure sought to increase the capacity of the
public sector and improve the quality of care while also limiting to some extent
the private practice of medicine. These two goals were intended to reduce
inequalities in the distribution of health care services. The limitations on the
private practice of medicine were strongly criticized by the Medical College.
Physicians were also irritated by other measures, such as calling upon doctors
for eight-hour shifts and the extension of working hours to 9:00 p.m.,230 and they
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were displeased with the unprecedented open and participatory interaction
encouraged between health workers and the community.
Between November 1970 and October 1972, the tension between
physicians and the government intensified considerably.

It is astonishing to

observe that within less than two years, the Medical College went from honouring
President Allende “for his extensive and brilliant performance in public life,
especially in the field of social medicine, and the merit of being the first physician
elected as president of the Republic,” 231 to serving as a strong and active
opponent in 1972 as a leader of the professionals against the government.
Even so, during that time the Allende government had been able to transform the
health system into a more equitable, efficient and unified organization through
negotiation and consensus building. Many of the problems in the SNS were
caused by more liberal visions and approaches within the medical sector,
opposed to the socialist views of the Allende government. The government
exaggerated its revolutionary discourse and, overall, the almost irreconcilable
ideological viewpoints deepened the crisis and accentuated the fear felt by health
professionals. Physicians favouring a more open or a more blended privatepublic health care system refused to accept the changes toward a model of
socialized medicine, which they feared would alter their status by positioning
them as state medical employees. In October 1972, the Medical College took
over the leadership of all professional associations, joining the opposition
231
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movement to promote the paralysis of the country and signing its so-called “Chile
petition”.232 Finally, in August and September 1973, the College called for the
indefinite suspension of medical activities and demanded the resignation of
President Allende. Among the government’s supporters, the most radical sector
called for a deepening of the political, economic and social changes underway.
The parties that formed part of the coalition began to clash, which limited the
president’s capacity to govern.
However, the situation was even more complex, as beginning in October
1972, some government political parties and their supporting social movements
called for the creation and implementation of a “people’s power” movement
composed of non-traditional territorial organizations, aimed at defending the
government and facilitating unified actions between the Popular Unity coalition
parties and the popular movement.233 This movement, with its radical political
discourse, clashed with the cultural universe of the middle class and its
attachment to order and security. The People’s Power movement was politically
criticized and rejected on the basis of its extremity and provocative ideas and
found almost no support from the parties in the government. The Chilean road to
socialism clashed with the middle class, whose ideology was based on the
naturalization of social inequalities and a rejection of unrest, instability and
turmoil.

232
233

Pliego de Chile.
Poder Popular.
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The health sector was witnessing the same political turmoil as the country
at large, with a growing inability of the political class to negotiate and
accommodate the interests of several actors and stakeholders in order to reach a
consensus on the urgent reforms the country needed. The country was thus
faced with the limitations of its economic model, the inability to implement
equitable and redistributive policies within its economic paradigm and a social
crisis with profound structural, social, and political contradictions. At the same
time, stiff resistance from employers exacerbated the decline in industrial
production and fuelled the shortage of consumption goods, creating critical food
shortages and increasing the opposition’s antagonism with respect to the Popular
Unity government. Accusations that the government was engaging in illegal and
incompetent behaviour gained favour in the public opinion, while authorities
interpreted these signs as merely technical problems that would be overcome
and resolved through the revolutionary process. It is particularly interesting to
note how even though the changes were carried out within the same
constitutional order inherited from previous governments (the 1925 constitution),
the Allende government was accused of circumventing the legal system.
Another element of the crisis was the growth of the opposition movement,
including several business organizations in the areas of trade, transportation and
construction. This also created a new political context and new political dynamics
for the opposition movement. The increasingly hard line of the opposition is
exemplified by the refusal of the president of the Senate and of the House of

149

Representatives234 to even speak to President Allende. The physicians’ support
for the “Chile petition” made it close to impossible for them to negotiate with the
government, as their endorsement implied a belief in the illegitimacy of the
government, as the opposition charged. The government, however, relied on the
apparent support of the Armed Forces and the revitalization of its own political
parties, which had gained popular support and saw electoral growth in the
previous municipal elections. It agreed to resume dialogue with the unions, but
with each union separately, and only after they put an end to the strike. The
government’s legal, constitutional and political systems were still able to regulate
conflicts and reduce tensions while awaiting the outcome of the parliamentary
elections scheduled for March 1973. The results of these elections were not
unlike those of 1970 and 1971, and opposition parties won a parliamentary
majority 235 to impeach the president and to compel the Popular Unity to
negotiate.
Between March and September 1973, a series of events took place that
once again modified the political scene, deepening the political crisis. Important
legal changes introduced by the government included the implementation of: a)
the Unified National School (ENU);236 b) the Social Property Area (industries that
were transformed into public properties through government intervention,

234

Cámara de Diputados.
Chile has a presidential system were governments can still govern and stay in power until the
next scheduled presidential elections and are not forced to resign even if they don’t have the
support of the Parliament or the Senate, as is the case in a parliamentary system.
236
Escuela Nacional Unificada.
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nationalization or expropriation); and c) new forms of popular organization. These
three changes generated even more resistance from the opposition to the
Allende administration. In June 1973 there was an attempted military coup that
was considered a trial run for future intervention. This crisis and the country’s
intense emotional climate allowed opposition forces to escalate their threat of a
military solution to the crisis. The collapse of the democratic process and the fall
of the elected government became the only way for the opposition to re-establish
its hegemony over the political and economic process.
Due in part to the bitter struggle waged by the opposition and the
intensification of terrorist actions against the government, the legitimacy of the
military hierarchy and the democratic process itself continued to erode. However,
neither the violence nor the failure of talks between the Popular Unity
government and the Christian Democrats frustrated Allende’s efforts to
reconstitute his cabinet, surprisingly incorporating the Armed Forces as well. But
a new general strike against the government, led by the professional
associations, was supported with military discourses invoking the need for an
authoritarian government with a strong and impersonal character. The message
to the Armed Forces was clear: control all political instability and overthrow the
government. The discourse of the oppositional political elite reflected the
conservative ideology that the Armed Forces constituted “the moral reserve of
the Nation”.
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As a consequence of this turbulence and instability, on August 22, 1973,
Parliament declared that the elected government was illegal, setting the stage for
the military coup237 , of September 11, 1973 (euphemistically called a “military
intervention”) that brought a brutal end to the government elected in 1970. The
new military dictatorship radically altered the economic, social and political
processes underway in the country. These changes had a profound impact on
health policy, as the new regime imposed a new liberal market approach to
health care, bringing drastic changes to the social welfare system that Chile had
known since the beginning of the century.
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On 11 September 1973, the combined Chilean Armed Forces (the Army, Navy, Air Force and
the Carabineros (Police) overthrew the democratically elected Allende's government in a coup.
Augusto Pinochet, a highly ranked Chilean general became the commander in chief of the army,
later the chief of the Military Junta and finally the self-nominated President of the Republic, with
the support of the other military branches. The military junta held the executive role until 17
December 1974, after which it remained strictly as a legislative body, when the executive powers
were transferred to Pinochet.
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CHAPTER THREE

LEGAL INSTITUTIONALITY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A MARKET MODEL OF HEALTH CARE IN CHILE:
1973–1989

INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores and analyzes health legislation during the
development of the neoliberal market approach implemented after the 1973 coup
d’état in Chile. The beginning of the military regime marked the beginning of a
legal and institutional crisis characteristic of a country in a dictatorship. In 1974,
Decree-Law 788 was enacted, specifying that constitutional, legislative and
executive powers would be exercised via supreme decrees issued by the Military
Junta. In addition to concentrating legislative and executive powers in a single
body, constitutional power, which in democracy lies with the citizens, was
“legally” eliminated. This decree declared that when supreme decrees were
contrary to the existing constitution, the constitution was thereby modified, 1
violating the basic principles of law and granting the Military Junta a constitutional
authority that nobody had ever conferred it. This “legalization” of the dictatorship
illustrates the rationality of the legal and institutional procedures that made
possible the military regime’s transformations of economic, political and social
sectors.
The end of the republican regime and democratic rule had come to be
seen as the only viable way for the hegemonic bloc to restore the balance of
power and create the economic conditions to bring health and welfare into a
business model. The economic and social reforms of the socialist Allende
government, elected in 1970, were considered to be interfering with the historical
1

Decree-Law (DFL) 788 (1974): “a - f” & art. 1,2 7 3. Regulates the exercise of constitutional
power.
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reproduction of the capitalist model of development and economic growth. A true
neoliberal economic revolution was in the making, which, given the long-standing
and broad societal consensus on maintaining the welfare state, could only be
carried out by dictatorial rule.
The state was thus transformed, focusing its action on ensuring the free
exercise of market activities, becoming a product of the market. The liberal state
was said to have overstepped its original theoretical and legal frameworks, as it
intervened arbitrarily in the economy, breaking the rules of economic freedom.2
The idea was to revive or adapt the liberal economic theses of economists like
Rustow, Misses and Hayek and modify them to suit the final decades of the 20th
century. In Chile, this materialized in the decisive influence of the “Chicago boys”
based in the University of Chicago, and particularly that of Milton Friedman and
Harold Harberger.
The neoliberal Chicago School was opposed to governmental intervention,
rejecting market regulations and Keynesianism and adopting monetarism, except
for interventions to save the market and the banks (like in the Chilean financial
crisis in the 1980s, 3 which put the new economic model in jeopardy). The
influence of this neoliberal school within the Chilean government and the
particular role played by the “Chicago boys”, as well as the policies of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, were decisive in bringing about
2

Pablo
Dávalos,
”Neoliberalismo
político
y
Estado
social
de
derecho”,
http://www.puce.edu.ec.documentos/NeoliberalismoyEstadosocialdederecho.pdf at 5
3
The crisis in Chile that began in 1981 and lasted until 1986 saw inflation rise to almost 30% and
caused a currency devaluation of 40%, which created a serious debt problem, exacerbated by a
significant drop in the price of copper, the principal source of foreign exchange.
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this shift in the economic model. The new model imposed a new logic, and social
consciousness around health issues became defused, making health concerns
an individual problem and stimulating the atomization of society and the
promotion of health care as business.
On August 26, 1976, the US magazine The Nation published a long article
by Orlando Letelier, Allende’s minister of defence and then ambassador to the
United States, in which he presented his theory that the application of the new
neoliberal model is only possible under a dictatorship: “The economic plan now
being carried out in Chile realizes an historic aspiration of a group of Chilean
economists, most of them trained at Chicago University by Milton Friedman and
Arnold Harberger. Deeply involved in the preparation of the coup, the Chicago
boys, as they are known in Chile, convinced the generals that they were
prepared to supplement the brutality, which the military possessed, with the
intellectual assets it lacked” 4 & 5. One month later, Letelier and his American
secretary were assassinated in Washington by the Chilean secret police (DINA)
when their car was blown up.6
To sum up, the process of lawmaking in the absence of democratic
institutions resulted in the forceful rupture of the welfare state, which would not

4

Orlando Letelier, "The Chicago Boys in Chile: Economic Freedom's Awful Toll," The Nation,
August 28, 1976.
5
The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has disclosed that CIA collaborators helped
plan the economic measures that Chile's junta enacted immediately after seizing power (“A
Draconian Cure for Chile's Economic Ills”, Business Week, January 12). Id.
6
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/globalfocus/pinochet112598.htm. After the return
of democracy, in 1989, the chief of the secret police was sentenced to life in prison for this and
several other crimes.
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have been possible under other circumstances. This is why it is important and
essential to analyze the context in which it was possible to “legislate”, by force,
the profound transformation of the health system, enacting legislation that did not
have to go through the legal and institutional process.
This chapter analyzes the principles, doctrine, legislation and regulations
that permitted and promoted the establishment of a market model for health care.
The doctrinaire principles behind the model were that health care was a service
to be acquired individually and that people had a personal responsibility in this
process. This approach went in exactly the opposite direction from the public,
solidarity-based system that Chile had been building for decades. The health
system could not remain invulnerable to changes in its broader political
landscape.

Health policies were adapted to the new political and economic

reality and formed a part of this new process of economic liberalization. The
development of the new health model and its policies had a clear and coherent
rationality, based on a) the partial withdrawal of the state from the health sector;
b) the creation of a market for private health care; and c) the growth of the
structure and autonomy of the private health sector.
To meet the objectives of restructuring the public sector and developing
the private sector, the regime restructured public services to play a subsidiary
role. This meant that only those activities that could not be exercised by the
private sector or those in which the action of the state was justified as a
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“substitute” for the private sector should be left in the hands of the public sector.7
Economic freedom was seen as a guarantee of “real freedom”, while the military
regime was simultaneously promoting a non-liberal but authoritarian state that
suppressed political freedom. Liberalizing the market and giving the state a
subsidiary role in socio-economic affairs and an authoritarian role in the political
sphere modified the traditional role of the Chilean state. State involvement
increased significantly in the political sphere in domestic affairs, defense, culture,
communication, education and social organization, but was limited in the
economic and social spheres.
With respect to creating a market for the private sector in health care,
legislation was introduced to privatize curative services and develop mechanisms
for the population to allocate a portion of their wages to private health insurance.
This increased the amount of circulating capital that could be capitalized by the
private sector in the business of curative health. Finally, with respect to the
growth of the structure and autonomy of the private health sector, legal
provisions allowed the restructuring of public curative services by municipalizing
and decentralizing them and transferring them to private corporations.

The

legislation also privatized complementary services in public institutions and
incentives for private clinics.

7

Ministry of Health, Political Economy, financing Health, (Chile, 1979) at 8.
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1. THE PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL CHANGES FOR A MARKET
MODEL OF HEALTH CARE
There are eleven legal and theoretical documents produced by the military
regime that can serve as a reference for an understanding and analysis of the
principles, doctrine and reforms brought forward in the field of health between
1973 and 1989. The first four documents outline the general ideological
framework and political principles that influenced the different spheres of life after
1973.
They are:
-

“Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile” (March 1974)8

-

“National Objective of the Government of Chile” (December 1975)9

-

“The Constitutional Acts” (September 1976)10

-

“Constitution of Chile” (March 1981)11

The other seven documents guided development strategies as well as health
policy and regulations:
-

“Presidential Guidelines for the Ministry of Health” (December 1972)12

-

“Directive from the President of the Republic to the Minister of Health”
(November 1975)13

8

“Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile” (March 1974).
“Objetivo Nacional del Gobierno de Chile” (December 1975).
10
“Actas Constitucionales” (September 1976) / In particular: Decree-Law 1,319
Constitutional Act No. 1 created the state Council as the supreme advisory body to the
President on matters of Government and Civil Administration. It was composed of former
Presidents of the Republic, in its own right, and by other individuals, appointed by the President.
Decree-Law 1,551, Constitutional Act No. 2 expressed the essentials of Chilean Institutions. It
affirmed that the Chilean state was a unitary entity, and that the country was divided into regions
with a decentralized territorial administrative apparatus.
11
Constitución de Chile (March 1981).
12
Orientación Presidencial para el Ministerio de la Salud (December 1972).
9
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-

“Complementary Orientations from the President of the Republic to the
Minister of Health” (December 1976 and July 1979)

-

“Decree-Law 1,552 Constitutional Act No. 3 (September 1976)14

-

“Health Policy” (January 1977)15

-

“Health Restructuring” (February 1979)16

-

“Political Economy and Financing of Health” (October, 1979)17

The official discourses articulated by those with authority to implement
health policies during the military regime recognized the definition of “health” put
forward by the World Health Organization, which stated that, “Health is a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity.”18 At the same time, the conceptual consideration on which

13

Directiva del Presidente de la República al Ministro de la Salud (November 1975).
This Constitutional Act guaranteed all people a long series of rights. The most relevant rights
pertaining to the health of people were:
14

The Right to Life and personal integrity.
Equality before the Law.
The Right to personal freedom and individual security.
The Law respected and protected the privacy and honor of the individual, and his family.
It guaranteed the inviolability of domestic and private communication.
• The Right to Education. Parents have the primary right to educate their children, and the
ability to choose the educational establishment. Basic education was compulsory.
• The Right to Live in an environment free of contamination.
• The Right to Health was guaranteed. The state assumed responsibility for ensuring free
and equal access to promotion, protection, and restoration of health and rehabilitation of
the individual.
• The freedom to work was protected by this Act.
• The Right to Social Security was ensured so that the state could formulate national policy
on Social Security, control the system’s operation and ensure the preferential right of
members to make their choices.
15
“The President of the Republic’s additional guidelines to the Health Minister” (December 1976
and July 1979).
16
“Health Restructuring” (February 1979).
17
“Political Economy and Financing of Health” (October 1979).
18
Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International
Health Conference (New York, 19-22 June 1946); signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives
•
•
•
•
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the regime based its health policy was that illness was not the result of the action
of a specific agent, but rather the convergence of innumerable elements in a
complex ecological context. The military government thus proposed quite a
global and interdisciplinary conception of health, which made it possible to
imagine a progressive and modern vision for further reforms.
The fundamental principles that were to govern its health policy were, in
summary, the following:
•

Health is defined as the overall physical and psychological state of welfare
of the people and of society, and not merely as the simple absence of
illness.

•

Health as such is a value that human beings require for their own personal
fulfillment, and it is both an element of and a means for societal
development.

•

Health is a national heritage and, consequently, an irrefutable
responsibility of the state.

•

Health is a human right as established in the political constitution.

•

The right to health is acquired from the moment of conception and must
be guaranteed throughout life, independently of social status, age, religion
or sex.

•

The right to health is exercised through free and egalitarian access to the
services provided to this effect.

•

Health acts are defined as the activities of promotion, protection, healing
and rehabilitation, which must be integrated, coordinated and provided in
a timely, continuous, effective and manner.

•

All citizens must contribute financially to the system based on income.

of 61 states and entered into force on 7 April 1948 (2 Official Records of the World Health
Organization 100).
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•

Public, private and mixed sectors take part in health activities in a
coordinated fashion.

•

The people must be free to choose which sector will provide them with the
medical care they need.
Health objectives focused on four elements: a) accessibility to services; b)

social security; c) restructuring of the public sector and d) new incentives for the
private sector. With respect to access to services, official governmental
declarations underlined the need to extend the coverage of public services, with
the aim of guaranteeing free and equal access to health services with a better
and more efficient organization of resources. As for social security, the plan was
to separate health services from social security benefits in such a way that would
determine the type of curative services needed. Such services depended solely
on the principle of necessity. It was only after this was guaranteed that the
financial capacity to pay for health care was to be considered.19 Nevertheless, as
we shall see below, it was not demonstrated in practice that the changes
imposed by the military government privileged the needs of the people over their
capacity to pay. A document issued by the Ministry of Health on health care
funding declared “that the state assumed a subsidiary role, executing health acts
through specialized institutions only when the person had no access, through any
other means, to public, private or mixed health.20

19

Alejandro Medina-Lois, “Estrategias de Salud en Chile hasta el año 2000”, (1980) 18 Seguridad
Nacional at 53.
20
Ministry of Health, Political Economy, financing Health, supra note 7 at 7.
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With respect to health policy, confining the state to a subsidiary role meant
contradicting the regime’s own statement about the fundamental role of the state
in ensuring the health of the whole population and not only in a subsidiary
fashion, while it also failed to guarantee free and equal access to medical and
health care services. In parallel with this restructuring, the regime gave the state
a role that could be qualified as “negative intervention” (no intervention). In other
words, it meant to limit its own capacity and jurisdiction as well as to stimulate the
private sector. Thus, although the military regime’s declaration of principles and
its health doctrine reflected a wide-ranging and commendable vision of what
health policy should be, in practice it became clear that the implementation of
reforms contradicted those same principles they were supposed to sustain.
In response to constant criticism and accusations that the military regime
was compromising basic and fundamental health principles, the government and
supporters of the market model of health care fiercely denied that the policy was
to privatize health care. Authorities argued instead that the purpose was to
guarantee freedom of access to curative services and to promote efficiency. It
was obviously difficult to understand this contradictory discourse, which masked
the hidden agenda that was progressively transforming the health sector,
reducing the role of the state and promoting a neoliberal conception of health
more related to the principles of freedom of choice than to those of satisfying the
needs of individuals. In effect, the regime considered that “access to medical acts
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had to be the result of a free decision on the part of the person, freedom that
included choosing where and by whom the service was to be provided.”21
Within the broader context of the political and economic changes
introduced by the military regime, the health care system clearly could not remain
unaffected. It was necessary to adapt the health sector to the new conditions to
include it in this process of capitalist liberalization. To achieve this integration, the
regime moved to expand the market, stimulate the operational capacity of the
private sector, dictate decrees and laws and legislate in favour of a rapid
privatization process and the diminishing of the public sector, as will be
discussed in the next sections of this chapter. These changes occurred in
different phases. The last of these phases, as we shall see, was characterized by
the resolution of conflicts of interest and different approaches within the regime,
the neutralization of lobby groups and, finally, the fulfillment of several final
prerequisites for the implementation of health reforms.
We must look to the history of Chilean society and its profound inequalities
to understand why the majority of the population was unable to exercise this
“freedom option”. The government initially believed that the real freedom of
individuals would be guaranteed by the subsidiary role of the state, as individual
and personal relations with curative services would be strengthened. To privatize
social security and to alter the responsibility of the state in the services sector
meant to transform “social concern” into an “individual concern”. This change
21

Sergio Molina, “La nueva política económica”, (1974) 266 Mensaje at 7.
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was also politically interesting given the traditional strength of the health sector
as a force of organization and popular cohesion.
It is, in effect, with respect to health issues that people may develop a
“social consciousness” about the problems that afflict individuals. This
consciousness allows them to share similar claims and channel forms of social
struggle. Castells22 defines these processes of politicization as a “socialization of
claims” where collective consciousness focuses on collective action. In contrast,
the neutralization of claims and the atomization of society stem precisely from the
individualization of interests, when health issues become individual problems and
not social concerns. This particular scenario also echoed the global health care
crisis, characterized by fiscal limitations to expanding socialized medicine and
the barriers to accessing care in increasingly expensive health care scenarios. In
the face of the increasing cost of care and the significant financial impacts of
chronic diseases that accompany an aging population, the high demand for
pharmaceuticals and more demanding specialized technology, reforms and
potential solutions focused mainly on organizational and financial measures to
contain costs, improve efficiency and transfer the responsibility to patients. The
crisis of modern, specialized medicine, accelerated by demographic and
epidemiological transitions, was also revealing how the patient was becoming the

22

David B .Clarke, Consumer Society and the Post-modern City, (New York, Routledge, 2003) at
102 and Manuel Castells, “Análisis marxista de la crisis del capitalismo”, in Hugo Mercer & José
C. Escudero, Políticas de Salud en los Estados capitalistas de excepción: Argentina, Chile y
Uruguay, (UAM-Xochimilco, México, Editorial Mimeo, 1979).
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target to blame in the health-illness process23 and the source of revenue in the
health care business.
Doctors did not reach a full consensus on the health policies being
implemented by the military regime. Some tried to de-dramatize the discourse,
suggesting that health care could not be considered part of a social market
economy since no goods were at stake. Others argued that to apply some
elements of the market economy to the health sector was neither mercantilism
nor merely a way of making profit, but rather a strategy for maximizing efficiency
through honest and healthy competition. 24 But the ideologues of Chile’s long
tradition of public health and state responsibility argued that most technical
needs and their alternatives are better solved through public services. This was
even the model applied by the Armed Forces for their own medical care services,
and it seemed inconsistent to replace their efficient public service with
cooperatives offering private services.25
As we shall see, the military regime finally established a new legal
framework that redefined the public system, creating open competition between
medical establishments. According to promoters of the model, this new “healthy
and effective competition in health care services” was a correction to the state’s
ineffectiveness as a provider of medical services and a solution for the “financial

23

Robert Crawford, "You are dangerous to your health: the ideology and politics of victim
blaming", (1977) 7 International Journal of Health Services at 663.
24
Interview to Osvaldo Artaza, (1974) 2037 Revista Ercilla at 11.
25
Ernesto Medina-Lois, “La Salud: necesidad social del mundo actual”, (1975) 103 Revista
Médica de Chile at 461.
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anarchy” of distributing resources and establishing costs.26 They reiterated that
the reform process not only imposed regulations on the public sector to improve
its effectiveness, but also brought renewed economic dynamism to the
management of curative services, which would result in “increased income for
health professionals”, “more new sources of employment”, “a new boost to the
investment-deprived sector” and “reduced health costs.”27
Behind these notions, there was a metamorphological vision of the
meaning of freedom, in that it did not constitute an end per se, but rather a
mechanism for achieving efficiency and a discourse for promoting the
privatization of services. In addition, the hypothetical increase in users’ abilities to
pay was not related to improved performance or to the extension of services, but
rather to the economic need to create a market for the private sector. These
changes in the dismantling of the public sector were a logical outcome of the
excessively flexible new health care model, which was necessarily in tune with
the economic model being imposed by the military government.
However,

despite

the

government’s

principles

and

objectives,

transformations in the health sector were not easy to implement and did not take
place as quickly as expected. Although supporters of the model continued to try
to implement a broad, market-driven approach, others within the same military
regime were more cautious and preferred to keep the state as the principal actor

26
27

El Mercurio, Editorials 2, 6, 10 & 22 May, 1981.
El Mercurio, Editorials 8 & 29 May, 1981.
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responsible for the health sector. The internal dissent and conflicts between
health professionals slowed down the Ministry’s action plans and brought
modifications to the proposed health model. The public sector had historically
been considered to play a fundamental role in health care, with a role too
critically important to be suddenly modified. Thus, the government was forced to
continuously defend itself from its critics, indicating that it did not want to
implement “either a cold market model or a state model”. Its polemical pragmatic
discourse favoured a combination of market policies and policies based on the
responsibility of the state. The regime labelled it a “social market economy”,
probably following the liberal German model. The idea was that the private sector
and the market would invigorate social development, while the subsidiary role of
the state would protect fundamental social interests.
Social policy reforms were outlined in a document called “El ladrillo”,28
which outlined seven modernization principles as a general guide for action.
These included decentralization as well as reforms in agriculture, education,
health care, labour, social security and the judicial system. However, major
changes did not occur until 1979, mainly because of resistance by the
physicians’ lobby, as well as the Air Force, which had control over social policy
and was not fully in favour of the market-oriented reforms. The doctors’
professional association, the Medical College, approved of the decentralization
process but rejected the municipalization plan to download health care
28

“El Ladrillo” (the brick), became the economic policy blueprint for the military Junta. It was
published only in 1992, after the reestablishment of democracy in Chile.
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responsibilities to the municipalities on the basis that it was being imposed from
above without consulting the principal actors.
To move the reform process forward, General Pinochet dismissed Air
Force Commander General Leigh along with another 18 Air Force generals using
a provision of a decree that allowed the military junta to remove a member “not
able to fulfill his duty”. In this way, Pinochet consolidated his power and brought
the technocratic “Chicago Boys” into the government. Later, in February 1981,
the military regime lifted another main obstacle to lobbies with Decree-Law
3,621

29

,

associations

which
30

transformed

professional

associations

into

corporate

and eliminated mandatory affiliation. Physicians, like other

professionals, were excluded from all policy development, breaking with the
traditional system of professional participation in policy formation in place since
the late 1940s.31
The health care reforms introduced by the military regime after 1981
created a dual public and private system, in which the private sector received
considerable support and stimulation. The public component was composed of

29

Decree-Law 3,621 (1981) regulated the professional associations into corporate
associations. These corporate associations were regulated by Decree-Law 2,757 (1979). The
professional colleges became union associations and were subject to the norms dictated in
Decree-Law 2,757 (1979), which sought to eliminate monopoly systems and did away with the
obligation to belong to a professional college in order to exercise a profession or trade. The
professional colleges’ power to resolve conflicts was abolished by decree, and the courts became
the only bodies authorized to enforce the sanctions contemplated in the respective College’s
Organic Law and to penalize any breaches of professional ethics.
30
Asociaciones gremiales.
31
Rosanna Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment: The Quandaries of Social Protection Under
Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1990”, (2001) 43 Latin American Politics and Society at 55.
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the National Health Fund (FONASA), 32 the National Health Services System
(SNSS) 33 and local municipal services, mainly for primary health care. The
Armed Forces and the Police 34 continued to have their own health care
institutions. The private component consisted of private health insurance
institutions (ISAPRES),35 funded by salary deductions and private contributions
as well as co-payments by affiliates. The ISAPRES were legally established with
Decree-Laws No. 3 (1981) and No. 3,626.36 They were created as a financial
mechanism to draw private capital into the health sector and represented an
alternative to the FONASA (National Health Fund), administering at first 4% of
workers’ salaries, and later up to 7%.
As indicated above, several of the health principles and objectives
seemed to be aimed at bringing progress to the health sector, yet in practice, this
was far from the case. The health field and the country underwent an ideological
rupture in sharp contrast to the incremental reforms and changes that had
contributed to the building of a welfare state in Chile. The re-conceptualization of
the notions of freedom, need and common good and the introduction of “social
32
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market economy” principles resulted in an overall dominance of the “market” over
the “social”. An analysis of the economic rationality of this model will allow us to
better understand these policies.

2. THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL RATIONALITY OF THE
MARKET MODEL
Health is one of the most difficult cases to insert into the social market economy
as planned by government, but it will not be able to escape.37
Free initiative and competition will offer better services to users...38
Decentralization, freedom of choice and the actual development of private
initiatives... reflect the true aspiration of the Chilean people...39

The development of the new health model and its policies had a clear and
coherent rationality, based on a) the partial withdrawal of the state from the
health sector; b) the creation of a market for private health care; and c) the
stimulation of the autonomy of a vigorous private health care system. Within this
same rationale, however, there were disputes and contradictions between
different perspectives and ideological approaches. In particular, the militarists,
mostly from the Armed Forces, concerned with internal security; the right wing
“gremialistas”, mainly old student leaders from the Catholic University with
traditional values; and finally the neoliberal “Chicago Boys” trained in the
neoliberal Department of Economics at the University of Chicago.
37
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A. Partial withdrawal of the state from the health sector
According to Milton Friedman—ideologist of the Chicago school of economic
thought and source of inspiration for the Chilean neoliberal model—there were
only two ways to coordinate the economic activity of the state. The first was
centralization, which required coercion, and the second was the free market,
which could be achieved with voluntary cooperation.40 Friedman maintained that
authoritarian decisions can only come from an entity with the power to dictate
them; that is, the state. In other words, power resided in those who control the
state. Contrary to expectations, the larger the field for authoritarian decisions, the
higher the risk of losing control of power. Thus, Friedman’s neoliberal reasoning
was also that state intervention in social life did not improve the social welfare of
the population at large. Economic freedom in an authoritarian political system
and a liberal market economy with the state as subsidiary modified the traditional
role of the Chilean welfare state. Interventionism increased significantly in the
political sphere in domestic affairs, defence, culture, communication, education
and social organization, while the state presence was limited in the economic
and social spheres.
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Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1962)
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This conception of the role of the state, while consistent with the goal of a
capitalist reorganization of the economy, did not respond to the needs of those
who depended upon state support—the vast majority of the population.
Despite all this, the military regime was, although not without difficulty,
headed towards the dismantling of this system and the withdrawal of the state
from the health sector. The arguments invoked to carry this out were linked to
criticisms that the public sector was excessively centralized, with an inefficient
and exaggerated bureaucracy and a disorganized planning structure. The military
regime focused its initial actions on denouncing the problems caused historically
by strong state intervention in health matters. In addition to this discourse, the
regime made clear its perception of the particular shortcomings that were
preventing a satisfactory distribution of health services among different groups of
the population, such as bureaucracy, lack of initiative, low levels of innovation,
lack of accountability, etc. 41
Although these criticisms of the shortcomings of the public health system
were valid, the level of social and economic development of the country
precluded the possibility that free, open and business-like market laws would be
able to care for the well-being of the population. The debate about the
advantages of a liberalized health system compared to those of preserving the
social responsibilities of the state may have been relevant in a society where
41

It is interesting to note the ongoing claims by the media to damage the image of the public
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resources were abundant and where the population had real options for
exercising their freedom of choice. In a country like Chile, though, this debate
was irrelevant, as for the vast majority of the population, the satisfaction of health
needs was only possible through the public sector, including the middle class.
This situation was even more critical in the area of preventive medicine.
The most acute cases were found in the rural sector and among the selfemployed. Waged workers were much better protected than the self-employed,
as they had free access to public health care. Such access, however, was
available to less than 25% of the population, and more than half of the population
was not having its health care needs met.42 A shrinking state presence in the
area of health services even further aggravated this situation.
The decline in public health expenditures by the military government was
reflected in reduced capital investment in public health personnel such as
decreased wages, less spending on training, fewer hirings, etc. While in 1969,
capital investment represented 12.8% of public health expenditures, it amounted
to only 2.8% ten years later, in 1979.43 By the early 1970s, there was already
great disparity in the distribution of qualified health care workers in the health
system. The later cuts to financial and human resources in the public sector
made it even harder for the population to access medical and health care. In
addition, the stimulus provided to the private health care sector further skewed
42
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the already uneven distribution of services and the concentration of medical
personnel in large cities and the richer municipalities, where the middle and
upper classes resided. According to Ortiz, the number of personnel in the public
health care sector dropped from 75,694 to 66,969 employees in 1978 alone,
accompanied by a decrease in the real value of wages throughout the entire
public sector.44
Four basic aspects of the public health care system—policy, service
provision, financial management and primary care—were reorganized. DecreeLaw 2,76345 (August 1979) re-organized the Ministry of Health and created the
National Health Service System,46 the National Health Fund,47 the Public Health
Institute of Chile 48 and the Central Supply Centre of the National Health
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Francisco Ortiz, “El sector salud y sus recursos financieros: Análisis de la Década” in Hugo
Lavados Montes (ed.), Desarrollo Social y Salud en Chile, (Santiago, Corporación de Promoción
Universitaria, 1981) in Viveros-Long, Id. at 394.
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Decree Law 2,763 (1979). Regulations for the Ministry of Health, National Health Service
System, National Health Fund, Public Health Institute of Chile and Central Supply Centre of
the National Health Service. In addition, it established the foundations for a deregionalized
National Health Care System. It established a Ministerial Health Secretariat for each of the
country’s regions and created Health Services authorized to delegate tasks to the universities,
unions, employers’ associations and other bodies with technical capacities for the activities
assigned to the Health Services. The funding would come from the National Health Fund, which
was the legal successor to SERMENA and the SNS.
46
Each Service was under the charge of a director, responsible for the supervision, coordination,
and control of the facilities and services of the system.
47
The National Health Fund was a functionally de-centralized public service, with a legal capacity
and financial resources of its own. Legally, it was a continuation of the National Health Service for
Employees and the National Health Service, for the purpose of carrying out administrative and
financial actions.
48
The Public Health Institute of Chile was created as a functionally de-centralized public service,
also with a legal capacity and financial resources of its own. It contributed to the national
laboratory, and was a referential source for s the fields of Microbiology, Immunology,
Pharmacology, Clinical Laboratory, Environmental Pollution and Occupational Health. It was the
legal continuation of the National Health Service with respect to its relation with the
Bacteriological Institute of Chile and the National Institute of Occupational Health.

175

Service. 49 According to Decree-Law 2,763, health service agencies were
functionally de-centralized, with independent legal capacities and their own
resources for fulfilling their duties. They were charged with the implementation of
integrated

development,

protection

and

restoration

of

health

and

the

rehabilitation of sick people. Policy-making power was transferred from the SNS
back to the Ministry of Health, and the executive power to implement curative
and preventive services was decentralized in the new National Heath Services
System. Thirteen regions and twenty-seven semi-autonomous local health
systems were created across the country, which finally became the legal
successors to the National Health Service and the National Health Service for
Employees (SERMENA).

The health service agencies, the National Health

Fund, the National Council for Food and Nutrition, the Public Health Institute of
Chile, the Central Supply and the National Health Service were also brought
under the ambit of the Ministry of Health.50
This was a major change from the historically centralized structure of the
SNS. Furthermore, financial management was unified in a single agency, the

49

The Supply Center of the National Health Service came into being as a functionally decentralized public service, again, with a legal capacity and financial resources of its own. It
provided the medicines, instruments and other supplies that may be required by the agencies,
organizations, institutions and persons affiliated to the Health System, for the implementation of
incentive measures, protection or restoration of health, and the rehabilitation of sick people. The
Supply Central was the legal successor of the National Health Service.
50
The Ministry of Health was responsible for formulating and implementing the health policies. It
had to perform the following functions: direct and guide all government activities relating to the
health system; lay out the internal technical, administrative and financial regulations to be
followed by the agencies, and institutions of the health system; and supervise, monitor and
evaluate the implementation of policies and health plans.

176

FONASA,51 and the regime began transferring primary care responsibilities to the
municipalities. However, because of the severe economic crisis that followed the
“second oil shock” in 1979, by 1982 only 20% of the centres had been
transferred and the process was not complete until 1987.52 The partial withdrawal
of the state from curative services and the limitations suffered by the public
sector in general constituted a loss of decades of progress and experience.
What would happen to this vast sector of the population as a result of
privatizations? As the great majority of the population used the public sector, the
new policies needed to determine how to satisfy this demand in a shrinking
public sector with declining resources. The response lay precisely in the other
axes of the market model; namely, the formation of a market for the private
sector and the growth of the structure and autonomy of the private health sector,
which I analyze below.

B. The creation of a market for the private sector
Social policy was guided by market-oriented principles, including the
reduction of state intervention, the strengthening of the private sector, the
adoption of free-market and stabilization policies and the privatization of public
corporations and state companies and industries. Social policy had to be

51
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Viveros-Long, “Changes in the Health Financing”, supra note 43 at 382.
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consistent with economic rationality.53 Promoting private medicine and making it
profitable necessarily implied extending its market potential by increasing the
consumption of private medical services. The disbursement of financial
resources was redirected from subsidizing the supply of health care services to
subsidizing the demand for such services. The previous system of direct budget
allocations distributed by the SNS was replaced with production criteria.54 Thus,
the direct allocation of public funds to health care institutions via an annual
budget was reduced in order to increase the allocation of funds as
reimbursement for actual services rendered, creating competition between
institutions. Until the sanction of Law 2,575 in 1979, only 16% of the budget was
allocated according to production criteria and 63.7% by direct budget allocation,
with another 20% coming from direct income and donations. 55 Decree-Law
2,57556 (1979) extended the benefits of Law 16,781 to the beneficiaries of the
National Health Service.
This policy of subsidizing demand even further weakened the capacity and
the image of the entire public sector and stimulated the growth and legitimization
of the private sector. Need-based access to services was replaced with access
53
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Decree-Law 2,575 extended the medical and dental benefits of Law 16,781 (1968) to the
beneficiaries of the National Health Service. The legal beneficiaries of the National Health
Service were eligible for the health care system under Law 16,781, without prejudice to the care
that they were entitled to of that service in accordance with Law 10,383 and its amendments. The
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Assistance Fund, as established by Law 16,781. Any difference between the amount funded by
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based on an individual’s capacity to pay prices that depended on real demand as
determined in a market economy, 57 in which health care was just another
commodity.

The “demand” for health care was not actually the result of an

individual’s decision to use medical services based on his or her medical needs;
rather, it was the result of several other factors, such as the capacity to pay and
the accessibility of services. 58 Additional factors taken into consideration by
patients included the subsequent cost of follow-up treatments and drugs59 as well
as the loss of income during recovery. Given these constraints, which were not
insignificant, increasing the capacity of patients and users to pay became one of
the financial challenges of the new liberal health care model. This situation was
further exacerbated when the principles of cooperation and coordination between
different

services

and

institutions

were

replaced

with

inter-institutional

competition. There was also a tendency to reorganize the availability of services
to target the most profitable types of medical specializations.
Since the only way to guarantee the freedom of choice for health services
57
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caso chileno” in Lavados, Desarrollo Social y Salud en Chile, supra note 44 at 394.
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Emanuel de Kadt, “Las desigualdades en el campo de la salud” in Livingstone & Raczynski
(eds.), Salud Pública y Bienestar Social, (Santiago, CIEPLAN, 1976) at 31-32.
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In developed countries, drug expenses represented between 9% and 10% of the budget
destined for health services. These figures more than doubled in underdeveloped countries.
These numbers were even more eloquent in Chile, as it was reported that pharmaceutical
expenses comprised of almost a third of all expenses recorded in the health sector. Ernesto
Medina & Ana María, Kaempfer, “Análisis crítico de la metodología de planificación de salud”,
(1968) Revista Médica de Chile 455. The concentration of the pharmaceutical industry in Chile
demonstrated that in 1977, out of 57 active companies, 24 were foreign and the 5 largest of these
already controlled 32% of the market. The leading 25 companies controlled 80.5% of the total
market and 18 were foreign multinationals. Also, since foreign pharmaceutical companies hold
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restrictions in domestic exportation. See Constantine Vaitsos in Meredeth Turshen, “An analysis
of the medical supply industries”, (1976) 6 International Journal of Health Services at 275.
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was to extend users’ capacity to pay, the government established mechanisms
that would permit users to exercise this freedom, including subsidizing the
demand for services and privatizing social security. The goal was to facilitate the
transfer of savings to private insurance institutions, thus increasing the users’
capacity to choose services and simultaneously stimulating the private practice of
medicine and the development of private clinics and, eventually, hospitals. The
new market approach to resource allocation was clearly reflected in the type,
efficiency and variety of services offered, which now had to incorporate time as a
variable to maximize profit. Furthermore, artificial demand was created with the
introduction of more screening appointments, excess consumption of nonessential medical services and the promotion of greater drug use, all part of, as
described by the regime, a sophisticated approach to medical care.
The creation of this private sector would supposedly guarantee freedom of
choice. The ISAPRES could contract out their health care services or run their
own health care institutions.60 The purpose was to provide the people with a free
choice as to whether to make their mandatory contributions into either the public
fund or the private sector. Each ISAPRE had several predetermined health plans
that affiliates could choose from according to their health care needs, the benefits
offered and the monthly premiums. Both parties signed the contract, but the
ISAPRE had the right to reject the affiliate or to deny the renewal of the contract,
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allowing clients to be selected according to the level of risk they presented.61
While the FONASA and the former SERMENA covered up to 85% of the
population, the private ISAPRES started with a modest 2% coverage, but
climbed to 26% before later falling to 16% of the population. Coverage by the
FONASA decreased to 59% of the population as ISAPRE coverage increased.
By 2006, FONASA had recovered to about 70% of the population.62,63
The military government increased the share of the health care on
individuals and eliminated the employer contribution. The mandatory contribution
started at 4% of taxable income, which was raised to 6% in 1983 and then to 7%
in 1986. The same year a reform introduced co-payments to the public sector. In
1985, Law 18,46964 created the General Benefits Regime,65 which defined the
rights and responsibilities of citizens in the public sector and established the
grounds for the relationship between the ISAPRES and the public sector
(FONASA and SNSS).66 This law governed the exercise of constitutional rights
to health protection and created a regime of health benefits. The constitutional
right to health protection included the free and equal access to the promotion,
61
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protection and restoration of health, as well as to actions related to the
rehabilitation of the individual. It guaranteed the freedom to choose between a
private and public health system. The agencies in the National Health Service
were responsible for the implementation of these health actions. The Health
Benefits Regime’s affiliated members included public and private workers, those
who received family allowances from dependent workers,67 independent workers
included in any legal pension plan, volunteers in any legal pension plan and
individuals entitled to social security pensions, disability allowance or severance.
This law also recognized pregnant women and children up to six years of age.
Lastly, all those who lacked resources and received welfare pensions and family
subsidies were also beneficiaries of the regime. Incorporation into the regime
occurred automatically upon fulfilling any of the criteria listed above. Members
had to make contributions to the National Health Fund, which was used to fund
the health benefits. 68 However, the law classified those insured by FONASA
according to their income levels. This is why all FONASA affiliates (except for
low-income beneficiaries) had to make additional co-payments based on their
income, 69 unlike ISAPRE beneficiaries who could make additional payments
according to their subscription plan.
67

Dependents of workers listed on any independent legal pension fund system, and complying
with the same qualifications and requirements as prescribed by the Law to receive family
allowance of a dependent worker, were eligible for benefits under this regime.
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The beneficiaries were entitled to medical examinations, tests, preventive medicine, and
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Later, in 1989, Law 18,56670 required an additional contribution to the
ISAPRES, this time by employers. This tax-deductible contribution was fixed at
2% of the taxable income of each affiliate subscribed to a health plan and was to
be paid by the employer, supposedly as a means to allow the middle class to
gain access to the private health care sector.71 However, everybody had the right
to opt not to contribute to any ISAPRE and to select instead the public system
fund (FONASA), a choice often made by low-income earners in order to obtain
access to free health care across the full range of services. Those with higher
incomes could also use the public system, but were charged by FONASA for a
portion of their hospital costs. Alternatively, they could use the private system
and pay the difference between the basic amounts that FONASA covered and
the amount being charged for the private service.72
Lastly, Law 18,933,73 passed in March 1990, created the Superintendence
of Health, which had a legal capacity and financial resources of its own. Its main
function was to supervise and regulate the health institutions (ISAPRES),
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replacing FONASA in this role, and to determine the minimum coverage to be
offered by the ISAPRE health plans. The Superintendence was charged with the
registration of the ISAPRES and was also responsible for providing general
instructions 74 that would clarify health contracts and agreements. 75 All the
supervision of the legal and financial matters of the ISAPRES came under the
purview of the Superintendence of Health. If any disputes arose between the
ISAPRES and its affiliates or beneficiaries, it was the Superintendence that could
intervene to resolve the crisis. This law also replaced the yearly ISAPRES
contracts with life-long contracts, eliminating the possibility that the renewal of
the policy would be denied unless the affiliate defaulted on payments. However,
the ISAPRES could re-establish the benefits and the cost of the policies on an
annual basis, provided that the new conditions applied to the affiliates did not
lead to discrimination or involve unacceptably high costs for members.76 In 1990,
16% of citizens were beneficiaries of an ISAPRE, climbing to 25% by 1995.
These transformations in the privatization of the health sector cannot be
analyzed separately from what was a similar privatization process in the pension
and social security sector. From a health perspective, it may seem to be a
74
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different and not necessarily related issue, and this may indeed be the case in
the context of a welfare state, but not in the context of the formation of a market
for the private sector. The logic of individual contributions to private health
insurance was also applied to pensions. A private pension system opened the
way for an immense capitalization mechanism for private business. Politically,
this approach allowed the transformation of social concerns (including forms of
social struggle) into separate, individual problems creating a personal and private
pension fund, which contributed to the atomization of society’s concerns
(Castells’77 anti anti-thesis). Thus, the main reforms included opening up the
market to the new private health insurance companies (ISAPRES) and privatizing
the pension systems (AFP),78 which should also be taken into account in this
discussion.
In this process of privatizing pensions, the opposition was much more
disperse than it was for other policies, because Chile had no national
organization capable of lobbying against the transformation of the pension
system. Although there was no labour or professional resistance to the social
security reforms, some military officers opposed privatization, especially of the
Armed Forces fund. The first important regulation was implemented in 1979 with
Decree-Law 2,448,79 which created a standard minimum retirement age of 65 for
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men and 60 for women, eliminating pensions based on the number of years of
service. Another social security reform was implemented in November 1980 with
Decree-Law 3,500.80 This law created a system in which old-age pensions and
disability and survivorship benefits were derived from individual savings. The
capitalization was carried out through the Pension Fund Administrators (AFP).
These private institutions administered the Pension Fund, providing benefits for
those covered under this law. The Fund was independent and separate from the
other assets of the AFP, which had no rights over the individual pension funds
(the principle of separation of assets). On the other hand, all affiliated members
of the AFP could transfer the value of their shares to another AFP by giving
notice to their employer for the transfer of funds, when applicable (the principle of
the personal freedom of pension savings).
Each AFP was authorized to administer only one fund and to collect
contributions to be deposited in capital accounts for the purpose of making
investments. The AFPs were entitled to remuneration based on a commission for
all legal purposes, all pensions were to be regarded as age-related pensions, excluding only
Disability, which prescribed an age requirement, and the Survival pensions. The age criterion for
the Disability pensions was sixty-five years for men and sixty for women.
80
Decree-Law 3,500 (1980) regulated old-age pensions and disability and survivorship
benefits. It created a system of old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions based on individual
capitalization through the AFPs, and corporations would administer the Pension Fund and
provide the services. They had to ensure a minimum rate of return for the funds collected. The
state guaranteed minimum pensions for those affiliated, adding to the supplementary state
contribution if the accrued pension was less than the established minimum pension. All workers
who began working had to start to contribute to an AFP, which could not reject membership
applications. All workers could deposit an additional amount in their individual capitalization
accounts. For independent workers, it was established that affiliation to an AFP would take effect
as of the first payment. The fund’s resources could be invested in General Treasury of the
Republic securities, the Central Bank and letters of credit issued by financial institutions, among
other entities. The AFP Superintendency was created to regulate the AFPs and tasked with their
oversight and control.
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the fees paid by affiliates, which were deducted from their individual accounts.
The state guaranteed a minimum old-age pension and disability and survivorship
benefits to all members of the health system who fulfilled the criteria mentioned
under the law. Without prejudice to the rules for independent workers, employed
workers were automatically affiliated and had to choose which AFP they wanted
to contribute to in order to build their pension.81 With this, these workers acquired
membership status with a legal relationship between the worker and the pension
system, which led to rights and obligations; namely, the right to benefits and the
obligation to contribute. Membership was unique, permanent, and persisted
throughout the life of the member.
Decree-Law 3,500, which brought an end to the pay-as-you-go system,
went through several amendments.82 Further revisions were introduced by new

81
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The monthly rent was paid to the member under Insurance or Annuity withdrawals as per
Article 62 (pension age), and that were subject to income taxes levied on pensions,
salaries and wages.
The Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) could not carry any advertising prior to the date
that started up to the public.
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legislation. Decree-Law 3,50183 established a new Social Security Contribution
System, whereby all existing welfare institutions required a legislative provision to
establish new benefits or to make transfers of funds that would reassign the
affiliates’ contributions and their indexation. Decree-Law 3,502 84 created the
Institute of Pension Normalization (INP)85 as an autonomous body with a legal
capacity and funding of its own. It was linked to the government through the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Its purpose was to study and propose
policies and measures to the government that would ensure the timely
implementation of pension commitments that the state or the institutions dealing
with pensions had incurred prior to the enactment of this law or were going to
incur in the future. This law also created the Pension Trust Fund.86 Ultimately, the

•

•

The Administrator must send notifications to the homes of each of its members regarding
their individual accounts, indicating the number of registered shares, their value and the
date of investment.
In case of bankruptcy or dissolution of the Administrator, the obligation to pay fell on the
insurance company in which the Administrator was hired, and the Disability Insurance at
the time the pensions originated.
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Decree-Law 3,501 of 1980 established that a tax be paid by employers on the taxable
wages of all workers, regardless of the pension system which was in effect. The tax rate was
3% until 31st December 1981, 2% until 31st December 1982 and 1% until 31st December 1983.
th
This Law established that as of 30 October 1986, a permanent tax would be charged at the rate
of 2%. Later the Law 18,566 declared the former transitory article No 3 of the Decree-Law 3,501,
to be permanent.
84
Decree Law 3,502 (1980) created the Pension Normalization Institute (INP). Its principal
functions included studying and proposing policies and measures to guarantee compliance with
the pension commitments that the state or pension institutions had made prior to this law taking
effect or would make in the future, in addition to administering the Pension Finance Fund. The
Fund had to finance the recognition bonds referred to in Decree-Law 3,500 (1980), the retirement
payments that were part of the pension institutions’ significant liabilities and the pensions of those
opting to remain in the pension institutions affected or that would be affected by Decree-Law
1,263 (1975).
85
Instituto de Normalización Previsional.
86
Pension Trust Fund, had to fund: a) the credit bonds (Decree-Law 3,500 of 1980); b) the
retirement benefits of passive affiliates to pension institutions; and c) the pensions of people who
choose to stay in the pension institutions affected by Decree-Law 1,263, of 1975.
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Law was fully amended by Decree 3,626 87 and Decree-Law 101. 88 This
legislation created the new pension model that remains in place today.89
These regulations changed the pension system’s financial mechanisms,
moving from an inclusive system to a system based on individual savings,
administered by the AFPs, which are private, profit-oriented funds. This new
pension system was not implemented for the Armed Forces and the Police,
which continued with the old, not-for-profit system. The AFPs were created to
institutionalize a private pension system, with workers contributing 10% of their
insured wages, up to an upper limit, to any of the private AFPs on the market.
After deducting their commission, the AFPs invest the remaining money on
behalf of the workers and collect the proceeds in a separate account for each
affiliate. Upon retirement, the accumulated sum can be used to purchase an
indexed annuity or to provide a pension. Neither the state nor the employer
contribute to the plan, and the worker cannot borrow or draw from the personal
pension account until retirement.90 The private pension system is regulated by
the state and audited by the AFP Superintendency.91 Regulations are strict in
order to protect the workers and to provide transparency in terms of the
investment portfolio. There are no restrictions in terms of AFP ownership, and in
fact the largest ones are still owned by foreign multinationals. However, the law
87

Decree-Law 3,626 (1981) introduced amendments to Decree-Law 3,500 (1980) and Decree
824 (1974). See supra note 29.
88
Decree-Law 101 (1980) established the statute for the Pension Fund Administrators
(AFP).
89
Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment”, supra note 31 at 40.
90
Gillion & Bonilla, “Analysis of a national private pension scheme”, supra note 72 at 172.
91
Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones.
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does impose restrictions on the composition of the portfolio, and the distribution
of investments is regulated to avoid speculation and excessive risk. Most of the
funds are invested in Central Bank bonds, and the proportion of funds invested in
equities is limited. At first, funds were not allowed to be invested overseas, but
this restriction was later lifted.92 Overall, coverage for health care and pension
investments represent between 19.5 and 20.7% of personal earnings.
This economic rationale for the formation of a market for the private
sector, when implemented, immediately stood in stark juxtaposition to the noble
objective of health for all, reinforcing the two-tier system in which a large
proportion of the population with little capacity to pay for private health care
services was excluded from a public system that became more and more limited.
Not surprisingly, during the implementation of the market model of health, health
workers, doctors and even ministry officials began to dispute the characteristics
of such a peculiar restructuring of the health system. 93 Much criticism was
focused on negative externalities, such as the growth of specialization, the
concentration

of

medical

professionals

in

wealthier

urban

areas,

the

reinforcement of competition and the reduction of resources. Most importantly,
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Gillion & Bonilla, “Analysis of a national private pension scheme”, supra note 72 at 177.
The NHS should end up being a national embarrassment. A modern country like Chile should
not have a public organization that provides very poor services, and one that is largely
responsible for the public deficit (Emilio Sanfuentes, Revista Qué Pasa, February 1, 1975). “The
new system must satisfy at any price the sensitive vast majority of physicians in order to ensure
the possibilities of constant professional development. It should also ensure that this new system
will be more efficient, cheaper, more human, and will provide medical benefits to the whole
population regardless of their income” (...) “The NHS (SNS) is not a national disgrace. Like all
institutions in Chile, there are shortcomings, but also virtues”. (Doctors Artaza & Salvestrini,
leaders of the Medical College, El Mercurio, February 26 1975).
93
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critics believed that the majority of the population would eventually have limited
access to curative services.
In 1974, in an attempt to minimize or eliminate the negative externalities,
the Medical College presented an alternate restructuring program. This program
clearly responded to the early concerns and interests of doctors who were
worried about the proposed modifications to the health system. The proposal
consisted of maintaining and centralizing public planning while decentralizing the
public sector’s operations. It also aimed to maintain the same level of health
spending in the budget, as doctors thought it unlikely that private infrastructure
could be established that would be capable of replacing the state infrastructure.94

C. The growth of the structure and autonomy of the private health sector
Beginning in 1974, different visions of health care in the country resulted
in numerous controversies and conflicts, and two opposing tendencies divided
the government and medical sectors. While one vision called for the rapid and
drastic privatization of the sector, the other preferred a transition process that
would support an important state presence until there were optimal conditions for
a transfer to the private sector. In December 1973, the military regime dictated
Decree-Law 212, which created the National Commission of Administrative

94

El Mercurio, August 5-6 1974 at 2 & La Patria, August 5 1974, at 3.
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Reform (CONARA).95 Its duty was to study and propose the necessary provisions
and legal and administrative regulations for bringing about administrative
regionalization in the country. Regionalized services were operationally
decentralized, becoming legal entities in their own right, with an independent
structure. The CONARA depended directly on the Military Junta. All public
services, autonomous or self-governed state enterprises, public legal institutions
and public enterprises had to provide reports and information as well as the
technical and administrative cooperation requested by the CONARA. The
Commission closely supervised the entire country and enforced its presence and
action nationwide.96
One of the first measures to improve the structure, functioning and
autonomy of the private sector was a series of regulations that decentralized and
“municipalized” public health services. Even though in theory the decentralization
of curative services to the municipalities could have been interpreted as a
positive measure to streamline and reduce the bureaucracy of services, in
practice this was not the case at either the organizational or the financial level,
especially for those municipalities with scarce resources. The municipalization of
primary health care facilities had major drawbacks, including a lack of
95

Decree-Law 212 (1973). Created the National Commission of Administrative Reform
(CONARA). Comisión Nacional de Reforma Administrativa.
96
Since the Constitution of 1925, Chilean territory was divided into provinces, which came under
the charge of appointed Governors. The Provinces were then divided into municipalities under the
charge of elected mayors and council members. Regional Ministerial Secretariats (SEREMI),
Planning Secretariats, represented the central government and other departments that
coordinated with the different managerial levels, provided supervision, and were in charge of the
budgetary control and management of the Regional Development Fund.
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coordination with other health care institutions and the Ministry of Health and the
deterioration of working conditions and wages, as workers were now covered by
the Labour Code as employees of private institutions and no longer as public
servants. Furthermore, the fee-for-service method of payment, 97 which was
supposed to cover all of the municipalities’ health care costs, did not reflect the
real cost of services. As a result, municipalities were under-reimbursed, while
expenditures increased and not all prevention services were compensated.98
At the national level, this reorganization was critical, as the historic
National Health Service (SNS) and the SERMENA were replaced with the
National Health Services System (SNSS). The new structure integrated twentysix regional services, which were each dependent upon their respective Regional
Ministerial Secretariat (SEREMI).99 The country’s new administrative structure
was instrumental in the process of decentralizing and privatizing health care
services, both directly and indirectly, by transferring the administration of public
institutions to private or semi-private jurisdictions. Municipalities became legal
entities with independent structures, authorized to contract services with not-forprofit private corporations, and they occupied a dominant role in rationalizing
public expenditures100 as well as in the deepening of the privatization process.
Thus, the responsibilities and traditional functions of the municipalities expanded
97

Payment for Rendered Services per Municipality System, FAPEM.
Annick, “The Chilean Health System: 20 years of Reforms”, supra note 61.
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Secretaría Regional Ministerial (SEREMI).
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Julio Ruiz, “Municipios y servicios sociales. La experiencia chilena (1980-1993)”, in ILPESOMS/OPS-Ministry of Health, La Municipalización de Servicios Sociales en Chile (Santiago,
1995). See also Mario Parada, (2004) Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en
Chile: un análisis sociológico (Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain) at 238.
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to include specific domains in the area of social policy, including the
administration of primary and secondary education and primary health care
services.101
The SNS also transferred financial resources to the National Private
Social Development Corporation (CNPDS)102 to cover the operating costs of the
clinics, buildings, facilities and equipment so that this private corporation could
manage and provide the medical and health care services required by the
population.103 Financial surpluses were to be re-invested to enhance services
and/or to be handed over to the SNS. At the same time, efforts were made to
increase professional efficiency, with a higher level of administrative support
available to improve the quality of services.104 However, although the private
sector could offer “more comfortable” and “more personal” services, these were
not necessarily of better quality. Private hospital management was not less
costly, and experience showed that transferring hospital management to the
private sector led to some duplication of hospital and technological resources,
thus significantly increasing the country’s overall health expenditures.105
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The transferred services included staff that was contracted at market salaries. As a result, they
lost all rights and benefits as civil servants, and suffered significant decrease in wages. As for
assistance programs, the municipalities identified potential beneficiaries and distributed aid
according to their needs. They were monitored by the “CAS Card” that provided a database of
extreme poverty in the country.
102
Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Social.
103
The 1975 transfer of three public health-care clinics belonging to the SNS (Maipú, Chucunco
and Cerrillos) to the CNPDS was the first measure to implement this new conception of the
municipality.
104
Ministerio de Salud, El Mercurio, December 25, 1975.
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Alejandro Goic, “Fundamentos médicos de una organización social de la medicina” in
Lavados, Desarrollo Social y Salud en Chile, supra note 44 at 70.
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Beginning in July 1980, the intention was to transfer medical and sanitary
establishments to the municipalities in a loan-type agreement for a period of five
years. The target was to transfer 30% of the country’s consultation offices and
clinics to the municipalities, granting them both direct and indirect responsibility
for providing curative services. Decree with force of law (DFL) 36 (1980) 106
established and regulated the agreements between the Health Service and other
entities. The provisions of the decree applied to all agreements between the
Health Service, universities, organizations, unions, employers or workers in
general and any natural or legal person on health actions to be executed on
behalf of the Health Service. This decree thus governed those agreements under
which a body, entity or person replaced the Health Service in the execution of
one or more actions for the promotion, protection and restoration of health or
rehabilitation of patients, without prejudice to the care that could be provided to
others under the agreement. Health actions subject to the agreement had to be
identified and detailed, and the obligations under the agreement could not be
transferred or entrusted to third parties without prior approval from the Health
Service and the Ministry. No agreement could include those actions that by their
very nature had to be exercised directly by Health Service authorities. As a
general rule, agreements were drawn up for a period of one year.

106

DFL 36 (1980) established and regulated the agreements between the Health Service
and other entities.
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However, to consolidate the private sector as the neuralgic axis of the
neoliberal model in a health system that was still considered not fully organized
under the market model, it was necessary to invigorate the health infrastructure
in order to be able to respond to the new demand. This, as already discussed,
was stimulated by legislation that granted new financial resources to the
ISAPRES through income deductions and voluntary contributions. The private
sector’s ability and legal capacity to operate thus became a necessary condition
for its further development and incremental expansion. State non-intervention
encouraged the normal growth of private structures and facilitated the partial
withdrawal of public involvement in health activities. Legislation with these ends
was present from the very beginning of the military regime, permitting the
outsourcing of ambulance services, maintenance operations, laundry, hotelrelated services and the manufacture of certain products, creating financial
incentives to open and operate more private clinics and liberalizing imports for
the medical industry. In addition to these measures, agreements were signed
between the Health Ministry and private entities to transfer health care services
out of the public sector. This normative deregulation process, instrumental to the
growth of the private sector, was euphemistically termed the “alternative system”.
Eventually, privatization advocates within the regime, who initially
controlled the decision-making process, lost their initiative, ultimately becoming
more predisposed to a transitional and gradual process. The Health Minister
acknowledged that it was the state’s responsibility to guarantee free access to
196

health care by taking on full leadership and control, adding that the state could
not neglect any part of the health sector in the hope that private ventures would
eventually fully develop and take control. However, he further indicated that the
state should or could pull out of those areas appropriately covered by the private
sector, though it had the obligation to maintain its responsibility and authority
when essential health needs were not met.107 Although these ministry proposals
did somewhat moderate the wave of privatizations, contradictions between the
principles and the practice were evident. It was no coincidence that public health
expenditures, whose growth had outpaced that of the population at first, began to
decrease substantially from 1979 on, while the participation of the private sector
in services (housing, health care and education) was constantly stimulated. By
March 1981, thirteen health care institutions had been transferred to the private
sector. The CNPDS received these establishments and their assets under a
long-term borrowing agreement. According to legislation, they were charged with
providing the same services as the former SNS and SERMENA had offered to
their affiliates.108 In 1977, the minister of health explained that the rationale for
stimulating such activity was to:
a) Reduce pressure on the public system;
b) Complement the resources of the national health plans with agreements
with both private and public entities;
107

Fernando Matthei, “Política de Salud”, Ministry of Health document in (1977) Revista de la
FACH 22.
108
Resolution No. 803 of the Directorate of Central Health Service, Ministry of Health
(March 3, 1981) and Decree-Law 36 (1 July, 1980) about the rules that apply to the contracts
approved by the health services.
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c) Ensure state curative health care services for patients, either individually
or collectively;
d) Purchase, sell and exchange services at cost between the public system
and the alternative (transferred) system.

Making health a part of the municipal agenda was rationalized as a
decision to prioritize the provision of medical care in health clinics instead of
hospitals. This was in line with a program to expand primary health care, initiated
in 1977 and financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO). The objectives were to make
services more accessible, to gain greater efficiency, to improve control by
management, to promote social participation and to facilitate privatization.109 It
was expected that municipalities would also seek meaningful social participation
in the area of health management in order to reduce governmental intervention
and the management apparatus, thus allowing for an efficiently regulated, betteradapted investment, with more resources and an overall better service for the
community. The regionalization and municipalization model was one of central
control, though it was territorially de-concentrated.110 In fact, this was part of a
process of decentralization, sustained by the central government with support for
109

The Health Deputy Health Minister, Hernán Buchi, said that by decentralizing the health
services management, it was more likely to facilitate the gradual transfer of public actions to the
private health sector in the future. See Beatriz Heyermann, “Municipio, Descentralización y
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local development and the transfer of new financial resources and flexible
management mechanisms to the municipalities.
A dual control structure was created, as municipalities took over the
funding and administration of health services (locally incorporating personnel
under the Labour Code instead of according to administrative regulations), while
the services—the health programs themselves—remained under the technical
supervision of the Ministry of Health. It was a matter of providing the municipality
with a new role based on its close ties to the population. The municipality was
thus granted a power that converted it into a springboard to state concessions, to
the benefit of the private sector.111 As the mayor of Valparaiso defined it in 1981,
“The municipalities are skilled and effective institutions designed to transfer
municipal goods and services to the private sector.” 112

& 113

By 1988, the

municipalization process of the health system was considered complete.
Excluded from the process were the hospitals, their related medical services,
specialized and emergency services and large medical clinics that covered more
than fifty thousand inhabitants. These institutions and services all remained
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The DFL 1-3063 (1980) regulated the application of paragraph 2 of Article 38, DL N°
3,063 (1979). This regulation contained the general rules which governed the investments of the
Municipal Common Fund, with respect to the following: a) temporary or permanent transfer of
public sector services, and its resulting transfer of assets, financial and human resources, and
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requested it… (Hernán Pozo, “La situación actual del municipio chileno y el problema de la
municipalización”, Working paper 7, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1981) at 54.
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within the SNSS. 114 The pursuit of economic profitability and the creation of
favourable economic conditions for the development of the private sector
stimulated outpatient medical centers, clinics, diagnostic centres, laboratories
and the private practice of medicine in order to capture the demand traditionally
met by the public sector.
The transfer of responsibilities previously held by the state over to the
private sector115 was creating increasingly unequal access to curative services,
according to social class, the capacity to pay, the patients’ source of income, and
their capacity to make co-payments via income deductions for private health
care. This inequality deepened, partly because of the reduced allocation of public
resources, and partly because of the private sector boom in new health care
offerings targeted at the middle- and high-income strata in the major cities. This
meant more effective services for a minority of the population, to the detriment of
114

The type, number and percentage of transfer of facilities were as follows: 178 urban clinics
(92%); 117 rural clinics (100%), 993 rural health posts (100%), 74 school dental clinics (100%);
491 rural medical stations (38%), which were functioning as health teams where the population
was scattered and provided services to schools or community centers, etc.
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private institutions such as the San Bernardo Hospital, the Missionary Hospital of Panguipulli, the
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German Clinic, the National Copper Corporation, the Bethlehem Iron Company, the Red Cross,
the National Petroleum Company (Empresa Nacional de Petróleo, ENAP), Customs, the “Colonia
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residences. Ministerio de Salud y Oficina de Planificación Nacional (ODEPLAN).
Colonia Dignidad, today Villa Villa Baviera, was situated in the town of Parral in the Maule
Region. It was founded by a group of fundamentalist Germans emigrants led by ex-Nazi Paul
Schafer in 1961. At its greatest extent, Colonia Dignidad had around three hundred German and
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http://www.archivochile.com/Chile_actual/16_hue_dict/chact_huedict0024.pdf
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the majority that depended upon imperilled public services. However, the
government repeatedly avowed that its intention was not to privatize the health
sector, but rather to increase its effectiveness. The opinion of the health workers
(regrouped in the National Federation of Health Workers (FENATS) 116 was
substantially different. They considered health to be a part of the national
heritage, and hence, they believed that the role of the state should be reinforced,
as the state’s subsidiary role was clearly insufficient. Health workers did not
believe that normative and regulatory actions exercised by the state could protect
the public interest without having negative effects on its support of the private
sector.117
These changes implied a revolution in the health field, where traditionally
90% of the Chilean hospital infrastructure had been owned by the state, 5%
belonged to university institutions and to the Armed Forces, and the other 5%
was private. Along with these transfers and the privatization of services, other
factors also contributed to the growth of the private sector. First, doctors’ low
remunerations in public hospitals and staff layoffs drove doctors to regroup in
private medical centres or to find managerial or salaried work in private clinics.
Many physicians also welcomed this opportunity to practice in private medical
centres or clinics, as it allowed them to share the costs of a private practice and
enjoy the benefits of a more sophisticated technical infrastructure.
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Federación Nacional de los Trabajadores de la salud (FENATS).
FENATS, (1979) Revista de la Federación nacional de Trabajadores de la Salud.
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It is interesting to note that the process of privatizing the public health care
sector did not affect the staff of the armed forces and the police in the same way.
The type of privatization developed in the ISAPRES system, which was based on
each contributor’s individual capitalization, the private administration of medical
and health care services, and free choice by the patient, was not applied for the
armed forces and the police. Health care funding had three sub-systems: the
public system, the private system and the system for the armed forces and the
police. Like health care services for all other workers, the latter system was
funded with contributions equivalent to 7% of monthly wages as well as direct
state funding. The funds allocated to the armed forces and the police covered the
operation of the ten military hospitals and health care coverage for their
personnel and their families, which made up close to 13% of the population.118
As discussed above, this system concentrated people according to their
income, such that those with lower incomes and greater health risks went to the
public sector, while those with high incomes and low health risks went to the
private sector, which was less crowded and much faster.119 However, the case of
the hospitals for military and police staff was quite distinct, as while their
coverage came from public funding, they were considered autonomous
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institutions, with privileges that the public sector did not enjoy but the private
sector did. First, access to this system was restricted to military and police staff
and their families. Second, these entities could enter into agreements with public
health services to reduce costs and use their infrastructure.
The privatization process was based on a very clear economic rationale
for why and how to impose and implement the new liberal market model in the
health sector, which, as indicated above, included an articulated process to
reduce the public sector, stimulate the growth of the private sector and lastly,
expand the market for the private sector. This was precisely in line with neoliberal
political and economic principles, according to which private sector interests and
market laws become the impulse for development. In summary, these politicaleconomic policies in the health field were no guarantee of better health care;
rather, they were tools to increase the profitability of the “business” of medicine
and the medical-industrial complex.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE RISE AND FALL OF WELFARE HEALTH
LEGISLATION IN CHILE OVER DECADES:
OVERALL ANALYSIS
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INTRODUCTION
Ideas, discourses and practices that dominate or subvert relations of
power are not free-floating, health reforms and health legislation need to be
analyzed in relation to ideological determinants mediated by the diversity of these
actors, wherein health legislation is an outcome of the articulation of political
practices and negotiations. Once created and enacted, the law adapts to the
political context in which it resides, it employs its own particular normative
discourse, and it promotes its “exchange value” as being “equal”, “neutral” and
“blind”, hence becoming its own agent. Therein lies its fetishism,1 which ensures
that legal rationality supplants those who have created the law and acquires the
capacity to transform them into objects of its own creation.
Law can be circular, and only the law can create law. This interpretation,
put forward by Luhmann in his autopoietic theory and closely connected to
biology and the functioning of ecosystems, has the limitation of not capturing the
law in terms of its own movements, capturing it only in its formalization. However,
it is important to understand the law as a function of its own dynamics. Law is
circular in its formalization, but not in its creation or prior to having a life of its
own. In this sense, it is probably closer to physics, relativity, chaos theory and
indeterminacy. This is perhaps why legal systems function in an unpredictable
way but require predictability. They appear to be stable because they function in
1
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the realm of positive law, but law has its own dynamics, and the system works
precisely because it does not necessarily work, even though it must: the rule of
law. This is why we must understand the law in its synchronic and diachronic
moments.
Peters indicates that the formalization of the law – that is, its legalization –
makes explicit what was implicit, and, in the legalization process, social relations,
interests and objectives are conceived or re-conceived. In this sense, the author
suggests that legalization contributes to the transparency of social reality and to
the rationality of social action.2 That is, the law in its own dynamics is directly
related to the exercise of power and dresses in the clothes of legality.
Legalisation pretends the impartiality of the law and neutrality in its genesis and
simulates a process of mediation among equals who are not equal. Accepting
legalization as an instrumental ex post facto conflict-resultion mechanism is
different from interpreting it as an element of transparency in social reality.
It is with this identity, now recognized as formal, that law is legitimized.
When the exercise of the conflict-consensus dialectic is guaranteed, this
legitimation, and even more importantly the acceptance of this legitimacy, is
expressed in the collective acceptance of the legalization of the law. Its ex post
facto recognition facilitates the symbiosis between lex law and jus law. Here, the
2

Peters, Law as a Critical Discussion, in Gunther Teubner, Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare
State, (ed.) (1986) (Berlin & New York, Walter de Gruyter) at 253.
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Western Kantian notion of “being” (Sein) and “should-be” (Sollen) as the
fundamental quandary in the construction of Kelsen’s pure theory of law and
development of positivism is not irrelevant to the problems of the legitimization of
legal rationality. In this case, the formal validity of the legal text depends on the
rationale that validity is the result of a procedure that takes place in an
appropriate body. So, we may argue or question who or how we can validate the
procedure, so the law becomes legitimate within its own legal rationality.
With respect to the law’s economic and political interrelations in Marxist
theory, 3 the law is simultaneously a means for exercising power and for
promoting ideas or ideological values.4 Law and the power of law are thus largely
ideological, transforming power relations into seemingly fair and legitimate
relations by making them seem beyond power:5 “the ideas of the ruling class are
in every epoch the ruling ideas.”6 In this sense, the law loses its dynamic role and
becomes the merely formal result of the exercise of power, which is able to
adulterate itself, presenting itself as something it is not. Legislative decisions are
validated as a result of procedures that are then legitimated because all interest
groups can be represented and can compete for influence or, even more,
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because citizens are made equal by choosing the laws that will govern them.7
The population must be persuaded that the existing order is just and that it is
they who want it to be as it is.8
Legal processes are embedded in political transitions, and law evolves
and is transformed. When we speak about political dynamics and their
implications for the law, we understood law as praxis. That is, “law-making as
praxis,” (and not necessarily in its abstract notion), tied to a structure in which the
community participates in bringing the law to life.9 This means recognizing “the
role played by all social actors, including even oppressed individuals and groups,
in the constitution of the legal order.”10
I have discussed legislation as an “ongoing process” that entails an
understanding not only of the nature of the legal system, but also of how the law
is processed, dictated and legitimized. This reading of the law as a process in
which actors intervene in the pursuit of a consensus on interests in order to
transform them into legal texts (lex) is part of the very dynamics of the legal
system should not necessarily be understood in the “tradition of consensus” in
legal theory.
As already indicated this dissertation argues that law has a dual rationality
or role. It preserves the social order, or, in Durkheim’s language, it provides
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“cohesion and integrity”, while on the other hand, it contributes to social change.
From a critical perspective, the law is also clearly an element of authority that
supports the power concentrated in the government, in the family, in the market
and in the workplace,11 and, as vehicle for the reproduction and legitimation of
the dominant elites.12 However law can also assume this dual role, as it can
respond or react to a situation of social and political change or even generate
and promote change. In this case the Rule of law, which has become essential
in Western democratic and legal theories, was associated with the procedures
characteristic of citizen participation,13 yet this citizen participation is incomplete,
not necessarily representative or inclusive, and furthermore, often an instrument
for the political legitimation of the established order. Nonetheless, within its
process and dynamics, the Rule of law has also permitted and facilitated
important changes in the evolution of the state, and in particular the welfare
state, such as social benefits, struggles for equity, the awarding of civil liberties
and protection against (arbitrary or authoritarian) state intervention.14 Therefore,
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by analyzing the law in its different dimensions and in its contradictory nature, we
can understand it as an agent of control or as an instrument for change.
The analysis here has captured law as a process of transformation,
focusing on actors, norms and movements in relation to the legal transformations
of the health sector in Chile.
Latin America, including Chile, has created highly fragmented health
systems.15 According to Frenk, a health system can be understood as “a set of
relationships among major groups of actors: health care providers, the
population, the state as a collective mediator, organizations that generate
resources, and other sectors that produce services with health effects.”16 From a
comparative perspective, all countries have similar concerns, but the economic,
political, ideological and epidemiological reasons behind them differ.
It is difficult to classify them as purely public or private, due to the complex
arrangements and negotiations that are the result of political choices.17 Systems
of social protection, different in each country, have been formed through diverse
historical processes, resulting from a combination of economic, political and
cultural forces. These forces, along with unique sets of social values shared by
the local population, form a complex web of institutions “responsible for financing,
organizing and providing social service delivery”, defining “who is entitled to
15
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benefits and services”. 18 There are four pressure groups that have had an
influence on social security policies in Latin America. In order of political
significance, Mesa Lago identifies: 1) the military, 2) political administrative
groups, 3) economic and market groups and 4) unions. These groups have had
different sources of power at different times in their history. They are certainly not
homogeneous; they can be subdivided into subgroups, and their power has
varied over time. We must also, as we shall see below, add the role played by
the state and the action of the political parties.
My analysis of health care legislation is situated within its relationship to
the economic structure and political variables, wherein the negotiation process in
lawmaking is the result of political and economic choices, motivated by
contrasting ideologies and mediated by a diversity of political actors and civil
stakeholders. Changes in health legislation have taken place where and when
political parties, stakeholders and organized civil society have prompted
transformations and applied strength and pressure to legislate.

1.HEALTH LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF THE ACTORS IN CHILE
The development of a positivist liberal legal system in Chile gradually led
to progress in social legislation and, following its own dynamics, gave shape to
the different health models in the country. This certainly leads us to ask about the

18
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possibility of interpreting or considering the law as a mere instrument of the
status quo for maintaining and reproducing the progressive system or as a factor
of change or, perhaps, as both. The health reforms implemented in Chile have
therefore been the result of political and economic choices, motivated by various
ideologies and negotiated by a variety of actors.
Their legitimation was not the result of the imposition of one group over
the rest, but rather the articulation of interests through the development of a
consensus, or, more specifically, what I have called “hegemonic consensus”. In
essence, this scenario has allowed for an understanding of the interplay of
interests that has led to major changes in health reforms as well as permitting an
understanding of the negotiation process between a web of economic, political
and social forces that contributed to the health laws in Chile during the 20th
century.
The conflict-consensus dialectic is part of the process of law creation and
is not only embedded in the dynamics of law itself, but also gives it life and
makes it real. It is not that consensus is positive and conflict negative, nor is it
true the other way around. We may judge the results, we can have opinions
about conflict and consensus based on our values and ideologies, but neither
conflict nor consensus can exist without the other, as suggested by the
Hobbesian thesis, according to which society is in constant flux and made up of
contradictory elements.
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In the specific case of the health sector, we can see that reforms in Chile
specifically and Latin America generally –– have been strongly determined by the
influence and capability of mobilizing interest groups through the articulation of
conflicting interests in the political arena, which has been mediated by the
political strength and the mobilization capacity of political actors and organized
civil society, as well as the church and the armed forces. Governments have
bargained separately with labour factions, urban workers, employees, the police
and the armed forces, ultimately resulting in a very heterogeneous structure, in
which the rights and benefits of the different factions have come to depend on
the negotiation power of the different groups.19 This means, as mentioned above,
that health legislation is the result of a negotiation process in which the strength
and interests of actors are confronted.20 This is why changes to health legislation
have been neither easy nor linear, but rather the outcome of political struggles
and the action of social movements, currents of opinion and ideological
confrontations in a given economic and political context. Most of these changes
are rooted in legislative reforms, achieved through negotiations 21 and consensus
within the prevailing political dynamic.
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It is particularly interesting to note that although organized civil society and
political parties usually promote change, the state too can be involved in the
negotiating process to articulate and frame transitions. An examination of the
policy actors (individuals, social groups and power relationships), the policy
process (forms of interaction and policy outcomes) and policy content (content
issues related to health policy reforms and agenda) 22 is essential for an analysis
of the dynamics of health reforms and health legislation. The complexity of
political

equilibrium,

the

historical

outlook,

social

needs

and

external

intermediaries are thus relevant for an analysis of social legislation.23
Roemer24 was perhaps the first to identify these pressure groups (that he
called “social classes”) in Latin America with respect to the type of health system
that covered them.25 In the case of Chile, using Roemer’s typology, the groups
are made up of four sectors, extensively reflected in the different health-care
subsystems that covered them: 1) the military and the police; 2) civil servants,
including journalists as well as municipal, railroad and bank employees as
important subgroups; 3) white-collar workers and 4) blue-collar workers.
Pressure groups like pensioners, unions, professionals and especially the groups
22
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tied or linked to the state apparatus, such as service providers, bureaucrats and
technocrats are important stakeholders in processes of change. Institutional
reforms and the implementation of legal changes require the collaboration – or at
least a lack of active opposition – from mid-level bureaucrats and health
authorities. These actors may have only limited or very circumscribed influence
when legislating, but they can be facilitators of or obstacles to the implementation
of reforms.26
The rest of society not incorporated into these groups and subgroups
relied on the public systems, charities or privately assumed the cost of their
health care expenses.27 Every group had ad-hoc legislation with specific benefits,
as well as particular mechanisms for financing these benefits. The proliferation
and multiplicity of institutions, regulations and procedures created a legislative
maze, with enormous difficulties to control and supervise them as well as high
administrative costs for those covered.28
This very stratified health care system granted social security benefits to
workers in the formal labour sector, while the rest of the population received
services provided by the state, thereby creating differences and inequities. Latin
America’s fragmented systems had their origins in the profound economic,
political and cultural changes that accompanied the process of industrialization
and urbanization in the mid 20th Century. This pattern of structured social
26
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interactions also led to several other characteristics, such as the stratification
and/or exclusion of certain population groups, the disintegration of institutions, a
narrow and fragile financial basis and strong actors with vested interests
represented in the political arena.29 Health reforms and health legislation were
clearly “process-oriented”, including the organizational structure for reorganizing
relations between the public and private sectors, managers, policymakers,
providers and consumers.30

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE AND HEALTH
LEGISLATION AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
By the mid-19th century, Chile had already witnessed the implementation
of social legislation, thus leaving behind the Spanish colonial regime and
embracing the consolidation of a liberal republic. Later, and inspired by the
German system pioneered by Otto von Bismarck, first Chancellor of the German
Empire (1871-90),31 Chile began to transform its social protection system in a
process marked by vigorous political turmoil, social disputes and military
interventions alongside substantial legislative changes. As early as 1890, the
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creation of an agency in charge of public hygiene and sanitation initiated state
involvement in public health.
Workers were able to access social rights, basic benefits and public health
care services from a variety of sources, financed by salary deductions,
employers’ contributions and public state funds. However, the funding for these
social and health benefits was associated with specific segments of the labour
market and different occupational organizations, thus the benefits perceived by
individual workers varied according to their occupations and occupational
affiliations.32 This diversity did not contribute to greater equality, but only served
to reinforce inequalities based on occupational status. There was no clear
consensus amongst the different sectors involved: the business elite was
opposed to state intervention and new additional tax policies; the workers wanted
to entrust the administration of the newly created social institutions to the labour
unions; and physicians demanded the creation of a strong corporatist entity to
lobby for and protect their interests.
During the late 19th century and the early 20th century, the expansion of
capitalism in Chile profoundly transformed labour relations. A proletariat linked to
mining activity emerged, along with the incipient process of industrialization and
greater urban activity related to the extension of cities and ports and increased
economic development. A number of laws, decrees and policies intended to
regulate capital and labour relations were promulgated. At the same time, the
32
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growth of the state apparatus and the process of industrialization led to an
increase in both blue- and white-collar workers. These changes in the
composition of the work force were marked by conflicts that led to new social
movements and, ultimately, social reforms, as the workers struggled to
consolidate new, comprehensive legislation that would clearly regulate contracts
and protect workers in the case of illness or work-related accidents, tolerate
unions and legal strikes, and create mechanisms for conflict resolution.33
The modernization of public institutions originated in the late second and
third decades of the 20th century, with President Arturo Alessandri Palma. During
his first and second mandates, Chile promulgated a new constitution and a new
Labour Code, Tax Law, Sanitary Law and Social Security Law, all in anticipation
of several aspects of global trends having their origins in the treaty of Versailles
and the International Labour Organization. The government provided health
services to workers and their families,34 and the state assumed an active role
with universal health care and the consolidation of state responsibility in public
health. Social security was extended in a program that benefitted railway
employees, and the mid-1920s witnessed the creation of organizations like the
National Public Employees Fund (CANAEMPU) 35 and the Fund for Private
Employees (EMPART).
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The year 1924 (the year of a military intervention) marked a new stage in
the history of social legislation in Chile, because it was from this date that the first
social laws began to be enacted. Employers, workers and physicians welcomed
them. Health legislation and the reforms that followed were not intended to
reduce the activities of private aid, but rather were aimed at consolidating a
centralized body for social and health policies. The creation of Workers’
Compulsory Insurance, or Social Security, in 1924 became a central piece in the
history of public health in Chile. These events suddenly transformed the medical
profession into a privileged actor in the construction of the state and radically
changed the morphology of its labour market. 36 Finally, the new constitution
(1925) reflected global trends as it increased individual rights and the obligation
of the state in ensuring social rights, subjected the right of ownership to what was
considered the “rule of social progress”, protected labour and industry and
enforced social welfare and legal protection for workers. It also proclaimed that
public health services were a state obligation. The most important of these social
laws was the creation of the Workers’ Insurance Fund, which later became
known as the Social Security Service (SSS).
In this context, the state has always been of enormous importance in the
structure and administration of Chilean society and has assumed a leading role,
becoming the most important agent of the production and reproduction of society
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and legislation. Health care services became fragmented and developed in
dissimilar ways as fractions of the middle class, the working class, private
interests, the church, physicians and health workers, the armed forces and
organized civil society succeeded to varying degrees in pressuring the state to
extend coverage.
After the world economic crisis of the 1930s, the state began to penetrate
the full range of social and economic sectors in Chile. The crisis was a stimulus
for the state to allocate important resources to the industrial sector, to the
construction of infrastructure and to the legal protection of labour benefits.
Accelerating the industrialization process was crucial, resulting in economic
growth and remarkable social improvement actions. This gave the state the role
of welfare provider, thus enabling it to assume a clear function in legitimating the
process of growth and accumulation. Also, we cannot ignore the influence of the
bureaucracy, which in some countries has also played a decisive role, acting as
a significant pressure group to justify the stratification of social security.37 This
can also be applied to health systems and especially their diversification in
different subsystems, which is what occurred in Chile throughout the 20th century.
Later, in 1938, the Popular Front government (led by Pedro Aguirre
Cerda), which looked favourably upon democratic socialist ideas, implemented
the Law of Preventive Medicine, which allowed all blue- and white-collar workers
to be screened for contagious and chronic diseases. In 1939, Dr. Salvador
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Allende, then the Minister of Health (who would later become president in 1970),
wrote a book that furthered Virchow’s research as he advocated that social rather
than medical solutions were necessary in order to combat current health
problems. The Chilean Socio-Medical Reality, “conceptualized illness as a
disturbance of the individual fostered by deprived social conditions” 38 and
focused on specific health problems that were generated by the poor living
conditions of the working class: maternal and infant mortality, tuberculosis and
sexually transmitted diseases. At that time, these suggestions were considered
not only innovative, but also absolutely revolutionary.
The period between 1917 and 1939 established the state’s responsibility
in matters of health and welfare. However, the multiplicity of institutions that were
created resulted in costly health care service. An integrationist and centralized
movement began to develop a new reform process at the end of the 1930s,
which reached its peak in 1952. In 1940, the Popular Front government
presented a bill that clearly indicated that a more comprehensive form of
coverage was needed to reduce health care inequities and centralize the
management of all hospitals under a single government agency.
It was a process that was developed through negotiations between
governments, unions, health workers and the medical profession, each
representing their own political, economic and corporate interests.39 The outcome
38
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was the establishment of the National Health Service (SNS)40 in 1952, which was
the major health provider in Chile for four decades. The National Health Service,
created in 1952 by Law 10,383 and established as an independent legal and
administrative entity, was not only created as a direct and mechanical response
to class interests, but also as a result and probably the synthesis of specific,
articulated interests as well as social and political contradictions and disparities.41
At the same time, the different insurance regimes and the dispersion of funds
were maintained. The SNS provided curative care to 70% of the population and
took on responsibilities related to disease prevention and social protection.
Greater state involvement in satisfying health care needs became part of public
policy independently of the government in power, and the SNS continued to
developed and consolidate its position over time.
Like in Western Europe, full employment provided the ideological cement
for hegemonic order throughout social democracy. In the case of Chile, the
welfare state provided the legal framework for social and health reforms,
including labour protection, social stability and a more Keynesian state
involvement in economic development. Although capitalist development in
industrialized countries was characterized by the progressive establishment of a
welfare state within a political context of so-called liberal democracies with
protectionist social policies, the historical reality of “Third World” economies was
40

Servicio Nacional de Salud.
Carolina Tetelboin, (1980) La práctica médica en Chile (Thesis, Sociology, Universidad
Autónoma Metropolitana-Xochimiloho, México) at 49.
41

222

and has been considerably different. In developed capitalist societies, the social
policies of the welfare state, such as public education, wide-ranging public health
actions, public health care services, social security and unemployment insurance
contributed to the formation and development of human capital by improving the
overall well-being of the population. In doing so, these social policies helped
activate the economic process of circulation, thus stimulating consumption and
economic growth. The Chilean welfare health system developed through
negotiations between different social, political and economic forces, political
parties, labour unions and social organizations played a redistributive role,
reducing inequalities and protecting the low-income population and those
residing on the margins of society.
These processes of political negotiations in the 20th century facilitated the
formation of a state based on compromises. It is through these negotiations that
the Chilean state managed to progressively resolve its conflicts while preserving
relative autonomy and permitting significant institutional development. The state
exercised its power to act as an agent of transformation, intervening directly in all
social, economic and political spheres. The state assumed the role of benefactor
for the most disadvantaged social sectors and took leadership in the overall
orientation of social and economic policy.
Beginning in the 1960s, however, Chilean society came to be affected by
two basic phenomena: a structural stagnation of the capitalist economic model,
which was incapable of promoting and stimulating development, and a socio223

political context of increasing democratization, due to the actions of social
movements and very active political parties. As Chilean development was
characterized by the failure of industrial and financial capital to promote
economic and social development, the industrialization process began to lose its
initial dynamism. Added to this was a limited market, a deficit in the balance of
payments and recurrent inflationary spirals getting increasingly out of control. In
1964, the Christian Democratic Party led by President Eduardo Frei Montalva
proposed the “Revolution in Freedom” program, which blended capitalist growth
with social development and the reinforcement of popular participation. The
government’s intention was to improve, extend and improve the efficiency of the
national health system following six years of a conservative regime. The
government expected to implement vast reforms to create a more unified health
care service.
In response to pressure from the growing middle class, the centrist
Christian Democracy government (1964-1970) took the initiative to develop a
new program for white-collar employees (SERMENA). It permitted users to select
their physicians, stimulated a semi-public insurance system and created primary
and preventive care clinics and laboratories for the middle class that were no
longer fully covered by the public system. These so-called “harmony ideology”
reforms were the culmination of an incremental process rather than a rupture
with the past, and the government was the dominant group, able to dictate reform
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policy despite the objections of opposing interest groups in civil society.42 As
analyzed by Fleury, “the social policies that have developed in most Latin
American countries are rooted in a similar development model. They are
responsible for some of the most significant features of the relationship between
the State and society, as well for the incorporation of a particular power structure
into an institutionalized system.”43
The Medical College manifested its desire to preserve a totally
professional approach to health care, independent of political interference. The
government lost control of social crescendos, while physicians faced unexpected
changes to their profession, such as the greater autonomy of non-medical health
care professionals. The SNS thus began to incorporate the free-choice system,
while at the same time popular awareness of health rights became more
widespread. The economic policies of President Eduardo Frei Montalva’s
Christian Democrat government (1964-1970) were greatly insufficient, and by
1967, plummeting economic indices, unresolved inequalities, unsatisfied social
demands and unmet salary demands for labour and the lower middle class
stimulated significant political agitation. President Frei concluded his final year
amidst great political, ideological and social turmoil.
This complex economic, social and political context constituted the
prelude to the victory of the popular forces, headed by Salvador Allende as
leader of the Popular Unity coalition in 1970. Between 1970 and 1973, the
42
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“Unidad Popular” (Popular Unity) government introduced reforms to democratize
and centralize the organizational structure of the National Health Service. 44
Hoping to resolve gaps in health benefits, the Popular Unity government aimed to
restructure health services, streamline medical care, increase access, coordinate
activities, and, in turn, repackage them within a dynamic and effective national
plan. This task was entrusted to the Single Health Service.

45

The new

organizational structure was called upon to incorporate public institutions and to
absorb the health institutions responsible for providing health care services to the
different segments of the middle class.
This major policy change resulted in a radicalization of the social
significance of health and a more visible state presence. Despite its promise, the
program’s numerous efforts to support democratization ultimately attained more
modest

results

than

projected,

particularly

at

the

management

level.

Nonetheless, several policies enhanced health conditions, such as those related
to contagious diseases, maternal health, childhood diarrhea, nutrition and
preventive health measures.
Between November 1970 and October 1972, the tension between
physicians and the government increased substantially. In the end, the Chilean
road to socialism came up against the traditional conservative elite and the
middle class. The health sector went through the same political turbulence, with
44
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the mounting inability of the political class to negotiate the interests of several
stakeholders in order to reach a consensus. The outcome of this turmoil and
uncertainty was the military coup of September 11, 1973, bringing a brutal end to
the government elected in 1970. The military dictatorship (1973-1989) replaced
the public-oriented system with a market-oriented approach, transferring
important responsibilities to the private sector, curtailing benefits and reducing
state involvement in the funding of public policies and their administration.46

3. HEALTH LEGISLATION, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
Over the time period explored in this dissertation, Chile went through
several different stages in its development and responded to different economic
models, which corresponded to historical processes and international influences.
The country participated in global and regional economic traditions, first linked to
the models typical of Third World countries as mono-exporters of raw materials
and natural resources, and then to the contemporary market models of the 1980s
based on the neoliberal theses tied to the Washington Consensus.47 Between
these two extremes, the developmentalist models linked to processes of
domestic industrialization and import substitution rose to popularity, such as the
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more CEPALian models, 48 with a large emphasis on Keynesian economic
policies and states closely based on welfare models.
Among these models was the dependency school in the 1960s and 1970s,
which had a large impact on the Third World and Latin America. 49 The
dependency thesis described the structural dependency between the economies
of the Third World and the capitalist countries, requiring the former to adapt and
respond to the interests of the metropolis, jeopardizing their domestic economic
growth and playing a very decisive role in the international division of labour,
where the Third World and especially Latin America was assigned the role of
exporting raw material with no value added and consuming manufactured goods
and technology from the economically developed world. The CEPALian
proposals

also

sought

to

improve

financial

management,

and

their

developmentalist models advocated the necessity of foreign exchange controls,
which entailed intervening in the exchange market, applying protectionist
measures through high tariffs and introducing forced savings policies.50 They
sought inward development and political initiatives aimed at reducing or
minimizing domestic weaknesses and eliminating the obstacles that made these
economies tightly controlled from abroad.
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Haggard and Kaufman’s analysis of development, democracy and welfare
statism during the 20th Century indicates that, “These structuralist ideas
emphasized the stimulative effects of generous wage settlements, social
entitlements, and labour protections. Welfare protections and job security were
sustained not only because of the pressure of national-populist political
coalitions, but also because the ISI strategy (Import Substitution Industrialization)
made them tolerable to dominant segments of the business elite as well.”51 This
model, which emerged slowly but surely following the global economic crisis in
the 1920s, was implemented throughout Latin America. It was a protectionist
economic policy that increased the price of foreign products in order to stimulate
national production, with the aim of increasing demand, stimulating job creation,
reducing unemployment and promoting economic growth.52
From a social perspective, dependency theorists maintained the need to
promote inward development, invest in public works, regulate the economy and
expand rights and social benefits. There were also important currents of
“dependentista” structural thought that were much more critical or radical, which
advocated the need to mobilize anti-capitalist or socialist revolutionary
processes. In synthesis, these “developmentalist” proposals were closely
associated with the construction of the state, right from the 1930s and with the
social policies following the Second World War.
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This occurred in various countries in Latin America. In Argentina, for
example, during Irigoyen’s first presidency (1916-1922), and in Mexico during the
Cárdenas government (1934-1940), national policies were implemented to
encourage economic productivity, increase public spending on infrastructure and
improve social services such as education, social security and retirement. These
actions could be called populist today, but ultimately they constituted an
important economic response for economic and social development.53
In the Chilean case, this model had ups and downs, but it did generate a
broad consensus. It was further strengthened during the popular governments,
such as that of the Frente Popular (Popular Front) between 1938 and 1941, as
well as later on. These Keynesian policies also enabled significant public
investment in the economy and the creation of important public corporations such
as the production development corporation CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de
la Producción) 54 in 1939 and companies like the national electricty company
(ENDESA, Empresa Nacional de Electricidad), the national oil company (ENAP,
Empresa Nacional del Petróleo), the Pacific steel company (CAP, Compañía de
Acero del Pacífico), the national telecommunications company (ENTEL, Empresa
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones) and the national sugar industry (IANSA,
Industria Azucarera Nacional). All these companies were later privatized in the
1980s with the implementation of neoliberal policies.
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International influence on development policies and health legislation was
no less significant. Developmentalist, populist and socialist policies were
criticized and in many cases did not solve the economic and social crises,
sometimes even exacerbating them, as in the 1960s and 1970s. In Chile, mixed
social policies were not only aimed at protecting the workers, promoting the
market and ensuring jobs, but also at responding to the economic and social
demands of a growing middle class. This was all made possible by social
organizations and union demands.55 Important social benefits were also secured,
as it was in 1952 with the creation of the National Health Service, the
cornerstone of public health, analyzed in detail in chapter two of this dissertation.
It is interesting to note the role that international academic institutions like
the German Friedrich Ebert foundation and the U.S. Ford Foundation and
Rockefeller Foundation played in these policies. The latter, for example, funded
many economics programs at the two main Chilean universities (the University of
Chile and the Catholic University), and the number of economists in Chile grew
from 120 in the early 1960s to more than 700 one decade later.56 The same thing
happened in the field of sociology, also with the Ford Foundation, as well as with
German and Belgian institutions. International research centres were established
in Chile, including most prominently the Latin American Faculty of Social
Sciences (FLACSO, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales).
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The move to neoliberalism in the 1980s was also highly influenced from
abroad, even though Chile was the first to apply it, even before the Washington
Consensus and the neoliberal policies of the Thatcher government in the United
Kingdom and the Reagan government in the United States. The strong influence
and pressure of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 57 was
decisive in this respect, as was the role played by universities in the United
States, particularly the University of Chicago,58 which was instrumental in the
implementation of neoliberal policies in Chile. Morgan, for example, in her
analysis of transnational law and universalizing neoliberalism, discusses “how
the processes of state regulation are increasingly guided by supranational norms
‘such that a particular form of economic rationality becomes part of the taken-forgranted ways of policy making’ ”.59
Along similar lines, the support and close ties between the United States
and the armed forces of countries in Latin America, including Chile, paved the
way for the coups d’état that disrupted the democracies in the region, imposing
authoritarian and dictatorial regimes that allows these models to be advanced.
The effects on social and health policies were powerful, shrinking the public
sector and stimulating market models for social and public policy, all with the
resulting impact and effect on economic policies of accumulation that were
57
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consistent with and instrumental to the neoliberal model, as it was analyzed in
detail in chapter three.

4. HEALTH LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN CHILE
Neo-Gramscian analysis examines hegemony as a territory of struggle in
which dominant social thought must be constantly articulated and rearticulated at
various levels of the social structure.60 But ultimately, the concept of hegemony is
a concept that expresses a form of domination, which is exercised in different
ways, originates lawfully, and is invariably linked to power relations and the
power structure in a society. For this reason, it is also essential to discuss how
the state acts and reacts in this process in which hegemony is exercised. This is
why transitions in health legislation, health reforms and changes to the health
care system must be considered in light of broader social, economic and political
factors.
Analyzing the evolution of health legislation necessarily involves
understanding how legislation is embedded in development processes and social
policies. As already discussed social and health policies in Latin America have
generally

reinforced

different

mechanisms

of

redistribution

and

social
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stratification, with effects on political and social stability and the reinforcement of
public and/or private health care, as well as the direct stimulation of capital
accumulation, which in the case of the neoliberal approaches, includes primarily
private pension and health insurance systems. Social and health policies have
thus been rooted in a relationship between the state and society with social,
economic and political characteristics that both influence and determine health
legislation.
In fact, social reforms are often ambiguous. In the process of deepening
social reforms, we are confronted with a plurality of objectives that correspond to
different interests. This process has also a paradoxical, but probably necessary,
dialectical nature: it facilitates equity, promotes protection and democratizes
society, while also legitimizing the state and a system of power that has created
its own inequality and lack of protection. As indicated by Fitzpatrick in relation to
the development of the welfare state: “since a welfare democracy would require a
more egalitarian distribution of power and resources than exists at present, we
need an account of those from whom power and resources would need to be
redistributed.”61
In Chile, like in other countries in Latin America during the 20th century, a
state took shape based on the Rule of law (Rechtsstaat), that is, a legal state or
a state of rights, where the exercise of power is constrained by the law, also
emphasizing the concepts of just or what is legally right and in conformity with
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that which is lawful or fair. The power of the state was thus limited to protecting
citizens from the arbitrary use of authority and guaranteeing the exercise of civil
liberties and political rights. Chile, along with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, are
the countries in the region that gave the state the role of “national project”, and
Chile, like Mexico, adopted the practices of an interventionist state with extensive
programs of educational reform and the extension of social security and labour
legislation. National institutions were therefore created to promote and foster
economic development, and programs for social benefits were stregnthened.62 In
Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, this political vision of creating a national state was
completed in the 1930s.
The models and transitions of the state in Chile are characteristic of the
evolution of a patrimonial state, as a legacy of colonialism. After the depression
of the 1930s and the Second World War, the state became gradually
consolidated as a strong and interventionist state, enabling the consolidation of a
solid Rule of law (Rechtsstaat) and thereby promoting economic and social
development.63 Given the characteristics of Chilean society, especially its class
composition, its past as a patrimonial state and its large social differences, the
development of the Rule of law – despite its limitations, ambiguities and
injustices – constituted a real possibility for extending rights and gradually
promoting greater social justice, neutralizing arbitrariousness and limiting the
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indiscriminate exercise of political, economic and religious power. In a formal,
legal and more stable system, power relations are expressed with less intensity
than they are under a system with diffuse, unclear or ambiguous legislation.64
In the case of health legislation and as discussed above, although health
reforms were determined by the dynamics of the power struggle between the
classes and social actors and their ability to mobilize their goals and forge
alliances to create temporary social consensus, 65 the state became more
interventionist in order to secure emerging social rights.66 Consequently, it is the
implementation of policies from above (the state) that generated a period of
unprecedented economic growth and ensured a standard of living that provided
employment and basic social services (health, education, retirement) for the
people of the countries that adopted such a pathway. For Fleury, “The concept of
social protection in Latin America rested on social and institutional mechanisms
of differentiation. Nevertheless, this political give-and-take constituted the first
instance in which the demands of the working class were considered in the
political arena and incorporated in the government agenda. Social protection was
rooted in a political system wherein the state played a key role in the
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industrialization process by combining industrial protectionism with a controlled
political incorporation of urban workers’ demands.”67

5. THE PARADOXES OF THE LAW BETWEEN LEGALISATION AND
LEGITIMATION AND THE CHILEAN CASE
The theories of legal realism, which marked the beginning of the
emergence of social scientific legal study, 68 have demonstrated the political
nature of the legal process69 and recognize, despite their regret, the possibility of
the indeterminacy of law. This regret disappears in critical theories such as
critical legal studies, in which the indeterminacy of law is not only recognized but
accepted: “The rules do not determine results and cannot explain whatever ability
legal practitioners have to predicts results.”70 This is not insignificant, as it is
precisely this indeterminacy that gives the law its nature as a political practice,
and it is for this reason that for critical legal studies, it is essential to be able to
uncover the political implications of the indeterminacy of the law.71 This is why
the law assumes this ambivalent and contradictory identity.
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This indeterminacy of law became clear in the ongoing political and legal
conflict faced by the Popular Unity government. Formally, the law was the same,
as it had been enacted by previous governments. Yet in this new and
revolutionary historical and political context, it acquired not only different
functions, but also conflicting ones. This is why those that had never questioned
the legitimacy of the law did so now. It was not feasible to declare the laws
illegal, but it was possible to challenge their legitimacy. This situation became
critical in the final years of the Allende government, which as we know did not
complete its constitutional term of office.
The socialist government declared its commitment to bringing about
revolutionary transformations to confront old-fashioned policies that were
obstructing the construction of a more equitable, efficient and suitable health
system. The government also implemented reforms to increase public
involvement in health care, to control the pharmaceutical industry, to encourage
citizen participation in health care management and to achieve health care equity
by creating a Unified National Health Care Service (SUS).
During the Allende administration, the democratization process deepened,
allowing an increasingly stronger presence of popular forces in economic,
political and social life. Not only were these popular forces involved in a broad
range of claims and political and social issues, but their agenda also consisted of
a concrete political program based on transforming the economic system in order
to promote social development. The principal objective of Salvador Allende’s
238

government was to implement radical economic and social changes to the
capitalist economic model and to establish the foundation for a future socialist
society, through the “Chilean way to socialism”. The economic mechanisms for
the implementation of this alternative were principally the nationalization of
natural resources, the extension of the so-called “social property” sector in the
economy—including all state owned companies and corporations—and the
acceleration of agrarian reform.
As expected, the new revolutionary program further accentuated the
incompatibility between the capitalist economic model and the democratization of
the Chilean political system. In short, the coming to power of a coalition of parties
and popular movements, including two Marxist parties (the Communist Party and
the Socialist Party), combined with the increasing democratization of the political
system, further deepened the crisis of capital accumulation. The legal economic
measures of the Allende government—such as the nationalization of foreign
companies, the nationalization of the entire mining industry, the expropriation or
intervention of monopolistic companies, the extension of agrarian reform, the
regulation of foreign trade, intervention in banking and distribution networks and
substantial wage increases—were redirecting economic surpluses normally
collected by capital. Furthermore, the rifts between industrial and financial capital
and between national small- and medium-sized companies and national and
foreign multinational corporations became even more acute and politically critical.
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Due to its minority position in Parliament, the popular government
executed its socialist economic and social program within the confines of the
1925 Constitution and under the existing legal system. Some of the most radical
reforms were legally legitimized through the unabridged legal texts from the
hundred-day “Socialist Republic” in 1932 and the legal faculties associated with
the jurisdiction of a presidential regime. This is why Allende’s government was
labelled “the revolution in legality”. The same legal system that had legitimized
the political control of conservative forces in the past was now instrumental in
allowing legal reforms against their economic interests.
In Gramscian terms, for the dominant class that controlled the
corporations, the media and strongly influenced the judicial system, the country
was witnessing a rupture of the historic bloc.72 It was in this context that Allende
declared that what hurt the dominant class the most was that the government
was fighting the grand bourgeoisie with their own laws. In these circumstances,
the role played by the state was extremely critical, as it faced challenges in a
struggle for power and control.73 In this sense, the Chilean state had been coopted by different groups with opposing or conflicting agendas.74
For example, this phenomenon was particularly interesting in Chile in the
1970s due to the explicit relationship between the law, the legal system, political
factors and the political dynamics themselves. This made the interesting
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relationship and contradictions between formality and substance deeper and
more transparent in the process of “the law becoming law”. During this historical
period, there was an atypical but revealing change in the content and meaning of
the law, which led to or made even clearer the contradictions within legal rule
itself. 75 During the three years of Allende’s government, the “ revolution in
legality” (called also the Chilean way to socialism) had at its very core the
contradictions between the different dimensions of law and their interpretation
and/or use.
The formality of law was legitimated no longer as an instrument of the
status quo but as an agent of change, while resistance to this made no allusion
to the essence of the change itself, but rather to its supposed illegality.
Furthermore, the legal formalism of drawing on legal provisions from the 1930s
(laid down in another era with different realities) that were instrumental for
strategic economic transformations became a tool for change. I refer here to the
decree-laws, dictated in 1931 and reused in the 1970s that allowed the state to
intervene in private companies and put them temporarily under its control. In
other words, forty years later, the content or essence of the legal provision
(dictated in a different economic and political context) changed without modifying
its form (positive formalism), as it was applied in a different context.76
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In the case of Chile, as indicated above, the notion of respect for legality
was valued as an important part of the political tradition, and this legality was the
result of historical commitments, both unspoken and formal, to channel economic
and social transformations within the Rule of law. In this sense, while the legal
system reproduced itself, the origin of this reproduction (or self-reference) was
not in the essence of legal formality but in the political agreements that upheld it.
As discussed above, in the 1970s, the government of President Allende, which
called itself a “revolution in legality,” is undoubtedly the clearest example of the
country’s legalist political tradition, even though there was not much in the
existing law that could be used within the confines of existing legal legitimacy and
tradition.77 It is therefore not surprising that the legal revolution led by President
Allende was unable to find much legal “inspiration”, despite the long tradition of
respect for the Rule of law.
The Rule of law, once instrumental in the exercise of power and its
legitimization, was now playing a counter-hegemonic role. Political debate could
no longer take refuge in the “neutrality” of the law. The Allende government’s
economic and social reforms and the political conjuncture limited the possibilities
for social and ideological reproduction, restricted the process of capital
accumulation and interfered in the process of legitimation that reinforced the
status quo and the capitalist model of development.
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If the Rule of law is seen as an ideology that legitimizes and conceals
power relations,78 it is interesting to see how in the case of Chile, the Rule of law
was also instrumental for changing power relations. This created a major legal
debate, as the Allende government was implementing revolutionary changes
within the same legal order that it had inherited. As it was very difficult and
practically unsustainable to oppose the transformations by a government that
had been elected fairly and democratically to lead such changes, the opposition
addressed the government in legal terms, arguing and debating that it was
violating or circumventing the legal system and the Rule of law. 79 This
phenomenon, which in Gramsci’s terms can be called counter-hegemonic,80 was
particularly interesting from the point of view of law and politics. Throughout all
the years of the Allende government, the debate about the legality of the
government’s acts and respect for the Rule of law persisted. The government
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repeatedly expressed that the Rule of law was a tangible reality and that legal
norms were scrupulously observed and respected. The opposition pointed out
that constitutional norms had been breached and that legal norms were
circumvented or legal loopholes were used astutely, such as, according to the
opposition, had occurred with the nationalization of companies.
The law can thus serve different purposes in different economic, political
and historical contexts and has many dimensions that are not unequivocally
perceptible, given its synchronic and diachronic aspects. There are laws that
have had one purpose and, in a different context, serve different purposes, such
as Roman civil law during slavery, for example, which later served the modern
ideological purposes of capitalist economic organization.81 In the case of Chile in
particular, these laws from the 1930s82 were instrumental for initiating processes
of socialist transformation during the Allende government between 1970 and
1973. We can see, then, that the functions of the law are historically contingent;
that is, they can fulfill different functions and serve different masters over the
course of time.83
Hence, breaking the Rule of law once it was no longer instrumental was,
for the opposition, only a matter of time. Put in Gramscian terms, once the crisis
becomes extremely delicate and dangerous, radical solutions and “unknown
81

Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, supra note 9 at 118.
The Salvador Allende government divided the economy into three areas: social, mixed and
private. The transfer of large companies to the state was rejected by Parliament, thus the
government issued a decree authorizing the expropiation of any industry considered fundamental
for the economy. This method was criticized by the dominant economic sectors as a legal
loophole.
83
Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, supra note 9 at 118.
82

244

forces, represented by charismatic ‘men of destiny,’”84 become visible. Gramsci’s
“men of destiny”, or Engels’ “heroes”, 85 were the Armed Forces, while the
unknown forces were no other than the conservative right-wing political parties
along with multinational companies and the United States government,
represented by the Secretary of State and the Central Intelligence Agency.86

6. THE FALL OF THE WELFARE STATE IN CHILE
In Chile, the breakdown of democracy in 1973 appeared as a precondition
for the restoration of the factors that would allow the reinstatement of the liberal
economic model, earlier threatened by economic changes undertaken during the
government of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity). Incremental health reforms
were disrupted by the military dictatorship, and the implementation of a new
health model that altered the previous reforms and plans challenged the welfare
state and opened the way for a neoliberal market model.87
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Until 1973, Chile had been a pioneer in Latin America in terms of social
policy, developing one of the most universalistic systems on the continent. This
rupture of democracy, by means of a military coup, was more significant than a
mere tactical action or transitory military solution to restore the “ancient regime”.
A true neoliberal economic revolution was in the making, which, given the longstanding and broad societal consensus on maintaining the welfare state, could
only be carried out under dictatorial rule. Legality was politicized in the
discourses of those who had always predicated the contrary. As Engels had
already written in 1895: “...if we are not so crazy as to let ourselves be driven to
street fighting in order to please them, then in the end there is nothing left for
them to do but themselves break through this dire legality.”88
After the coup, the end of civil liberties, the limitation of democratic rights,
the end of trade unions and professional associations like the Medical College,
the closure of political and partisan activities, the control of the mass media,
interventions in university affairs and the burning of critical books—all put in
place to prevent any possibility of resistance or opposition—were legitimized with
legal and political mechanisms and validated with dictatorial norms, regulations
and laws. This way, it was now possible to impose legislation on labour relations,
wages, disputes and strikes without the need for a system of negotiations or a
consensus between different social actors. The use of violence and political
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repression facilitated the imposition of new regulations intended to stimulate and
sustain the accumulation process.89
Legislation included lifting all price controls, allowing the free movement of
foreign capital, privatizing most public corporations and companies, liberalizing
foreign trade and wage controls and introducing new labour laws. The neoliberal
economic revolution that immediately followed the 1973 coup demonstrated how
the Chilean Armed Forces took on the “political representation” of monopolistic
capital, directly linked to transnational companies. It also revitalized the political
interests of conservative forces, which had been neutralized for a decade (since
the end of the Alessandri administration in 1964).
In terms of social and health policy, the consequences were dramatic and
put an end to Chile’s welfare system. Chile had been considered a pioneer in
Latin America in terms of social policy, developing a large universal and inclusive
system of social welfare.90 The military dictatorship fundamentally transformed
the economic, social and political processes, giving rise to radical changes to the
social welfare system and eventually the dismantling of the National Health
System.
The increased and progressive involvement of the state in public and
health-related activities was now replaced with a neoliberal, market-oriented form
89
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of economic development, with all the social implications that such a shift
entails.91 Under the new model, health care was understood as a commodity or
service to be bought. The financial responsibility for health care was left to
individuals, who contributed a proportion of their income, leaving the state to
support the poor and the blue-collar workers covered by social security.92 This
innovative version of the “social market economy”, in which the “social” was only
in the branding, imposed freedom by denying it to civil society and the political
sphere.
As is extensively discussed in chapter three, health legislation was altered
in three significant ways: first, in terms of reduction of the public health care
funding; second, the creation of private pre-paid health institutions (ISAPRES),
mainly for the middle, upper-middle and upper class; and third, the transfer of
public health clinics to county (municipal) management, to reduce state
bureaucracy and state-financed care. 93 These changes minimized the state’s
responsibilities and stimulated the development of private health care, health
insurance and the pharmaceutical industry. This was a logical step for
incorporating health into a liberal economic framework.94
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These neoliberal reforms changed the relationship between state and
society, either by replacing a political logic with market principles or by creating
new forms of control and participation.95 International financial institutions have
played, and continue to play, a significant role in the formation of social policy,
particularly in health and pension programs. Social security reforms have been
promoted by World Bank loans within a neoliberal framework, in which the
market has become responsible for providing health and pensions. Neoliberalism
was able to initiate the dismantling of the welfare state and its underlying
historical bloc.96
Although these reforms were presented as an appropriate strategy for the
rationalization and modernization of the health care system (as they were
believed to improve efficiency and effectiveness, while reducing cost and
bureaucracy), they were criticized for both their inequities and their prioritization
of market expansion.97 There is little evidence that these reforms have reduced
inequities and inefficiencies. It has fragmented health care among social classes,
and co-payments represent a heavy economic burden for those with lower
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incomes.98 The model has also reformed social security and private health care
insurance in order to stimulate capital accumulation99 as a necessary instrument
for the development of the private health care sector.100 The reforms and health
legislation introduced since the return of democracy in 1989 have focused on
reducing inequalities and establishing a new balance between the private and
public health care sectors.
To sum up, the consequences of the end of the welfare health system
following the 1973 coup were dramatic, especially in a country considered a
pioneer in Latin America in terms of social policy. This restructuring of the welfare
state in Chile, as further discussed in chapter three, went through different
stages. This first stage, in the 1970s, was to minimize the presence and
participation of the state in the health sector and reduce public spending and the
second stage, in the 1980s, was to reorganize the state in line with the principles
and objectives of a market model, which was advanced with deregulation and
privatization policies. This model, like the previous one with respect to social
policies, became an international reference point, but this time for its neoliberal
and privatizing changes to health and social security.101
Although the objective of this research is not to analyze the post-
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dictatorship periods, especially the final years of the 20th century, I wish to outline
a few aspects that deserve attention and that lasted for many years. The
privatization process, as pointed out above, affected the health care system and
continued to economically constrain the public system, reducing its efficiency,
efficacy and performance. The boost to the private system did not undergo
significant changes and continued to develop. In some cases, the state ended up
discriminating against its own public hospitals in benefit of the private sector,
which received better prices for the same services. This created a vicious circle
in which fewer resources were given to the public system and then it was made
to compete against a private system that received more revenue.
Nonetheless, reforms were implemented to expand public sector services
and correct the inequities created by the processes of privatization. The AUGE
and GES (Garantías Explícitas [Explicit Guarantee]) plans were not intended to
modify the system, but they improved it. New pathologies were covered by public
services or covered in private institutions with public funding in an effort to
establish a new balance between private and public health care providers and
revitalize welfare state policies. While it is true that the private sector continued to
grow, the Concertación governments’ plans advanced very slowly towards the
option of a mixed public-private system. Actually the “Chile’s health care system
was dualistic in its design, with a minority group using the private sector and the
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majority of the population relying on public care”. 102 The return of democracy,
then, in 1989, allowed new legislation to progressively increase support for the
public sector and increase the state’s involvement in the health sector. The first
the Concertación governement (1990-1994) and the second one (1994-2000)
significatevely increased funding for public health care services also initiated
adjustments for regulating the priovate care services as well as the private
insurance market.103
Paradoxically, what happened in Chile was historically analogous to the
destruction of the welfare state in the Weimar Republic in Germany. From the
point of view of legal doctrine, it is interesting to note how the state intervenes in
order not to intervene and how economic liberalism or neoliberalism reideologizes the legal system and dismantles the very foundations of legal
liberalism, the foundations of positivism and the Rule of law, essential to the legal
and political regime they historically constructed.
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CONCLUSION
" Art is politics. Everything is politics"
Ali Weiwei

It was only as I finished this research, and really only as I wrote the last
lines, thanks to my supervisors’ valuable criticisms to clarify my arguments and
ideas and refine this dissertation, that I began to close the gap between what I
was saying and what I wanted to say. This process of analysis and—why not say
so, introspection—brought me into the past.
It was in January 1973 when, as a fresh graduate from the University of
Chile’s Law School and now a researcher at the Centre for Studies of the
National Reality (CEREN), affiliated with the Catholic University in Chile, I was
asked to participate in the Executive Committee for the International Seminar on
State and Law in a Period of Transformation.1 More than forty law professors,
judges, lawyers, intellectuals, members of parliament, ministers and academic
researchers from 10 countries were invited to deliver talks and papers to a large
audience of participants in the Seminar. Chile was going through a unique
political period and was engaged in an important debate on the roles of the state
and of law. Salvador Allende’s elected socialist government and the coalition of
parties that sustained it, Popular Unity, was trying to carry out a social and
economic revolution within the parameters of liberal democracy, current
legislation and a constitution that went back to 1925. This process was
1
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internationally known as “the Chilean road to socialism”, which was essentially a
“legal revolution”.
In this context, those of us who were intellectually associated with law and
politically involved in social and economic change could no longer only theorize
about law and the state. We were obligated, by the country’s historical
circumstances, to address the fundamental problems of the legal and institutional
structure. Questions about the law as a guarantor of the status quo and about the
state as a reflection of material conditions were not enough. There was a
theoretical and legal gap to be addressed, with no historical precedents for our
experience. We were learning how to understand, or perhaps to invent, the
institutional order as a process and synthesis of modern society.2 Our theoretical
relationship with law was challenged by politics and by the interaction between
politics and law. We learned that these dynamics were essential for
understanding law in terms of its creation, its role and its representation.
Months after the International Seminar, the government was overthrown in
the military coup, which in addition to the known atrocities committed in violation
of human rights, was not only illegitimate but illegal. In a matter of mere days it
wiped out five decades of legal institutions, repealing the constitution and taking
constitutional power away from the citizens to submit it to a junta of three

2
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generals and an admiral. As Cicerón had said, without a constitution, not only are
there bad governments, but also law and the state disappear.3
I have provided explanation of how economic and political variables have
shaped different legal changes in the Chilean health system, one that has
experienced substantial transformations in health legislation. I have explored how
the law and the legal system are embedded in the transformations of the health
sphere and analyzed legislation as the outcome of the interface between different
stakeholders in the political, ideological and economic process of lawmaking. To
sum up, through this case study, I have studied how lawmaking as an expression
of politics and as the outcome of processes of negotiation can both maintain the
social and political order and be instrumental in promoting social change. In
doing this study, I have learned once again that law cannot be invented, nor
theorized, nor applied, in abstraction from politics.
This dissertation allowed me to deepen the interdisciplinarity of my
research activities. My initial training in law, which continued in sociology and
then the political economics of health care, has thus returned to law. It has
allowed me to branch out into socio-legal studies and make a contribution to
knowledge from this perspective, according to which not only can the law not
disregard the society in which it is embedded, but it must be understood as
closely related both to society and to its history.
3
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Interdisciplinary

research

presents

difficulties

characteristic

of

contemporary scientific research and its growing specialization, which can limit
the understanding of social phenomena. This research, which builds on my
interest in interdisciplinary analyses in the social sciences, also allows me to
reflect on the importance of investigating the theoretical and epistemological
needs of this interdisciplinarity. This undoubtedly entails difficulties, especially
since, unlike in the exact sciences, which develop out of dominant or hegemonic
paradigms, various paradigms coexist in the social sciences.
This is why further epistemological reflection seems to be increasingly
important for developing and legitimating theoretical discourse and developing
interdisciplinary syntheses. This interpretation is especially interesting in terms of
health care, in a context in which health care systems worldwide are
experiencing confounding dilemmas that critically impact both private and public
health sectors, making them unsustainable in the face of the significant financial
impacts of chronic diseases that accompany an aging population, high demand
for pharmaceuticals, and the lack of affordable specialized technology.
Attempting to contribute to research from a kaleidoscopic perspective –
analyzing and trying to understand reality in a comprehensive way and at the
same time understand its movement and see it from different perspectives – is a
significant epistemological challenge. Personally, in the legal field I am interested
in further exploring the epistemology of law and globalization, law and politics in
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21st-century society and legal pluralism. In the field of health, I wish to pursue
research on health care systems and the paradigmatic crises for envisioning the
future, requiring us to build knowledge from an interdisciplinary perspective
develop a comprehensive analysis of the relationships between health, political
economy and epistemology and how they impact the design of health policies,
and identify alternative options for emerging health paradigm.
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